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Foreword
For many of the 232 million people around the world who live outside their 
country of birth today, migration means the opportunity for a better life for 
themselves and their families. Yet, for many others, the search for such an 
opportunity comes at an extremely high cost, as they face unimaginable and 
often fatal dangers along their journeys. Some are ready to spend their lifetime 
savings or take on massive debts and risk their lives and the lives of their families 
for a new start. Death is a risk worth taking in desperate situations of violence, 
persecution, famine or even absence of prospects of a decent life.
One year ago, the world watched in horror when some 360 migrants lost their 
lives in the attempt to swim to the shores of the Italian island of Lampedusa. 
Regrettably, the horror seems endless: up to 500 migrants met their death at 
sea off Malta just a few weeks before this report was published. Two survivors 
reported that smugglers deliberately rammed and sunk their ship when migrants 
refused to board a less seaworthy vessel, after having been forced to switch boats 
at sea many times on their journey from Egypt. Two weeks after the incident, 
there were only 11 identified survivors; witnesses reported that as many as 100 
children were on board. 
These tragedies in the Mediterranean are but two examples of the many migrant 
tragedies unfolding all over the world. Hundreds perish every year on the 
journey from Central America to the United States through Mexico, under the 
desert sun or robbed and beaten along the way; migrants drown on their way 
from Indonesia to Australia, or off the coast of Thailand and in the Bay of Bengal; 
migrants die of thirst crossing the Sahara Desert into North Africa, or drown in 
the Gulf of Aden as they try to reach the Middle East. In many of these cases, 
migrants often disappear and die without a trace. 
The paradox is that at a time when one in seven people around the world are 
migrants in one form or another, we are seeing a harsh response to migration 
in the developed world. Limited opportunities for safe and regular migration 
drives would-be migrants into the hands of smugglers, feeding an unscrupulous 
trade that threatens the lives of desperate people. We need to put an end to 
this cycle. Undocumented migrants are not criminals, but human beings in need 
of protection and assistance, entitled to legal assistance, and deserving respect.
I have repeatedly emphasized the need for smarter policies to end the horror of 
migrant deaths, and particularly “practical protection” measures to guarantee 
safe and regular ways for migrants to reach their destinations. Collecting and 
presenting information about who these migrants are, where they come from 
and why they move is the first indispensable step to understanding this global 
tragedy and designing evidence-based, effective policy responses and practical 
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protection measures to prevent further loss of life. In providing the first global 
count of migrant fatalities and recommendations for better data collection, 
this report aims to catalyze a prompt and unified response from all parties 
concerned with this tragedy – governments, international organizations, civil 
society, companies and the scholarly community. The time is now, and we are 
already late .
William Lacy Swing 
Director General
Foreword
Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration
7
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank all contributing authors for their dedication to this 
project, and are grateful to many for their assistance in the production of this 
publication. We would particularly like to thank Marzia Rango for her invaluable 
support, as well as  Denis Kierans and Emma Eggink. We would also like to thank 
IOM colleagues in Rome, particularly Flavio Di Giacomo and Simona Moscarelli, 
as well as Martine Cassar from IOM Malta. Much thanks to Leonard Doyle and 
Joel Millman and the Media and Communications Division in Geneva, as well as 
colleagues in IOM Headquarters, Mexico, Australia and Egypt for their assistance 
with the revision of the content. Special thanks are also extended to Stefanie 
Grant for her advice, and Christopher Horwood and Marg Hutton for their 
contributions. This publication would not have been possible without the hard 
work of the IOM Publications team, based in Manila and Geneva and headed 
by Valerie Hagger. Finally, we are grateful to IOM Director General, William Lacy 
Swing, for his commitment to this publication and to the issue of migrant deaths 
more broadly.

Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration
9
List of Tables and Figures
Table 1.1:  Regional estimates of migrant border-related deaths  
compiled by various sources, available years  
between 1996 and 2014 ............................................................. 24
Table 2.1:  PCOME deaths coded as undocumented border crossers by 
country of origin among identified decedents,  
fiscal year 1990–2013 ................................................................. 62
Table 5.1:  Migrants recorded as dead or missing at sea,  
from 2006 to May 2014 ............................................................ 153
Table 6.1:  Known deaths related to Australian border controls,  
January 2000–July 2014 ............................................................ 187
Figure 1.1: Migrant border-related deaths around the world,  
January–September 2014  .......................................................... 18
Figure 1.2:  Regions in which migrant deaths occurred,  
January–September 2014  .......................................................... 20
Figure 1.3:  Deaths by migrants’ region of origin,  
January–September 2014  .......................................................... 25
Figure 1.4:  Deaths in the Mediterranean by migrants’ region of origin,  
January–September 2014 ........................................................... 26
Figure 1.5:  Available information on sex of deceased and missing migrants 
globally, January–September 2014  ............................................ 28
Figure 2.1: Migratory flows from and through Mexico  
to the United States south-western border ................................ 48
Figure 2.2:  Migrant deaths recorded by the United States Border Patrol 
relative to apprehensions on the sout h-western border,  
fiscal year 1998–2013 ................................................................. 54
Figure 2.3:  Migrant deaths recorded by the United States Border Patrol  
per 100,000 apprehensions on the south-western border,  
fiscal year 1998–2013 ................................................................. 55
Figure 2.4:  Migrant deaths recorded by the United States Border Patrol  
by sector, fiscal year 1998–2013 ................................................. 56
Figure 2.5:  California migrant death estimates by data source  
(excluding Yuma area), 1993–2013 ............................................. 57
Figure 2.6:  Deaths recorded by the Pima County Office  
of the Medical Examiner in Tucson, Arizona ............................... 59
Figure 2.7:  Arizona migrant death estimates by data source  
(excluding Yuma area), 1990–2013 ............................................. 60
Figure 2.8:  Texas migrant death estimates by data source  
(including El Paso area), 1993–2013 ........................................... 64
Figure 2.9:  Migrant death estimates by state (excluding Yuma area),  
1990–2013 .................................................................................. 67
10
Figure 2.10:  Approximate migrant death rate by state  
(excluding Yuma area), 1990–2013 ............................................. 68
Figure 3.1: Detections of illegal border crossing along selected routes  
of entry into southern EU and main nationalities  
detected on these routes, 2013 .................................................. 87
Figure 3.2:  Fluctuations in popularity of routes to Europe, 2009–2013 ....... 88
Figure 3.3:  Detections of illegal border crossing along EU external land  
and sea borders by nationality, 2013 .......................................... 89
Figure 3.4: Comparison of UNITED and Fortress Europe lists  
of border deaths in the Mediterranean, 1993–2011 .................. 93
Figure 3.5:  Border deaths between Africa and Spain – comparison of 
datasets, 1988–2014 ................................................................... 95
Figure 4.1:  Migratory routes from Sub-Saharan Africa ............................... 110
Figure 5.1:  Migratory routes in the Horn of Africa...................................... 139
Figure 6.1:  Number of offshore and onshore visas granted  
under Australia’s humanitarian visa programme,  
2003–2013 ................................................................................ 179
Figure 6.2:  Number of people arriving in Australia  
on unauthorized boats, 1 January 1990–30 June 2013 ............ 179
Figure 6.3:  Migrant smuggling routes to Australia   .................................... 180
Figure 6.4:  Year-by-year deaths during irregular journeys to Australia, 
January 2000–July 2014 ............................................................ 187
Figure 6.5:  Nationalities of asylum-seekers who died  
en route to Australia, January 2000–July 2014 ......................... 188
Figure 6.6:  Region of origin of asylum-seekers who died  
en route to Australia, January 2000–July 2014 ......................... 189
Figure 6.7:  Year-by-year deaths of asylum-seekers  
en route to Australia by sex, January 2000–May 2014  ............ 190
List of Tables and Figures
Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration
11
Executive Summary
In October 2013, 366 migrants died when their boat caught fire and sank off the 
coast of Lampedusa. Less than a year later, the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) reported that 500 migrants were feared dead after their ship 
was rammed by another boat near Malta. News of this sinking emerged as an 
additional ship carrying 200 people sank off the coast of Libya. Sadly, these are 
not isolated incidents. In 2014, up to 3,072 migrants are believed to have died 
in the Mediterranean, compared with an estimate of 700 in 2013. Globally, IOM 
estimates that at least 4,077 migrants died in 2014, and at least 40,000 since the 
year 2000. The true number of fatalities is likely to be higher, as many deaths 
occur in remote regions of the world and are never recorded. Some experts have 
suggested that for every dead body discovered, there are at least two others 
that are never recovered.
This report examines how data on migrant deaths is collected and shared in 
different parts of the world. The study shows that no organization at the global 
level is currently responsible for systematically monitoring the number of deaths 
that occur. Data tends to be scattered, with a range of organizations involved 
in tracking fatalities and often employing different definitions of border-
related death. Most available information comes from media reports and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but this data can be incomplete. For 
example, the media tend to cover larger-scale incidents, while cases involving 
smaller numbers of migrant deaths might not be considered newsworthy. There 
are few detailed statistics, because collecting data on migrant deaths has not 
been a priority for most governments around the world. Although vast sums 
of money are spent collecting migration and border control data, very few 
governments collect and publish data on migrant deaths.  
The study carefully reviews existing sources of data and shows that there are 
huge gaps in our knowledge. Relatively little is known about the migrants who 
perish. In the case of tragedies at sea, the majority of bodies are often never 
found. As many migrants are undocumented, often relatively little is known 
about their identities, even for those whose bodies are recovered. In 2014, 
nearly 70 per cent of deaths recorded by IOM refer to migrants who are missing, 
usually at sea. In the majority of fatalities occurring in 2014, it was not possible 
to establish whether the deceased were male or female. Information on region 
of origin suggests that the majority of migrants who lost their lives in 2014 were 
from Africa and the Middle East. The report also shows that for some regions of 
the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa, reliable information is often extremely 
scarce, as NGOs, media and governments are not tracking migrant deaths.
Additionally, the study finds important differences in death trends across regions. 
Although methods of counting vary, over the last 20 years Europe appears to 
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have the highest figures for reported deaths. Since the year 2000, over 22,000 
migrants have lost their lives trying to reach Europe. Between 1996 and 2013, at 
least 1,790 migrants died while attempting to cross the Sahara. Since 1998, more 
than 6,000 migrants have died trying to cross the United States–Mexico border, 
according to the United States Border Patrol. In Australia, the Border Crossing 
Observatory of Monash University suggests that nearly 1,500 migrants died on 
their journey to Australia between 2000 and 2014. 
Over the last year, the increase in deaths has largely been driven by a surge in 
the number of fatalities in the Mediterranean region. Why this is occurring is not 
entirely clear, but likely reflects a dramatic increase in the number of migrants 
trying to reach Europe. Over 112,000 irregular migrants were detected by Italian 
authorities in the first eight months of 2014, almost three times as many as in all 
of 2013. Many are fleeing conflict, persecution and poverty, with Eritreans and 
Syrians constituting the largest share of arrivals in Italy this year. The deteriorating 
security situation in Libya, where many migrants reside prior to their departure 
for Europe, has also increased migration pressures. In response to the high flows 
across the Mediterranean, policy has prioritized search and rescue, with tens of 
thousands of lives saved this year. In contrast to the Mediterranean, some parts 
of the world have actually seen a decrease in the number of deaths over the 
last year. For instance, along the United States–Mexico border, it appears that 
deaths have declined between 2013 and 2014.
Determining the link between changes in border enforcement policies and 
the number of migrant deaths is not straightforward. A 2006 US Government 
Accountability Office report found that a range of factors may affect the number 
of deaths, including changes in the volume of border crossings, variations in 
the locations where migrants attempt to cross the border, and fluctuations in 
weather patterns. 
How can we address the challenge of migrant border-related deaths? Many 
different policy options have been discussed over the years, from tougher 
sanctions against smugglers and traffickers, to the creation of more safe and 
orderly channels for migration, including increasing refugee resettlement quotas. 
Better data on migrant deaths is a crucial element to both inform and monitor 
the impacts of any policy response. When death occurs on such a massive scale, 
there is a responsibility to fully investigate the causes of such tragedies. There 
have been many calls in recent years for better data to help identify and account 
for the thousands of “missing migrants,” but relatively little action has been 
taken to address this problem.
This report concludes with a series of key recommendations on ways in which 
data can be improved in the future. This is not only a primary step in efforts to 
reduce the number of migrant deaths, but is essential to allow families to know 
the fate of their missing relatives. 
Executive Summary
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Key recommendations:
• An independent monitoring body should be established with representatives 
of governments, civil society and international organizations to promote the 
collection, harmonization and analysis of data on migrant deaths globally. 
Currently, varying methodologies and definitions hinder comparability 
between regions and even within national contexts. IOM’s Missing Migrants 
Project, which collects data on migrant deaths globally, could act to coordinate 
this new initiative.
• At the national level, governments should be encouraged to take greater 
responsibility for collecting data on migrant deaths, in partnership with 
civil society organizations to ensure transparency and accountability. While 
methods of data collection should be improved, governments may also utilize 
existing data, such as that contained in death records and coroners’ reports. 
Survivors, who often have a great deal of information about smuggling 
operations, as well as relatives of the deceased should also be encouraged 
to speak out and share information without fear of sanctions in order to help 
prevent further tragedies.
• Innovative data initiatives should be promoted and shared more widely. 
For example, a partnership between medical examiners’ offices and human 
rights groups in Arizona has resulted in the creation of the Arizona OpenGIS 
Initiative for Deceased Migrants, an online mapping tool that allows anyone 
to search the hundreds of known deaths of migrants in parts of the State 
since 2001. Such a tool allows for changes in migrant routes to be tracked 
over time, and can help humanitarian assistance along routes to be better 
targeted. 
Finally, behind the statistics we should not forget that these are stories of human 
tragedy involving very vulnerable people. One example reminds us of the risks 
that migrants face:
“After around one week of walking in the desert, during which some people 
died of starvation, we reached Tajoor Mountain, where we stopped in order to 
have a rest. I was looking around me, I found some people dying, some were 
sleeping, and others were crying and asking for water or food. I was walking 
among people laying down, looking at them and thinking they were staring 
at me, but no answer from their side. There I realized I was going through a 
journey of death.” (Testimony of a 15-year-old Ethiopian boy in 2012)1
1  DRC and RMMS, Desperate Choices: Conditions, Risks & Protection Failures Affecting Ethiopian Migrants in 
Yemen (Nairobi, DRC and RMMS, 2012).
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Tara Brian and Frank Laczko1 
1.1 Introduction
On 3 October 2013, over 360 people lost their lives travelling from Libya to 
Lampedusa, Italy, when their boat sank just a quarter-mile from its destination. 
With roughly 500 passengers jammed into a 20-metre-long boat, efforts to attract 
attention following engine trouble led to a fire that engulfed the ship in flames. 
Survivors tell horrifying stories of hours spent in the sea as their companions 
died around them. A second shipwreck near Lampedusa later in the month 
resulted in a further 34 deaths. While these events are tragic and alarming, they 
are not isolated incidents. IOM estimates that between January and September 
2014, at least 4,077 migrants died attempting to reach destinations around the 
world. This figure is nearly 70 per cent higher than the 2,400 deaths recorded 
for the whole of 2013, largely driven by increases in the Mediterranean region.2 
Since year 2000, IOM estimates that at least 40,000 migrants have died. 
While significant, these global figures still fail to capture the true number of 
fatalities. Many migrant deaths occur in remote regions of the world and are 
never recorded. In some cases boats and all their passengers disappear at sea 
and no deaths are reported. Some experts estimate that for every dead body 
found on the shores of the developed world there are at least two others that 
are never recovered (Weber and Pickering, 2011).
Despite the recognition among States, international organizations and civil society 
organizations that action must be taken to stop more unnecessary deaths, as yet 
there remains little information on the scale of the problem, and no organization 
* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM).
1 Tara Brian is a Research Officer with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Frank Laczko is 
the Head of the Migration Research Division of IOM based in Geneva, Switzerland. 
2 Figures correspond to deaths that occurred at the physical borders of States or during migration towards an 
international destination. They exclude deaths that occur once in a destination country that can be indirectly 
attributable to immigration policies, such those occurring in detention facilities, during deportation, or 
on forced return to a migrant’s homeland. Figures include both confirmed dead and people missing and 
presumed dead, generally at sea. Often numbers of missing are estimates, sometimes rough ones, as total 
passenger counts are rarely known. These figures include only deaths that are reported; countless others 
occur in remote areas and are simply not known of. Thus, estimates represent a base minimum of the true 
global count. In some cases, estimates were compiled based on extrapolation from partial data. For 2014, 
United States–Mexico border deaths are estimated based on available data for Pima County, Arizona and 
Brooks County, Texas, which cover the majority of the Tucson and Laredo sectors, respectively.
Counting Migrant Deaths: 
An International OverviewChapter 1 
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is tasked with monitoring deaths globally. Data on the number of migrant deaths is 
scattered, and in some areas almost non-existent. The vast majority of governments 
do not publish numbers of deaths, and counting the lives lost is largely left to civil 
society and the media. 
Drawing on a wide range of sources from different regions of the world, this report 
investigates how border-related deaths are documented, who is documenting 
them and what can be done to improve the evidence-base to encourage informed 
policy and practice. Not only can better record keeping draw greater attention 
to this issue, but obtaining reliable data on border-related deaths is an essential 
starting point for any discussion on how to prevent such tragedies from occurring 
in the future. 
1.2  International policy context and geography 
of deaths 
The issue of border-related deaths is currently at the centre of heated political 
and humanitarian debates. Many argue that there is a high “human cost” 
associated with the border control policies of many States. It is asserted that 
deaths have increased as migrants seek to move clandestinely and along 
more treacherous routes in response to tighter immigration controls.3 In turn, 
migrants are compelled to use the services of smugglers to help facilitate 
these more treacherous journeys and bypass strict entry requirements, a trend 
which creates a new set of risks and often leaves migrants vulnerable to abuse, 
extortion, and even death (UNODC, 2011).4 The irregularity of this migration 
means processes are largely hidden from the auspices of, and thus protection 
afforded by, the State, creating a space for the involvement of other criminal 
actors seeking to profit from an increasingly commercialized migratory process. 
Another perspective, however, contends that strict immigration policies actually 
reduce deaths by discouraging migrants from risking their lives on dangerous 
journeys in the first place. Making potential migrants aware of the risks of the 
journey and realities once reaching their destination is seen as a way to curb 
irregular flows that can result in death. However, the issue of migrant deaths 
extends deeper, raising questions concerning the responsibility of States to 
accommodate those fleeing poverty and persecution in their homelands.
Perspectives also differ with respect to what measures should be taken to reduce 
the risk of loss of life. Some believe that the situation should be seen from a 
humanitarian perspective, with the top concern to respect the right to life of 
3 See, for instance: T. Spijkerboer, “The human costs of border control, European Journal of Migration and 
Law (2007); Rubio-Goldsmith et al., The “Funnel Effect” and Recovered Bodies of Unauthorized Migrants 
Processed by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, 1990–2005 (2006); M. Jimenez, Humanitarian 
Crisis: Migrant Deaths at the U.S.-Mexico Border (2009); among many others. 
4 For instance, for a discussion on the United States–Mexico border, see P. Andreas, “The transformation of 
migrant smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico Border, in: Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives, 
Second Edition (D. Kyle and R. Koslowski, eds.) (2011). 
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all people. From this perspective, rescue should be the number one priority. It 
is also often argued that fewer migrants would risk death if more legal channels 
for migration existed. A competing view stresses that policies focusing on search 
and rescue encourage more migrants to make dangerous journeys and permit 
smugglers and traffickers to profit even more from irregular migration. 
While views may differ on how best to limit the number of migrant deaths, 
there is broad agreement on the need for better data. Fundamental information 
surrounding deaths is a necessary starting point from which to trace the impacts 
of policies and practices and to guide more effective interventions. Currently the 
scattered and ad hoc nature of much of the data on migrant deaths is detrimental 
to constructive debate. 
Particularly in recent years, media attention to the issue of migrant deaths has 
largely focused on Southern Europe, North America and Australia. In addition to 
these more “visible” boundaries between the Global North and the Global South, 
migrants are dying in numerous locations around the world, very often without 
their stories ever making headlines. Some of these areas include routes out of 
the Horn of Africa – either to the Gulf (via Yemen to Saudi Arabia); northwards 
through Sudan to the northern coast of Africa, or southwards towards South 
Africa, both treacherous routes that can involve crossing deserts, mountains 
and lakes, often passing through remote areas chosen with the aim of avoiding 
detection. Malicious actions of smugglers, traffickers and other criminals also 
contribute to deaths that remain hidden for the most part, except for in the 
horrifying accounts of survivors. 
Routes from Western and Central Africa to the Canary Islands and to North Africa 
are also fraught with dangers, and based on the accounts of migrants who have 
made these journeys, death is not uncommon. However, the shifting sands of 
the desert quickly hide remains that are often not seen again. Since 2012, nearly 
100,000 people are estimated to have risked their lives to cross the Bay of Bengal 
and the Andaman Sea to reach Thailand, en route to Malaysia (UNHCR, 2014b). 
The (Office of the) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
estimates that over 1,500 have lost their lives during this journey between 
2012 and the first half of 2014 (UNHCR, 2014a; UNHCR, 2014b). The mountains 
between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey present a daunting challenge for 
Afghans crossing overland to Greece, from where most hope to continue farther 
into Europe, although this is often not possible. With land borders increasingly 
sealed along both the Greece–Turkey and Bulgaria–Turkey borders, a growing 
number of migrants and asylum-seekers are attempting the more dangerous sea 
crossings to the islands of Greece (see Amnesty International, 2014). 
In addition to the routes mentioned above, numerous other rivers, mountain 
ranges, seas and deserts cost migrants and asylum-seekers their lives. Too 
frequently, journeys involve violence, abuse, torture, extortion and malpractice 
at the hands of criminals and corrupt officials, which can also result in death.
Chapter 1 Migrant Deaths: An International Overview
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1.3  How many have died? Statistics on migrant 
border-related fatalities 
Figure 1.1: Migrant border-related deaths around the world,  
January–September 2014a 
Source: IOM calculations based on various sources including media reports, information gathered by IOM 
Field Offices, data from medical examiner offices and UNHCR. 
Notes: (a) Figures correspond to deaths that occurred at the physical borders of States or during migration 
towards an international destination. They exclude deaths that occur once in a destination country 
that can be indirectly attributable to immigration policies, such those occurring in detention facilities, 
during deportation, or on forced return to a migrant’s homeland. Figures include both confirmed dead 
and people missing and presumed dead, generally at sea. Often numbers of missing are estimates, 
sometimes rough ones, as total passenger counts are rarely known. These figures include only deaths 
that are reported; countless others occur in remote areas and are not known of. Thus, estimates 
represent a base minimum of the true global count. In some cases, estimates were compiled based 
on extrapolation from partial data. United States–Mexico border deaths are estimated based on 
available data for Pima County, Arizona and Brooks County, Texas, which cover the majority of the 
Tucson and Laredo sectors, respectively. 
 (b) This refers to deaths that occurred in Europe other than the Mediterranean (7) and India (1). It 
should be noted that likely several hundred deaths of migrants are occurring in Central America each 
year. However, current data sources are patchy at best and do not provide sufficient information to 
distinguish whether deaths are related to the process of migration or due to unrelated causes while 
residing in a country (see note a). According to diplomatic sources, from January to August 2014, 64 
bodies of deceased Salvadorans were repatriated by the El Salvador Consulate in Mexico. However, it 
is not possible to determine if deaths occurred during transit.
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1.3.1  Challenges concerning comparability
Over the past two decades, various organizations have been working to track 
migrant fatalities in regions known for high irregular migration flows and 
dangerous border crossings, including the southern border of the European 
Union (EU), South-East Asia/Australia and the United States–Mexico border 
region. Various organizations also report on deaths in other areas, such as 
crossings of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Many groups collecting data use 
media as a principal source and quality of information varies by region, with 
some sources offering detailed information on each recorded death, and others 
only able to provide rough estimates with little demographic background on 
the deceased. In some cases, what is known is anecdotal and not compiled 
or analysed systematically. Furthermore, definitions of what is counted can 
vary. Some statistics are based on bodies found near the vicinity of the border, 
while others include both bodies found and reports, generally of survivors, of 
numbers missing and presumed dead, often the case when counting deaths 
at sea. Complicating comparisons between sources still further, there is no 
internationally standardized definition of what constitutes a “border-related 
death.” Some organizations count only deaths occurring at external borders of 
States, while others include deaths that occur once in the destination or transit 
country that can be directly or indirectly attributed to the border control regime, 
such as deaths of persons in detention. For the purposes of this report, figures 
compiled by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) correspond to 
to deaths that occurred at the physical borders of States or during migration 
towards an international destination. Given various methodologies, as well as 
differing levels of completeness and reliability of data, it is difficult to compare 
data across countries and regions. 
It should also be noted that estimates of migrant deaths include only those cases 
that are reported, generally by media, government authorities or international 
organizations. Given that large numbers of deaths occur in remote areas and 
many are not known of, figures underestimate the extent of migrant fatalities. 
Furthermore, because of the varying quality and comprehensiveness of data by 
region, attempts to estimate deaths globally may underrepresent numbers in 
certain regions, thus exaggerating the share of deaths that occur in others. With 
these limitations in mind, it is possible to suggest several key findings and trends. 
Chapter 1 Migrant Deaths: An International Overview
20
Where are deaths occurring? 
Figure 1.2:  Regions in which migrant deaths occurred,  
January–September 2014 
Source: IOM’s own calculations based on data from various sources. See footnote 2.
Notes: (a) Generally, regions correspond with UN classifications of regions. 
 (b)  East Africa excludes the Horn of Africa. 
 (c) Deaths occurring while trying to reach Spanish enclaves are included in totals for the Mediterranean. 
(d)  North America refers to deaths along the United States–Mexico border.
Mediterranean
Based on the data compiled by IOM, the large majority of deaths in 2014 
occurred in the Mediterranean, accounting for an estimated 75 per cent (3,072) 
of all deaths this year, making it the deadliest sea in the world for migrants (see 
Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2).5 When looking at numbers compiled over time, at 
least 22,400 people are estimated to have lost their lives trying to reach Europe 
since 2000 (IOM calculation based on The Migrants Files data).6 This means 
on average nearly 1,500 migrants died each year during this period. Based on 
available data, 2014 represents the deadliest year in this time period, with more 
than twice as many deaths occurring in the first nine months of the year than 
took place during the Arab Spring of 2011 when an estimated 1,500 lost their 
lives crossing the Mediterranean (UNHCR, 2012). The figure is almost five times 
5 The high share of deaths in the Mediterranean is likely in part due to the availability of better data for this 
region.
6 Estimate calculated using data compiled by The Migrants Files and enhanced with IOM 2014 data where 
needed. This figure includes deaths near European external land and sea borders. While The Migrants Files 
includes deaths that occur within Europe due to conditions in detention, efforts of irregular migrants to 
evade detection, and at times even death following return to origin countries, this count excludes such 
cases, focusing only on deaths occurring at external borders. Furthermore, The Migrants Files includes data 
on deaths in the Sahara and other areas of Africa when migrants are presumed to be en route to Europe. 
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higher than the 630 migrants who are estimated to have died or gone missing 
in the Mediterranean in 2007, the peak number prior to 2011 (ibid.). Deaths in 
recent months have reached devastating levels, with the most deadly shipwreck 
claiming an estimated 500 lives in early September (IOM, 2014).
In comparison, about 100 lives a year, on average, have been lost in the seas 
bordering Australia since 2000, although the numbers dropped significantly in 
2014 (see Chapter 6). In the United States, between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal 
year 2013, a total of 6,029 deceased migrants were found on the US side of the 
border with Mexico, which is approximately 377 persons per year over a 16-year 
period (see Chapter 2). 
The reasons for these differences have not been fully investigated, but the jump 
in numbers of fatalities in the Mediterranean this year likely reflects a dramatic 
increase in the numbers of migrants trying to reach Europe. In 2014 numbers 
have spiked, with over 112,000 arrivals by sea of irregular migrants reported 
by the Italian authorities in just the first eight months of the year (information 
obtained from the Italian Ministry of Interior), almost three times as many as in 
the entire year of 2013. Many are fleeing conflict, persecution and poverty, with 
Eritreans and Syrians constituting the largest share of arrivals in Italy this year. 
The deteriorating security situation in Libya, where many migrants reside prior 
to their departure for Europe, has also increased migration pressures. 
Africa
Estimates of numbers of sub-Saharan migrants who die while trying to reach 
northern Africa – either with the ultimate goal of continuing on to Europe 
or of remaining to work in Libya and other countries in the region – are very 
hazy. According to the blog Fortress Europe, since 1996 at least 1,790 migrants 
have perished crossing the Sahara, although it is acknowledged that this 
underestimates the true number (see Table 1.1). Data compiled by IOM suggest 
only 1.4 per cent of deaths in the first nine months of 2014 occurred in the 
Sahara (see Figure 1.2); however, this estimate is hampered by lack of available 
data and certainly does not include all the lives lost through migration in the 
region. Testimonies of migrants who have journeyed through the Sahara indicate 
the prevalence of death along this route. 
Knowledge is more complete regarding flows of migrants from the Horn of 
Africa who cross the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea to the shores of Yemen. About 
195 migrants have been known to die or go missing while making the crossing 
from 2010 to 2013 (UNHCR, 2013), and already in 2014 over 120 migrants 
have lost their lives in several large incidents (IOM estimate), comprising an 
estimated 3 per cent of deaths globally (see Figure 1.2). Numbers for 2014 are 
up considerably from 2013 and 2012, although they remain far lower than the 
peak in 2007 when deaths topped 1,000 (UNHCR, 2007). While deaths occurring 
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at sea are relatively well monitored, migrants who die while crossing overland to 
reach the sea, or en route to northern or southern Africa are often not reported. 
In 2014, a small number of deaths were recorded in the Sudanese-Libyan desert 
during the journey northwards, but certainly more deaths take place that are 
not known of. 
South-East Asia and Australia
According to the Australian Border Deaths Database, nearly 1,500 border-related 
deaths occurred between January 2000 and September 2014 (see Table 1.1). The 
number of deaths has dropped significantly this year, down from 214 in 2013 to 
less than a handful of cases (see Australian Border Deaths Database). In the Bay 
of Bengal, irregular maritime movements started gaining momentum in 2006, 
but increased dramatically in the aftermath of sectarian unrest in June 2012. 
UNHCR estimated that of the approximately 55,000 people who attempted to 
cross the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea in 2013, over 600 lost their lives 
(UNHCR, 2014a), and more than 200 are estimated to have died in the first half 
of 2014 (UNHCR, 2014b). Of all deaths occurring in South-East Asia in 2014 
captured by IOM, those in the Bay of Bengal amount to roughly three quarters. 
Central and North America
Along the border between the United States and Mexico, the harsh conditions of 
the arduous desert trek lead to hundreds of deaths each year and IOM estimates 
that between January and September of 2014 deaths along the border accounted 
for roughly 6 per cent of migrant deaths around the world (see Figure 1.2). The 
United States Border Patrol estimated that 445 died in the 2013 fiscal year,7 
slightly lower than numbers from the year before. Since 1998, when the Border 
Patrol started publishing data on deaths, they have recorded 6,029 lives lost (US 
Customs and Border Protection, 2013), with an average of approximately 400 
migrants dying every year since 2000 (see Table 1.1). Civil society organizations 
and researchers, however, suggest these numbers may underestimate the actual 
death toll at the border. 
While numbers from fiscal year 2014 had not been compiled at the time of 
publication, existing data for 2014 suggest a decline in deaths from the previous 
fiscal year; however, complete numbers take time to compile as remains may not 
be found for months or years (see Campoy, 2014). It remains to be seen if this 
is a trend that will continue. Declines may be in part due to increased patrolling 
and improved surveillance technology and assistance mechanisms (ibid.). 
However, determining the link between changes in border enforcement policies 
and the number of migrant deaths is not straightforward. A US Government 
Accountability Office report (GAO, 2006) found that a range of factors may affect 
7 1 October 2012 through 30 September 2013. 
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the number of deaths, including changes in the volume of border crossings, 
variations in the locations where migrants attempt to cross the border, and 
fluctuations in weather patterns.
Still more migrants lose their lives transiting through Mexico, often due to 
the activities of criminal groups. Although various sources suggest migrants 
are dying in large numbers along this stretch of the migration route, the scale 
of deaths is challenging to enumerate. Mexican authorities have recovered 
remains in mass graves, including those of 72 migrants following a massacre 
on a remote ranch in 2010 (Tuckman, 2010). Roughly 11,000 migrants were 
reportedly kidnapped over a six month period in 2010, according to the National 
Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, cited in 
Amnesty International, 2012). In addition to criminal activities, reports of Central 
Americans perishing in rail accidents are common. For example, on 25 August 
2013, 11 Central American migrants were killed and many more were injured 
when the cargo train they were riding derailed in Tabasco (Government of the 
State of Tabasco, 2013). At least 250 Honduran migrants were aboard the train. 
As further indication of the scale of deaths, last year the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
of El Salvador repatriated from Mexico the remains of 99 migrants; through the 
first eight months of 2014, 64 bodies were returned home (information obtained 
from the Foreign Affairs Ministry of El Salvador). However, from this data is it not 
possible to distinguish whether deaths are related to the process of migration 
or due to unrelated causes while residing in Mexico. Less in number, but still of 
significant concern are deaths occurring in the Caribbean – estimated at 45 so 
far this year and nearly 200 over the past three years (see Table 1.1). 
Deaths throughout South America have not been prominent and very little 
information is known. Research into this region and others not covered in this 
report is warranted to determine the risks faced by irregular migrants and 
asylum-seekers, including that of death. 
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Table 1.1:  Regional estimates of migrant border-related deaths compiled by 
various sources, available years between 1996 and 2014
Region Number of 
deaths
Years Source
Sahara 1,790 1996–2013 Fortress Europe
United States–Mexico 
border




22,400 2000–2014 IOM based on The 
Migrants Files
Australian waters 1,495 2000–2014 Australian Border Deaths 
Database
Horn of Africa 3,104 2006–2014 UNHCR; IOM for 2014
Bay of Bengal 1,500–2,000 2012–2014 UNHCR; Arakan Project
Caribbean 188 2012–2014 UNHCR; IOM for 2014
Notes: (a) The definition of border-related death varies between sources; some count only deaths occurring 
at external borders, while others include deaths that occur once in the destination or transit country 
that can be directly or indirectly attributed to the border control regime. 
 (b) 2014 figures are until September 2014 (Bay of Bengal until June 2014). 
 (c) Figure for the United States–Mexico border is until 30 September 2013. 
1.3.2  Who is most at risk? 
Origin of migrants
We know relatively little about the socioeconomic profile of deceased migrants, 
and in many cases even basic demographic information is missing. Regarding 
data obtained by IOM for 2014, region of origin is unknown for roughly one in 
five of those who have died around the world, highlighting the need for improved 
data. Comprehensive data regarding identity and nationality of each of the 
deceased is a long way off in most regions. Only in some areas along the United 
States–Mexico border is data of sufficient quality to determine this information, 
where condition of remains allows. Even data on region of origin is based on 
incomplete information. The region of origin of deceased migrants, indicated in 
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 below, is at times inferred based on available information. 
For instance, when all survivors of a shipwreck originate in a certain region it 
may be assumed that those who perished where also from this area. Thus, while 
these Figures provides a sense of where migrants are coming from, information 
is approximate. According to IOM calculations, in 2014 the majority of migrants 
who died in transit – 65 per cent – came from Africa and the Middle East (see 
Figure 1.3). The majority of migrants originating in Africa and the Middle East die 
while crossing the Mediterranean. Those from the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) (936 or 23% of deaths globally) are largely Syrians, as well as Egyptians 
and Palestinians, crossing the Mediterranean to Europe. Similarly, the majority 
of sub-Saharan Africans captured in IOM’s data die at sea while travelling to 
Europe. 
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Figure 1.3:  Deaths by migrants’ region of origin, January–September 2014 
Source: IOM own calculations based on data from various sources. See footnote 2.
Notes: (a) Generally, regions correspond with UN divisions of regions. 
 (b) Sub-Saharan Africa excludes the Horn of Africa. The majority of deaths occurred while trying to 
reach Europe, although 251 died crossing Lake Albert between Uganda and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, and some incidents occurred in Southern Africa. 
 (c) South-East Asia includes Bangladesh and southern borders of China. 
 (d) Deaths listed in Central America refer to both cases in which the nationalities of the dead are 
confirmed and to those in which nationality is assumed. 
 (e) Most of the not specified/unknown are thought to be sub-Saharan Africans and Syrians. 
 (f) In several instances, the region of origin was extrapolated based on available information.
In 2014, those dying in the Mediterranean have tended to be from west and central 
sub-Saharan Africa; the Middle East and North Africa, with most originating in 
the Syrian Arab Republic, Occupied Palestinian Territory and Egypt; and the Horn 
of Africa (see Figure 1.4). The vast majority, estimated at about 75 per cent, 
die along the Central Mediterranean route from northern Africa (usually Libya) 
towards Italy and Malta (IOM estimate). Many are fleeing countries embroiled 
in conflict and known for widespread human rights abuses; in 2013, 63 per cent 
of all detections of irregular arrivals to Europe by sea were from the Syrian Arab 
Republic, Eritrea, Afghanistan and Somalia, with 46 per cent from the Syrian Arab 
Republic and Eritrea alone (Frontex, 2014a). Again in 2014 Eritreans and Syrians 
have been the most prominent nationalities, accounting for over 46 per cent of 
all sea arrivals in Italy in the first eight months of the year (information obtained 
from the Italian Ministry of Interior). Numbers of Palestinians attempting to 
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Figure 1.4:  Deaths in the Mediterranean by migrants’ region of origin, 
January–September 2014
Source: IOM calculations based on data compiled from various sources. See footnote 2. 
Notes: (a) Generally, regions correspond with UN classifications of regions. 
 (b) Deaths occurring while trying to reach Spanish enclaves are included in totals for the Mediterranean.
In addition to the Mediterranean, a small number sub-Saharan Africans have 
been known to die in southern Africa, while others have died in the deserts 
of the Sahara, and one large incident on Lake Albert claimed the lives of 251 
refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Because data are very poor 
in some regions such as in the Sahara and parts of Western and Central Africa, it 
is certainly possible that greater numbers of sub-Saharan Africans are dying and 
a larger share is doing so within Africa (as opposed to the Mediterranean) than 
we are aware of. 
In the first nine months of 2014, about 12 per cent (473) of migrants whose 
deaths have been recorded around the world are from the Horn of Africa (see 
Figure 1.3). The majority of these deaths have occurred in the Mediterranean, 
although boat journeys to Yemen have also resulted in significant numbers of 
deaths, with an estimate of just over one quarter (26%) of all deaths of Horn 
migrants occurring while crossing the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. This number 
represents a significant jump from 2013, when only 5 deaths were recorded, but 
remains well below peak numbers in 2007, when annual deaths topped 1,000 
(see Chapter 5 and UNHCR, 2013). A smaller number of migrants from the Horn 
of Africa are recorded dying in the desert travelling through Sudan to northern 
Africa, although as mentioned previously, data in this region are very poor and 
many deaths are not accounted for. 
Other groups most at risk include migrants and asylum-seekers from South-
East Asia, whose deaths account for an estimated 6 per cent of border-related 
fatalities globally, according to IOM calculations for 2014 (see Figure 1.3). The 
vast majority of these deaths occur within the region, with those in the Bay of 
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in the first six months of 2014 (UNHCR, 2014b). Other incidents this year have 
occurred near Indonesia and Malaysia, with victims mainly Indonesian. 
Central Americans are the main group dying along the United States–Mexico 
border, with the largest share coming from Mexico. For cases in which nationality 
could be determined, the vast majority of those who have died have been 
Mexican, accounting for 86 per cent of cases examined between 1990 and 2012 
by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner (PCOME) in Arizona (BMI, 
2013). Changes in place of origin can be seen over the past 15 years, with a 
growing share of non-Mexican Central Americans, and changes in the region of 
origin of Mexican migrants (ibid.). 
Less frequent but still of concern are deaths occurring in the Caribbean. Of deaths 
known to IOM in 2014, all have been Haitians and Dominicans who drowned 
while sailing towards Puerto Rico and Florida. Reports suggest elevated numbers 
of Cubans have also been migrating through irregular channels to Mexico this 
year (Reuters, 2014).
Sex of migrants and other basic data 
In a large number of cases, basic information about the identities of missing 
migrants and cause of death is simply unknown, even in regions with relatively 
good data. For example, in the United States records kept by the PCOME 
contain basic profiles of the deceased, location of death, time after death when 
remains are found, condition of body/remains when found, and cause of death. 
Nonetheless, in over one third of cases between 1990 and 2012, the identities 
of the deceased remain undetermined, and cause of death could not be 
established in 36 per cent of cases in this time period (BMI, 2013). Of deaths in 
2013, cause of death could not be determined for 63 per cent of cases, primarily 
due to the limitations of examination of decomposed remains (PCOME, 2014). In 
PCOME’s data, precise information on age is possible only for migrants who are 
identified. In cases involving rescue at sea, rough estimates of the average ages 
of the deceased may be possible based on the ages of survivors and survivors’ 
accounts, although what information does exist is not systematically recorded 
or published.  
Highlighting the paucity of detailed information on the deceased, in the data 
compiled by IOM information on sex of the deceased is not available for the 
majority of migrants who lost their lives in 2014. Of the estimated 4,077 deaths, 
data on sex is available for only 171 people. The limited information available, 
however, suggests that by far the majority of the deceased are male (138 out of 
171 cases) (see Figure 1.5). Deaths of males are also more likely when looking 
at data along the United States–Mexico border, although to a lesser extent. Of 
the 97 dead thus far in 2014 investigated by PCOME, 33 were identified as male 
and 4 as female (12%) (IOM calculation based on data from PCOME). Data over 
time support this finding – with females comprising an estimated 18 per cent 
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of cases examined by PCOME since 1990 (BMI, 2013).8 Significant changes in 
gender ratios have occurred over time, with females reaching an average of 23 
per cent of those examined by PCOME during the early 2000s and decreasing 
later in the decade (ibid.). Along the United States–Mexico border limitations on 
information concerning the deceased is generally due to the advanced state of 
decomposition of many of the bodies found. In contrast, when deaths occur at 
sea the high degree of missing information is primarily because bodies are not 
found and lists of missing passengers do not exist.  
Figure 1.5:  Available information on sex of deceased and missing migrants 
globally, January–September 2014 
Source: IOM own calculations based on data from various sources. See footnote 2. 
Research by Pickering and Cochrane (2013) examining the sex of migrants who 
died in Europe, Australia and the United States–Mexico border found that basic 
information, such as sex of the deceased, was unknown in 70 per cent of cases 
recorded in Europe and Australia. Data were particularly lacking in Europe, with 
information on sex of the deceased missing in 82 per cent of cases. In contrast, 
information on sex was missing for only 3 per cent of cases along the United 
States–Mexico border. This difference in availability of information is likely 
because data on the United States–Mexico border is obtained from medical 
examiners’ offices – meaning bodies were recoverable. With this missing 
information in mind, the researchers found 14 per cent of deaths in Europe 
could be identified as male as compared to 3 per cent female; 18 per cent were 
male versus 14 per cent identified as female in Australia; and 76 per cent male 
versus 21 per cent female along the United States–Mexico border (Pickering 
and Cochrane 2013:37). Building on this data, the researchers found that the 
cause of death for women was more likely to be drowning than it was for men 
when crossing to Europe or Australia. An examination of the sinking of the SIEV 
X in 2001 near West Java, which killed over 350 people, revealed that women 
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were more likely to die than men. Seventy-seven per cent of the men on board 
drowned, whereas 93 per cent of the women and 95 per cent of the children on 
the boat drowned (Pickering and Cochrane, 2013:41).
This brief comparison of deaths across regions and the profile of migrants at 
risk, suggests that there are significant differences in the absolute numbers 
of migrants dying in different parts of the world. It is not clear to what extent 
such differences can be explained by the higher scale of irregular migration in 
some regions – thus, not necessarily higher rates of death – better reporting of 
deaths, or policies that have been effective in lowering fatality rates. Available 
information can also provide some understanding on the sex and origin of 
migrants most at risk. As explained in the next section, there are still large gaps 
in information that limit our understanding of both the number and profile of 
migrants dying while in transit.
1.4  Challenges of collecting data on migrant deaths
1.4.1  Invisibility
There are inherent challenges involved in tracking the deaths of irregular 
migrants and even the best counts will have gaps. For one, the very nature 
of irregular travel – that the objective is to avoid detection – makes tracing 
deaths, and identifying bodies, extremely challenging. Even when the most 
“newsworthy” sinkings occur, often the number of passengers on board is 
unknown, making accurate estimates of deaths near impossible. Many who 
die do not carry identity documents. When migrants travel in groups, survivors 
who reach their destinations undetected may be afraid of reporting deaths of 
fellow travellers due to fear of apprehension by authorities. For similar reasons, 
families may not report missing relatives. In the case of migrants fleeing gang 
violence in Central America and Mexico, survivors may refrain from reporting 
deaths and disappearances for fear of retribution to family members remaining 
in origin countries (see Chapter 2). 
1.4.2  Remote topography and challenging environments 
In addition to the clandestine nature of irregular migration, the topography 
through which migrants travel, again the choice of routes being motivated by 
the desire to remain undetected, presents challenges for documenting deaths. 
For one, migrant trails often pass through remote areas, far from the eyes of 
the State and the media. The tough ecologies of land passages can mean that 
remains may be quickly destroyed by arid climates and wild animals, or may 
be lost in crevices or swept down rivers. Those remains that are found may 
be at such an advanced state of decomposition that even basic demographic 
information on the deceased is not possible (BMI, 2013; PCOME, 2014). In the 
sea, without an accurate count of passengers, finding the bodies of all those 
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who drown often does not occur, as hope of recovering survivors dwindles 
and the number of missing people is unknown. Often this is compounded by 
the fact that bodies may wash up on the shores of countries not involved in 
rescue efforts - thus, these deaths may be excluded from counts. Even in cases 
when missing boat passengers and overland migrants are reported, generally by 
surviving relatives, bodies are often never recovered. According to the Colibrí 
Center for Human Rights, which works to trace missing migrants, an estimated 
2,000 people are reported as missing along the United States–Mexico border. 
Countless others remain missing and are never reported. They are simply not 
heard of again, their remains lost in the sand, buried in unmarked graves or 
washed on remote shores. 
1.4.3  Missing information
In 2014, nearly 70 per cent of deaths recorded by IOM refer to migrants who 
are missing, mainly at sea. While it is generally presumed that those missing 
are dead, this is often impossible to verify, again complicating attempts to count 
deaths. Much of the information on deaths is from the testimonies of surviving 
migrants who give estimates of numbers they believe to have died. When 
travel has been by boat, often migrants are not aware of the actual number of 
passengers, particularly when numbers are high – thus, their estimates of the 
missing frequently vary and are hard to verify. When boats are smaller, survivors 
may be able to give more precise information on numbers missing. Authorities 
may also create estimates of numbers missing based on the supposed capacity 
of boats. Again, however, the true number of passengers is often not known. 
Survivors of sea voyages may have heard of others on another boat who were 
supposed to be making the crossing but never arrived, however remains of the 
boat or bodies are not recovered. Additionally, the high number of bodies that 
are never found means that basic demographic information on the deceased is 
often not available, as described previously in section 1.3.2.
1.4.4  Involvement of criminal actors
An additional complicating factor arises from the fact that irregular migration is 
frequently intertwined with the actions of smugglers, traffickers, other criminals 
and corrupt State officials. While some of these actors may help migrants 
avoid certain dangers associated with travel, their involvement also leads to an 
additional set of risks and vulnerabilities for migrants. Countless numbers of 
deaths have occurred either through direct murder or indirect consequences 
of poor care, abuse, torture, or abandonment, among others (see Chapter 5). 
In these cases where smugglers or other criminals are involved, if deaths are 
not actively covered up, they are rarely reported. Murders that suggest state 
corruption and complicity are kept silenced; others that occur in remote areas 
are only captured in the memories of survivors. 
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1.4.5  Definitional inconsistencies
Finally, at issue in documenting border-related deaths is determining which 
migrant deaths can be deemed “border-related.” As noted above in section 1.3, 
some sources collecting data stick to recording deaths that occur at the external 
boundaries of States. Others follow a definition more similar to what Leanne 
Weber and Sharon Pickering have referred to as the “functional border,” which 
extends beyond the physical parameters of a nation State and includes all sites 
at which border functions are performed (Weber and Pickering, 2011).  
Weber and Pickering (2011) note the increasing “de-territorialization of borders,” 
suggesting that national boundaries are increasingly detached from sovereign 
territory. Migration zones and buffers may be created that extend beyond the 
territorial boundaries of the State – such as the excision of offshore territories 
by Australia – and remote methods of border control exist through visa policy 
and refugee determination processes (ibid.). Border control can be enforced by 
various actors, both state and non-state. For those illegally residing in a country, 
the border may remain present through exclusion from many of the State’s 
social and legal protections. Extending even further, conditions of illegality may 
contribute to situations of social and economic marginalization that lead to 
additional vulnerabilities (ibid.).9 
Thus, we can see how the border may extend far from the traditional conception 
of physical boundaries. When counting deaths attributable to borders, at what 
point does one draw the line? Should deaths in detention, through efforts to 
evade deportation, or due to exploitative working conditions, among others, 
be included, or should counts stick to deaths that occur at the physical 
perimeters of States? The physical border and the exercises of sovereignty and 
governance within a State can be broadly defined as the external and internal 
borders, respectively, together building the “functional border.” As will be shown 
throughout this report, the various entities collecting data have chosen different 
points between the external and internal borders at which to limit their counts.
As noted in section 1.3, IOM’s figures correspond to deaths that occurred at 
the external borders of States or during migration towards an international 
destination. They exclude deaths along the “internal border,” such as those 
that occur in detention facilities, during deportation, or on forced return to a 
migrant’s homeland, as well as deaths more loosely connected with migrants’ 
irregular status, such as those resulting from labour exploitation. This approach 
is chosen because deaths occurring at physical borders and while en route 
represent a more clearly definable category. When including fatalities more 
indirectly associated with border control and migration, it becomes difficult to 
determine where to limit counts and issues of comparability between sources 
9 For an in-depth discussion of the “functional border,” see L. Weber and S. Pickering, Chapter 1, Globalization 
and Borders: Death at the Global Frontier (2011).  
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persist. Data and knowledge of the risks and vulnerabilities faced by irregular 
migrants and asylum-seekers, including death, should not be neglected, but 
rather tracked as a distinct category. 
1.5  Who collects the data?
No organization at the global level is currently tasked with collecting information 
on migrant deaths occurring in border regions. National governments tend not 
to publish data on border-related deaths, and very few release data regularly 
and systematically (an exception is the United States Border Patrol). In some 
cases, States may have information concerning deaths that is not made public 
as it is collected for law enforcement purposes and considered highly sensitive 
(Weber and Pickering, 2011:42). Existing information is generally compiled by 
NGOs, universities, humanitarian and, at times, international organizations. 
In the United States, migrant deaths are normally investigated by medical 
examiners offices (at the county- or more rarely the state-level). Media outlets 
and journalists have also been actively involved in tracking deaths.
Some prominent NGOs tracking deaths include UNITED for Intercultural Action 
and Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía (APDHA) (Spain) in 
Europe; in the United States several organizations have partnered with medical 
examiners to track deaths and identify remains, including Humane Borders, 
the Colibrí Center for Human Rights, and the Coalición de Derechos Humanos, 
which also works with consular offices of Mexico and other origin countries. 
Projects run through universities include the Border Crossing Observatory out of 
Monash University in Melbourne, which maintains a database of deaths; and the 
Binational Migration Institute, based at the University of Arizona. International 
organizations publishing estimates of deaths often obtain knowledge from 
their field offices in locations known for high numbers of deaths, or through 
partnerships with local humanitarian organizations. Media outlets and journalists 
involved in tracking deaths include the Arizona Daily Star, The Migrants Files 
project and Fortress Europe. See Annex for a list of sources publishing data on 
migrant border-related deaths.
1.5.1  The media as a source of data
“These days, it takes a blockbuster tragedy for migrant boats to reach the 
front pages – the quiet, regular additions to the Mediterranean’s death toll 
encountered on an almost-weekly basis by rescuers, human rights activists 
and migrant communities themselves are simply far too humdrum to make 
the mainstream news.” (Jack Shenker writing for the Guardian following the 
Lampedusa shipwreck on 3 October 2013)
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Much of the published data on migrant deaths is based on information extracted 
from media reports. This is the case for several groups publishing data on the 
Mediterranean and Europe – for instance, UNITED,10 which has been maintaining 
a “list of deaths” since 1993 and also recently created a map of deaths;11 The 
Migrants Files, a project that began in 2013 but includes reports on deaths from 
2000; and Fortress Europe, a blog kept by the journalist Gabriele Del Grande and 
lists deaths from 1988. The Australian Border Deaths Database also gathers its 
data from media reports and contact with local NGOs. 
There are a number of shortcomings with using the media as a primary source 
of data on border-related deaths (see also Chapter 3). Perhaps most importantly, 
coverage is not complete. The media tend to cover larger scale incidents involving 
many deaths, while cases in which only several people die might not make the 
news or might only receive small mention in local papers and be missed by 
researchers. In localities where death is frequently occurring but each incident 
involves small numbers, such as along the United States–Mexico border, for 
instance, deaths are unlikely to be covered in the media as in a sense they cease 
to be newsworthy due to their regularity. There is no media presence in many 
of the areas in which migrants die and these deaths will likely never come to 
the attention of reporters, unless perhaps deaths are in large numbers and are 
discovered.12  
Even when there is media coverage of an incident, coverage may not continue 
until a final count of deaths is known. In many incidents involving deaths at 
sea, initial estimates of fatalities are vague as numbers of total passengers and 
the fate of those who remain missing is not known. Details of the incident may 
take weeks to resolve and media attention has often waned by this time. Often 
information provided in the media is not complete or does not mention details of 
the profiles of the deceased that would be helpful for a comprehensive record. 
For instance, particularly in reports of death at sea involving many victims, 
nationalities might not be listed or they may be mentioned in vague terms only. 
Age and sex of each of the deceased are also not listed in media reports of 
large incidents. Other information, like exact location and information gathered 
through coronial investigation, is not given. 
There have also been cases where media reports of lost vessels have proven to be 
incorrect. For instance, the records of 350 presumed deaths had to be removed 
from the Australian Border Deaths Database when it was found that the vessel 
that had been reported missing in the media had later been accounted for. 
10 UNITED’s data is based on information collected from own research, and information received from 550 
organizations in the network, as well as local experts, journalists and researchers in the field of migration. 
11 Includes all deaths UNITED deems are attributable to European border control – including those that occur 
due to, for instance, suicide following forced return to origin countries. Also includes deaths that occur while 
migrants are presumed to be travelling to Europe, even if these occur in Africa and other locations far from 
Europe’s borders. 
12 For instance, in 2013 over 90 bodies were found in the desert between Niger and Algeria. See www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-24753100.  
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1.6  Keeping count: Why we need better data
“It is imperative to begin a process to identify and account for the thousands 
of ‘missing’ undocumented migrants, who disappear – on the journey or after 
arrival – and whose identities are unknown.” (Council of Europe, Commissioner 
for Human Rights, 2007)
The need for improved death counts and identification of those who die 
during migration is not a new demand; indeed it has been articulated by the 
European Council (Stockholm Programme, para. 6 and 6.1.6), the Council of 
Europe (Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1467 (2000); Commissioner 
for Human Rights, 2007 issue paper), IOM, UNHCR, Amnesty International, 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), and numerous other IOs, 
NGOs, community groups, activists and scholars. 
1.6.1  Greater accountability and action
For one, more accurate data serve to highlight the magnitude of deaths and, 
through this, to spur greater action to prevent them. Data has the power to 
capture attention, and while counts of border-related deaths will always be 
estimates, they serve to make concrete something which has been left vague 
and ill-defined. As Weber and Pickering note in Chapter 6, while numbers are 
subject to competing claims, “[...]they at least provide a foundation for debate 
and accountability.” Politically, the availability official data is important. Lack of 
political commitment at national and international levels to record and account 
for the deaths of migrants both reflects and contributes to a general lack of 
concern more broadly for the safety and well-being of irregular migrants and 
asylum-seekers arriving by irregular means and contributes to public apathy, 
ignorance, and the dehumanization of these groups. Greater attention to human 
rights abuses, including the right to life, of migrants and asylum-seekers can 
encourage States to assume responsibility. 
1.6.2  More accurate determination of causes and effective response 
Additionally, data is crucial to better understand the profiles of those who are 
most at risk and to tailor policies to better assist these migrants and prevent loss 
of life. To what extent are practices and regulations surrounding surveillance and 
rescue at sea sufficient and effective? The Mediterranean, for example, is among 
one of the busiest seas in the world and yet there are still cases in which boats 
in distress are not assisted in time for lives to be saved, or are not assisted at 
all.13 Despite positive steps, such as Italy’s Mare Nostrum Project implemented 
13 One of the most shocking incidents occurred in 2011 in what has become known as the “left-to-die boat”. 
Seventy-two migrants leaving from Tripoli ran out of fuel and were left to drift for 14 days despite distress 
calls being sounded and their vessel's position being made known to European authorities and NATO ships. 
With no water or food on-board, only nine of the migrants were still alive by the time the boat drifted back 
to Libyan shores. See C. Heller, L. Pezzani and SITU Studio, Forensic Oceanography: Report on the “Left-To-
Die Boat” (2011). 
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in December 2013, and increased surveillance of the Mediterranean, more 
remains to be done to reduce avoidable deaths at sea, as well as on land. Another 
possibility is to use information on causes of death to better prepare potential 
migrants prior to departure. 
While precise data on deaths that occur at the hands of smugglers is a tall 
order and one that will never be complete, improved information on how and 
why migrants are dying may shed light on the extent to which the practices 
of smugglers and traffickers lead to death and if there are groups that are 
particularly vulnerable. For instance, anecdotal evidence from the Gulf of Aden 
suggests that rates of death have decreased during the crossing perhaps because 
of shifting dynamics in the smuggling business such that migrants are now more 
valued when delivered to their destination alive (see Chapter 5). More precise 
data concerning how migrants are dying could help distinguish these influences 
from those of changing policies and practices regarding apprehension and 
rescue, which may also have contributed to lower death rates.
However, it is not enough to only reduce fatalities without addressing the deeper 
causes that perpetuate this phenomenon – ultimately, improved data should 
contribute to efforts to better understand the underlying forces that are leading 
so many to risk their lives to reach another country. Researchers are interested 
in what data on deaths can tell us about the causes, both direct and indirect, of 
these fatalities and the potential links with broader migration control policies 
and practices. The information provided by survivors and the families of those 
who die can also help to persuade others not to embark on such risky journeys. 
We must know the contexts in which migrants are dying to ensure State actors 
make all possible efforts to protect the fundamental rights of migrants and 
refugees, starting with the most basic right to life. 
1.6.3  Respect for the dead and greater closure for families
Blanchard et al. (2008) argue that, although estimates of deaths will always 
lack precision, attempting to create a count is a kind of moral requirement, “a 
tribute to be paid to the victims,” and in a sense gives “these nameless deaths an 
existence” (translated from French). Concomitant with the need to better record 
numbers of dead is the requisite to give identities to those who have died, also for 
the sake of surviving family members. Stefanie Grant (2011) argues that the right 
to family life grants families the right to know the fate of their relatives.14 Untold 
numbers of migrants remain missing. With their locations never traced and their 
bodies never found, families are left in a state of unknowing. Groups of relatives 
in Tunisia have come together to trace their missing family members, many 
refusing to believe the worst: that their loved ones are dead and their bodies lost 
14 See: Council of Europe Convention, Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life; and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16(3), which states that: “The family is the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.” 
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in the sea (Moorehead, 2014). In February 2013, 151 Tunisian families signed a 
petition to the EU asking for actions to be taken to trace their missing relatives 
and some travelled to Italy to encourage exchange of information between the 
Italian and Tunisian governments (ibid.). 
1.7  Way forward: Better monitoring, data collection 
and analysis
Better monitoring and collection of data on migrant deaths is not merely a 
technical challenge. To date, there has been a lack of political will across States 
to collect and share such data in a systematic fashion. National authorities have 
not given priority to collecting this data, given that the migrant death count is 
often perceived by civil society groups as an indication of the consequences 
of tougher border controls. Furthermore, the receiving States have not been 
under pressure to produce better information because irregular migrants usually 
attract little public sympathy, and an emotional distancing from the suffering of 
the victims leaves deaths less noticed.
In a visit to Lampedusa, following the shipwreck on 3 October 2013, Pope Francis 
condemned what he called a “globalization of indifference” declaring the Global 
North cared little for the suffering of others. Irregular migrants may be seen as 
threats to social cohesion and national economies and as criminals and even 
potential terrorists.15 Dehumanization, write Weber and Pickering (2011:59), 
“produces exclusion, not only from a particular moral community, but also from 
all bonds of human empathy and protection.” The lives of those dying are in a 
way deemed less important (ibid.:62). Public demand for greater accountability 
is limited, and the political incentive for documenting border-related deaths is 
weak. 
Furthermore, political will to record deaths may be low as greater 
investigation into the lives of those who die carries implications for States to 
assume responsibility and, where necessary, be held accountable. As Caroline 
Moorehead notes: “To test for the identities of bodies washed up at sea would 
be to acknowledge a humanitarian dimension to the tragic lives of those 
forced to flee their own countries – even if the cause of flight is acute poverty” 
(Moorehead, 2014:70). 
1.7.1  Who should be counting?
Numbers are inherently political, particularly when there is a degree of 
uncertainty in them, as is the case with border-related deaths. This uncertainty 
is not only because information is often missing or non-verifiable, but because 
15 For an example of how the media may play a role forming and perpetuating these attitudes, see: Esses, 
Medianu and Lawson, 2013. 
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“border-related death” is not a recognized statistical category, nor an easily 
definable one. Some civil society organizations question whether governments 
who pursue restrictive migration policies should be tasked with collecting such 
data.
The appropriateness of counting as a State-led process has been questioned 
given States’ close proximity to both issues of responsibility and accountability 
for deaths. This is particularly an issue in countries with weak governments and 
those dealing with high levels of corruption, in which deaths more frequently 
involve collusion with authorities. 
An option would be to encourage both official, State-led counts as well as ones 
led by civil society and researchers – similar to what is being done along the 
southern border of the United States. In this way both sources could be held in 
check and cross referenced. For this to be feasible, common methodologies and 
definitions would need to be developed. 
Another possibility could be to develop partnerships between international 
organizations and local humanitarian organizations working directly with 
migrants. For instance, in Yemen daily coast monitoring patrols are organized by 
NGOs in partnership with UNHCR. By working with smaller groups on the ground, 
international organizations could potentially compile rich information collected 
by these groups that might otherwise go unpublished, and disseminate it from a 
centralized platform. International organizations are well placed to gather global 
counts of deaths due to the presence of field offices in the majority of countries 
around the world, allowing for close observation of the local situation in diverse 
border-areas, some of which may otherwise go largely unnoticed. 
Another source of data could be death records and coroners’ reports, information 
that could perhaps be compiled by a network of universities. This method comes 
with a new set of challenges – not least of which is how to account for deaths 
of those whose bodies are never found. However, the use of death records and 
information generated during investigation and registration could provide details 
for at least a number of those who die and may be particularly appropriate in 
certain contexts and regions. This option is explored in Chapter 3. 
More coordination is needed between actors and organizations collecting 
data on deaths. Currently, varying methodologies and definitions hinder 
comparability between regions and even within national contexts. An initial step 
in this direction could be to draft a data collection guide to be circulated among 
actors and organizations working in this area. The process of constructing this 
guide should be a collaborative one, involving academic researchers and civil 
society organizations, as well as relevant representatives from governments. 
Chapter 1 Migrant Deaths: An International Overview
38
A global monitoring framework involving a range of actors should be established 
to bring together data on deaths globally. IOM plans to continue working to 
improve data on migrant border-related fatalities in several ways. Ongoing 
data collection concerning deaths around the world began in January 2014 
and will be continued, feeding into an online database and portal dedicated to 
presenting more up-to-date figures on fatalities globally. IOM aims to enhance 
coordination with field offices to improve reliability and completeness of its 
dataset. Additionally, data on deaths can be improved through partnerships with 
NGOs and academics. Annual reports will make available most recent data on 
deaths and global estimates. 
This report makes a series of key recommendations on ways in which data can 
be improved in the future, in order to help reduce the number of migrant deaths 
and to allow more families to know the fate of their missing relatives. 
Key recommendations:
1. An independent monitoring body should be established with representatives 
of governments, civil society and international organizations to promote the 
collection, harmonization and analysis of data on migrant deaths globally. 
Currently, varying methodologies and definitions hinder comparability 
between regions and even within national contexts. IOM’s Missing Migrants 
Project, which collects data on migrant deaths globally, could act to coordinate 
this new initiative.
2. At the national level, governments should be encouraged to take greater 
responsibility for collecting data on migrant deaths, in partnership with 
civil society organizations to ensure transparency and accountability. While 
methods of data collection should be improved, governments may also utilize 
existing data, such as that contained in death records and coroners’ reports. 
Survivors, who often have a great deal of information about smuggling 
operations, as well as relatives of the deceased should also be encouraged 
to speak out and share information without fear of sanctions in order to help 
prevent further tragedies.
3. Innovative data initiatives should be promoted and shared more widely. 
For example, a partnership between medical examiners’ offices and human 
rights groups in Arizona has resulted in the creation of the Arizona OpenGIS 
Initiative for Deceased Migrants, an online mapping tool that allows anyone 
to search the hundreds of known deaths of migrants in parts of the State 
since 2001. Such a tool allows for changes in migrant routes to be tracked 
over time, and can help humanitarian assistance along routes to be better 
targeted. 
Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration
39
1.8  Outline and chapter overviews
Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration investigates how border-
related deaths are documented, who is documenting them and what can be 
done to improve the evidence base to encourage informed accountability, policy 
and practice. The book is organized by region – or more specifically, by areas and 
migration routes known to have high numbers of migrant deaths. These include 
the route through Central America to the United States, with a focus on the 
United States–Mexico border region; the southern European Union bordering 
the Mediterranean; routes from sub-Saharan Africa to Northern Africa; routes 
taken by migrants emigrating from the Horn of Africa towards the Gulf or 
Southern Africa; and the waters surrounding Australia. Each chapter presents 
the most recent data on migrant deaths, discusses practices of counting and 
associated challenges, and suggests steps for improving documentation. The 
report does not attempt to cover every region of the world, and some regions, 
such as South America, for which it was more difficult to find data have been 
excluded. This does not imply, however, that migrant deaths are not occurring 
in such regions.
In Chapter 2 Robin Reineke and Daniel Martínez discuss deaths along the United 
States–Mexico border and en route to the United States through Mexico. Using 
data from the United States Border Patrol, the Pima County Office of the Medical 
Examiner, studies conducted by several prominent scholars, and their own data 
from the Colibrí Center for Human Rights the authors piece together a picture 
of deaths along the border. The availability of relatively detailed data collected 
over the past two decades allows for some information on the demographics 
of the deceased, as well as information on the routes used over time, and rates 
of death along the border. Although it is recognized that deaths of migrants 
within Mexico occur in high numbers, often related to criminal activities of 
smugglers and drug cartels, estimates of numbers are vague and information is 
not systematically compiled. 
Chapter 3 focuses on border-related deaths in the Mediterranean. Authors 
Tamara Last and Thomas Spijkerboer provide recent data on deaths at sea and 
outline who is collecting this information and to what purposes counts are 
useful. In the absence of official data, groups tracking deaths often rely on media 
as a source of information, a method which comes with a set of shortcomings 
and challenges. The authors discuss options of alternative sources of data, such 
as that generated through the processes of registering, investigating and burying 
the dead in States bordering the Mediterranean.  
The dangers faced by migrants travelling from sub-Saharan Africa through to 
Northern Africa are the subject of Chapter 4, written by Christopher Horwood 
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with the support of Arezo Malakooti. Along these routes, there is no coordinated 
mechanism for recording migrant fatalities. However, the testimonies of survivors 
allude to the frequency of death. Along routes from Western and Central Africa, 
migrants tend to die from the dangers inherent in crossing challenging terrain, 
such as from dehydration and exhaustion. In other cases, death occurs when 
migrants get lost in the desert, are left stranded by facilitators or are crammed 
into overcrowded vehicles. Along routes from the Horn, similar dangers exist, 
although reports suggest the greater involvement of criminal activities in causing 
deaths, including outright murder and kidnapping. 
Chapter 5 discusses deaths of migrants leaving the Horn of Africa and travelling 
to Yemen or southwards in the direction of South Africa. Christopher Horwood 
describes the complexity of migration flows in the region and highlights that 
migration experiences tend to be characterized by hardship, neglect, victimization 
and at times death. Deaths occurring in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea are 
relatively well-documented, at least over the past decade. Challenges associated 
with documenting deaths of irregular migrants at sea are further complicated 
by the involvement of smugglers and other criminals, at times waiting on the 
shores of Yemen to take migrants onwards. On land routes southwards or to the 
coasts of Djibouti and Puntland, injury, illness and death are common. Again, 
the placement of irregular migration within a strong smuggling network and the 
involvement of other criminals and corrupt State officials further problematizes 
the process of counting the dead. 
The final chapter looks at deaths of migrants and asylum-seekers travelling to 
Australia, raising questions of accountability, responsibility and the importance 
of improved data in working towards compassionate and effective response. 
Drawing on data from the Australian Border Deaths Database, authors Leanne 
Weber and Sharon Pickering present available information on numbers of deaths, 
causes, and profiles of those who die, including gender-specific vulnerabilities. 
In the process, they address social and methodological challenges that arise 
when counting and accounting for deaths. The authors explore the value in 
counting the dead, noting that while underlying causes and responsibility for 
deaths are not easily explained or identified, numbers provide a starting point 
for dialogue and debate, ultimately prompting greater accountability, justice and 
more effective response.
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Robin Reineke1 and Daniel E. Martínez2
2.1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, a crisis of unknown proportions has unfolded along 
migrant routes from the United Mexican States3 and Central America to the 
United States of America.4 From their homes to their destinations, migrants in 
North America are exposed to disproportionate levels of risk of human rights 
violations, disappearance and death. The true number of deaths of migrants in 
transit is unknown, but the existing numbers, thought to be incomplete, are in 
the thousands. The absence of complete data on the dead and missing along 
migrant routes represents a secondary crisis beyond the initial loss of life of 
hundreds of migrants each year (Jimenez, 2009; Martínez et al., 2013; Martínez 
et al., 2014). Not only does this absence of information present “a serious barrier 
to determining the steps that need to be taken to mitigate the prevalence of 
migrant deaths along the border” (Amnesty International, 2012:17), but it also 
presents serious challenges to the identification of the dead. Thousands of 
families wait without answers regarding the whereabouts of missing loved ones.
This chapter presents an overview of the available data on migrant fatalities in 
the United States and in Mexico, and an analysis of the reasons for incomplete 
counts. Migrant deaths are defined as those occurring while migrants are 
actively in transit. Although migrants are exposed to additional risks once they 
arrive at their destinations, this context is very different from that of migrant 
trails.5 The two regions in North America where migrant fatalities occur at 
the highest rates are vertically along migrant trails in Mexico, and horizontally 
along the United States–Mexico border. Although the conditions leading to the 
injury, disappearance and death of migrants in Mexico are distinct from those 
in the United States, for many migrants the two regions are simply different 
* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM).
1 Robin Reineke is co-founder and Executive Director of the Colibrí Center for Human Rights in Tucson and a 
doctoral candidate in the School of Anthropology at the University of Arizona.
2 Daniel E. Martínez is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at George Washington University in Washington, 
D.C. 
3 Hereinafter referred to as Mexico.
4 Hereinafter referred to as the United States.
5 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the external versus internal borders.
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parts of the same journey. Whether Mexican or Central American, migrants 
share common experiences of marginalization and vulnerability throughout 
their journey – prior to migration, on the migrant trail, in their destinations 
and upon deportation.6 Sociostructural factors in Mexico and Central America 
are compelling entire populations to leave their homes in pursuit of physical 
safety and economic security. Certainly, a “culture of migration” has emerged in 
many migrant-sending countries, which contributes directly to migration flows; 
however, we contend that abject poverty, political instability, neoliberal policies 
and violence play significant roles in spurring outmigration in both regions. While 
Mexican migrants generally cross one border, Central American migrants often 
cross several. During their journey through Mexico, Guatemalans, Salvadorans, 
Hondurans and others travelling through irregular channels face severe dangers 
as they journey north, many crowding atop lurching freight trains and navigating 
organized crime. Once at the United States–Mexico border, they face an 
increasingly constricted barrier where the only clandestine passageways are 
through remote, inhospitable desert or mountain geographies.
The lack of data on migrant fatalities reflects official disregard for the safety and 
security of irregular migrants in both countries. With hundreds of deaths each 
year just in the single US state of Arizona, the death of migrants is a major public 
health concern. Yet there continues to be no reliable complete count of the 
number of fatalities in either the United States or Mexico. Although geographic 
and contextual factors can make the counting of the dead somewhat difficult, 
the challenges in North America in this regard are much less severe than those in 
the Mediterranean, for instance, where the recovery of human remains is often 
impossible as deaths occur in the open sea. The invisibility of migrant deaths 
relates to the invisibility of migrants in life. The story of migrant deaths in North 
America is a story of exclusion and exposure – migrants, seen as “illegal” or 
“other,” are excluded from social systems of safety and protection, while they are 
simultaneously exposed to the risks of organized crime, exploitation and harsh 
environments. It is these exclusions that make the counting and understanding 
of migrant deaths challenging. 
6 See Martínez, Slack and Vandervoet, 2013, for a discussion of migrant marginalization and vulnerability.
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2.2 Historical and geographical overview
Migration from Mexico to the United States is generations old, and despite 
drastic changes in the last 20 years, historical factors continue to be relevant. The 
agricultural sector in Mexico has struggled for centuries. The twentieth century 
in particular saw damaging shifts, as Mexican agricultural reform following the 
revolution enhanced bureaucratization and privatization, ultimately pushing 
many farmers off their land (Katz, 1974; Sanderson, 1981). Most recently, the 
economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s brought Mexico into global structural 
adjustment programs. The most damaging for small farmers of such economic 
restructuring was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
eliminated tariffs on several agricultural products and allowed US corporations 
to import cheap, mass-produced goods into the Mexican market (Nevins, 2007). 
The NAFTA challenged the livelihoods of smallholder farmers by putting them in 
direct competition with large, heavily subsidized and highly flexible multinational 
corporations (Johnson, 1994; Bacon, 2004; Nevins and Aizeki, 2008); an 
estimated 1.3 million Mexican farmers lost their jobs very quickly, and another 
million workers who depended upon the farmers became unemployed over 
time (Polaski, 2004; Wise, 2010). In turn, the US economy’s reliance on migrant 
labour – particularly in the sectors of hospitality, agriculture and construction 
– has become structurally embedded (Cornelius, 1998). Histories of migration, 
especially between Mexico and the United States, are also deeply embedded 
socially (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). 
A very similar history can be traced for Central American countries, with 
the added complication of violent internal political conflict and US military 
involvement in the twentieth century (Gonzalez, 2000). Central American 
governments emerged in the twenty-first century with weak democracies and 
civil unrest. Then, with former Mexican President Felipe Calderon’s “drug war,” 
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) moved their operations south into the 
Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. The influx 
of organized criminal factions in combination with already weak governments 
and rampant poverty has resulted in an increase in violence in these countries. 
Honduras now has the highest murder rate in the world, with 90.4 homicides 
per 100,000 people recorded in 2013 (UNODC, 2013). Central Americans also 
face severe poverty. The World Bank estimated that in 2012, 34.5 per cent of 
the Salvadoran population was living below the country’s poverty line (World 
Bank, 2014). This estimate is 66.5 per cent in Honduras for the same year, and 
53.7 per cent in Guatemala in 2011 (ibid.).
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Figure 2.1:	 Migratory	flows	 from	and	 through	Mexico	 to	 the	United	 States	
south-western	border
Source:  Adapted from Barron Cruz, M.G., La Bestia: La tenue línea entre la migración y la trata de personas, 
2013.
2.2.1 Demographics
Unauthorized migrants crossing the United States–Mexico border over the 
past two decades have primarily been from Mexico, but are now increasingly 
coming from Central American countries, especially El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Honduras. From 2000 until 2011, Mexican nationals accounted for 86 to 98 
per cent of all Border Patrol apprehensions along the south-western border. In 
2012, however, 27 per cent of the Border Patrol’s apprehensions were of non-
Mexicans, and in 2013 that percentage rose to 36 (US Border Patrol, 2014). Most 
of this increase in the irregular crossing of non-Mexicans (the overwhelming 
majority of whom are Central Americans) has occurred in South Texas (US Border 
Patrol, 2014). Non-Mexicans made up nearly 63 per cent of total apprehensions 
in the Rio Grande Valley Sector in 2013 (ibid.). The disproportionate increase 
in the apprehension of non-Mexicans in Texas in particular is in part due to the 
geographic proximity of South Texas to Central America relative to the rest of the 
south-western United States. 
The increase in outmigration from certain Central American countries relates to 
escalating violence and abject poverty in these countries, as noted previously. 
According to the Mexican Secretariat of the Interior’s Migration Policy Unit, 
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86,298 foreign individuals were detained in Mexico in 2013, primarily from 
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua (Isacson, Meyer and Morales, 
2014). Although the majority of migrants in Mexico are from Central America, 
a growing number come from Cuba, South America, Asia, the Middle East and 
Africa (ibid.).
2.2.2 Routes and risks: United States–Mexico border
The factors compelling Mexicans and Central Americans to leave home are 
complex and multilayered, and are both economically and socially embedded. 
Migratory routes from Mexico to the United States have been well travelled 
for decades. However, several changes in the 1990s made these routes more 
deadly. The US economy experienced a recession, and there was widespread 
public concern that immigrants from Mexico were taking American jobs and 
contributing to a weak economy. Immigration became a heated issue in the 
1993 presidential election, and Clinton promised the American public that 
his presidency would bring the southern border “under control” (Andreas, 
2009). Once in office, Clinton oversaw a series of sweeping changes to border 
enforcement. The strategy of “prevention through deterrence” along the border 
was undertaken in the 1990s and remains in place today (Andreas, 1998, 2009). 
As described by immigration scholar Wayne Cornelius, “the theory underlying 
the strategy was that raising the cost, the physical risk, and the probability of 
apprehension on each entry attempt would eventually discourage the migrant 
and cause him (or her) to return to the location of origin” (2001:667). The 
1994 Border Patrol Strategic Plan outlined a program whereby the border 
would be secured through “segmented enforcement.” Border Patrol agents 
and surveillance technology would be deployed heavily along the more easily 
crossed points of the border, while the more remote and isolated portions of 
the border would be left unpatrolled. This strategy relied on the remote and 
dangerous geography of the south-west borderlands to act as a “natural barrier.”
The result has led to increased dangers and risks for those trying to cross the 
borderlands irregularly as migrants, and the smugglers who guide them, are 
pushed into more remote deserts, a phenomenon often described by scholars as 
the “funnel effect” (Rubio-Goldsmith et al., 2006; Jimenez, 2009; Martinez et al., 
2013). Thousands have died in the remote geographies of the desert borderlands 
since the mid-1990s, and the strategies adopted in the Clinton era have only 
expanded. Amnesty International has stated these deaths are “a direct result of 
measures taken by the US Government to make safer passages impassable for 
migrants” (2013:7). Many others have observed the link between Clinton-era 
border enforcement policies and the increase in migrant fatalities (Eschbach et 
al., 1999; Eschbach, Hagan and Rodriguez, 2003; Cornelius, 2001, 2005; Nevins, 
2005; Rubio-Goldsmith et al., 2006; Jimenez, 2009; Martinez et al., 2013; Kovic, 
2013).
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Deaths along the United States–Mexico border first increased in Southern 
California in the 1990s, but then quickly shifted to Arizona, which has recorded the 
highest number of migrant deaths over the past 15 years. Following the Clinton 
administration’s border security measures, known as Operation Gatekeeper 
in the San Diego area and Operation Hold the Line in the El Paso region, the 
Arizona deserts became the main entry point for unauthorized border crossings 
beginning in the early 2000s. Border Patrol’s Tucson (Arizona) Sector, comprised 
primarily of remote, mountainous and desert geography, quickly overtook all 
other sectors both in the number of apprehensions and in the number of deaths.
Migrants face a number of deadly risks when crossing the United States–Mexico 
border. They suffocate in cargo compartments of commercial trucks; they drown 
in irrigation canals or rivers; they die in motor vehicle accidents or are struck by 
vehicles as they attempt to cross busy highways on foot; they fall to their deaths 
from mountain cliffs, and they freeze to death in the mountains of Arizona and 
California. Some are likely killed by human or drug smugglers (Sapkota et al., 
2006; Martínez, Slack and Vandervoet, 2013). A small but concerning number 
have died at the hands of the United States Border Patrol in isolated incidents 
(Spagat, 2013; Southern Border Communities Coalition, 2013). The vast majority 
of migrants who have died on the US side of the border with Mexico perish 
from heat stroke and dehydration in the deserts of the south-west (Eschbach et 
al., 1999; Eschbach, Hagan and Rodriguez, 2003; Rubio-Goldsmith et al., 2006; 
Martinez et al., 2013; Martínez et al., 2014).
2.2.3 Routes and risks: Within Mexico
Central Americans migrate to both Mexico and the United States. Therefore, 
Mexico is a sending country, a receiving country and a transit country for migrants. 
Migrants who travel through Mexico en route to the United States face grave 
threats during the journey. Although the differences in the risks migrants face 
in Mexico versus in the United States are complex, they can be summarized as 
follows: migrants face “structural violence” when crossing to the United States, 
and they face direct violence in Mexico.7 Structural violence, a term coined by 
Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung (1969, 1990, 1996), refers to social, legal 
or otherwise structured processes that lead to disproportionate levels of risk 
for some, often while “protecting” others. Structural violence can be difficult to 
“see” because it does not necessarily involve a victim and perpetrator, as is the 
case with direct violence. While the majority of migrant deaths in the United 
States are due to exposure to the elements, the majority of migrant fatalities in 
Mexico are caused by direct violence. Of course, migrants in Mexico experience 
structural violence as well, but from what is known about the fatalities that occur 
7 The authors gratefully acknowledge Marc Silver for this observation. A documentary film director, Silver has 
worked on issues relevant to migration and human rights in Honduras, Mexico and the United States since 
2009. His series of short films, Los Invisibles (2010), produced in collaboration with Amnesty International, 
as well as his feature-length film, Who Is Dayani Cristal? (2013), provide excellent insight into this topic. 
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along the migrant trail in Mexico, it appears that they are predominantly from 
homicide, likely by DTOs. The Mexican State security and migration authorities 
have been criticized for focusing primarily on preventing irregular migration, 
rather than ensuring the safety of migrants in Mexico (Isacson and Meyer, 2012; 
Pereyra, 2013). The result is what has been termed a “vertical border” through 
Mexico (Isacson and Meyer, 2012; Kovic, 2013) where Central American migrants 
experience illegality, vulnerability and marginalization along the migrant trail.
Most Central American migrants enter Mexico through the country’s southern 
border with Guatemala, represented by either a narrow river or sparsely 
inhabited jungle vegetation (Isacson, Meyer and Morales, 2014). After crossing 
the actual border, migrants predominantly travel north through Mexico, riding 
atop freight trains that run all the way from the country’s southern border 
with Belize and Guatemala to its northern border with the United States. It is 
during this part of their journey that migrants in Mexico face the greatest risk of 
experiencing direct violence. These routes are increasingly dominated by DTOs 
and youth gangs that are known to extort, enslave, torture and kidnap migrants 
(Vogt, 2012; Pereyra, 2013; Isacson, Meyer and Morales, 2014). The “human 
cargo” of Central American migrants is valuable, with the current price of 
smuggling through Mexico to the US border ranging from USD 6,000 to USD 7,000 
per migrant (Vogt, 2012). Yet many migrants cannot afford this expense, and 
travel through Mexico without guides (Isacson, Meyer and Morales, 2014). It 
is these migrants who are at the highest risk for abuse. “As smugglers pay fees 
to criminal groups (and at times Mexican authorities) who control the migrant 
routes, they are more likely to enjoy safe passage, with a significantly lower 
probability of abuse and violence” (Isacson, Meyer and Morales, 2014:15).
The Mara Salvatrucha gang (MS-13) is known to control entire sections of 
migratory routes, demanding payment from migrants riding atop the trains 
(Isacson, Meyer and Davis, 2013). Those who do not pay are thrown onto 
the tracks where they are frequently killed or maimed (ibid.). Kidnapping and 
extortion are rampant, with the perpetrators largely, but not completely, limited 
to drug cartels and organized crime. 
Irregular Mexican and Central American migrants are also exposed to dangers, 
including kidnapping and death, upon deportation from the United States. 
Deportation policies that put migrants at risk include dropping off Mexican 
immigrants miles from where they crossed the border, often at night, and into 
some of the most unstable areas of Northern Mexico (No More Deaths, 2011; 
Isacson and Meyer, 2012; Slack et al., 2013). 
The Mexican Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH, National 
Human Rights Commission) has attempted on at least two separate occasions 
to estimate the number of migrants who have been victims of kidnapping while 
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traversing the length of Mexico. By making visits to various locations throughout 
the country and speaking to migrants themselves as well as other stakeholders, 
they have arrived at some initial estimates (see CNDH, 2009, 2011, for the 
methodology).  
According to a 2009 report by the CNDH, an estimated 9,578 migrants were 
kidnapped in Mexico across 198 cases between September 2008 and February 
2009 (CNDH, 2009). Findings from this report suggest that migrants are being 
kidnapped en masse, with 55 per cent of the victims being kidnapped in the 
southern part of Mexico – mostly in the states of Veracruz and Tabasco (ibid.). 
Around 12 per cent were kidnapped in the north and 1 per cent in the central 
region of the country (ibid.). The region where the kidnapping occurred was 
unknown for 32 per cent of the victims (ibid.). Among the 9,578 migrants 
kidnapped, the person’s country of origin was only determined for 552 individuals: 
372 Hondurans, 101 Salvadorans, 74 Guatemalans and 5 Nicaraguans (ibid.).
In a follow-up report, the CNDH found that between April 2010 and September 
2010 at least 11,333 migrants were abducted across 214 cases, mainly by criminal 
organizations (CNDH, 2011). Based on 178 testimonies related to kidnappings of 
migrants gathered through site visits, 86 per cent of which were from victims 
themselves, the report cited that Mexican authorities were involved in an 
estimated 8.9 per cent of kidnappings (ibid.). With respect to the national origin 
of victims, the 2011 report found that just over 44 per cent of cases consisted of 
Hondurans, 16.2 per cent Salvadorans, 11.2 per cent Guatemalans, 10.6 per cent 
Mexicans, 5 per cent Cubans, 4.4 per cent Nicaraguans, 1.6 per cent Colombians 
and 0.5 per cent Ecuadorans (ibid.). The nationalities of victims were unknown 
in the remaining 6.5 per cent of cases (ibid.). In neither of the CNDH reports is it 
clear how many of the kidnapping victims were released, disappeared or found 
deceased.
Although the threats migrants experience in Mexico are primarily due to 
organized crime, other risks exist. Migrants are reported to drown each year in 
the Suchiate River which runs between Mexico and Guatemala (United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2003). Many are reported to accidentally fall 
from moving trains, or misstep as they attempt to jump on or off (Penhaul, 2010; 
Isacson, Meyer and Morales, 2014). There are also reports of migrants getting 
lost and dying of dehydration or heat stroke in the northern states of Mexico, 
as they traverse remote geographies approaching the United States–Mexico 
border (Campbell, 2012). 
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2.3 Estimated number of migrant fatalities
2.3.1 United States
While the true number of migrant fatalities in both Mexico and the United States 
is unknown, the estimates are alarming. The most complete numbers for migrant 
deaths along the US side of its border with Mexico come from the United States 
Border Patrol, which began compiling data on migrant deaths in 1998. Hundreds 
of deaths occurred prior to this time, however. For instance, Eschbach, Hagan 
and Rodriguez (2003) reported over 4,200 migrant deaths across the border 
between 1985 and 2000, with nearly 3,300 deaths occurring before 1998. A 
different study by Wayne Cornelius (2001) found that 1,700 deaths were reported 
to the Mexican Consulates along the south-western border from 1994 through 
mid-2001. A more recent study by the same author reported 2,978 fatalities 
border-wide between 1995 and 2004 (Cornelius, 2005). Even since Border Patrol 
began to track migrant deaths in 1998, there have been concerns that their 
numbers are incomplete (GAO, 2006; Rubio-Goldsmith et al., 2006). While the 
United States Border Patrol estimates provide an important insight into migrant 
deaths near the border with Mexico, the methodology behind the production 
of these numbers is unknown, and thus they must be interpreted with caution. 
The United States Border Patrol estimates of migrant deaths are the most 
comprehensive count of migrant fatalities along the entire border and over time, 
and therefore can provide insight into changing trends. Figure 2.2 displays data 
from the United States Border Patrol on the number of migrant fatalities along the 
south-western border between 1998 and 2013. South-western apprehensions 
by the agency during this period are also illustrated, a figure which is often used 
by scholars as a proxy for unauthorized migration flows (Espenshade, 1995).  
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Figure 2.2:		 Migrant	 deaths	 recorded	 by	 the	 United	 States	 Border	 Patrol	
relative	to	apprehensions	on	the	south-western	border,	fiscal	year	
1998–2013
Source: United States Border Patrol, 2014.
According to the United States Border Patrol estimates, between fiscal year 1998 
and 2013,8 a total of 6,029 deceased migrants were found on the US side of the 
border with Mexico, with the remains of at least 300 migrants being recovered 
each year along the border since 2000. As noted in Figure 2.2, migrant deaths 
have continued to occur year after year despite a substantial decrease in the 
United States Border Patrol apprehensions since the mid-2000s. Scholars and 
demographers have suggested that migration from Mexico, which for generations 
has been the single largest source of unauthorized migrants to the United States, 
has slowed substantially over the past several years (Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-
Barrera, 2012; Massey, 2012). Figure 2.3 further shows the relationship between 
decreased apprehensions and a consistently high number of migrant deaths over 
the past several years across the border. Over the past three fiscal years, there 
have been more than 100 migrant deaths per 100,000 apprehensions across the 
border, compared with just 40 a decade ago. Migrants may be at higher risk for 
death today than in prior years, and as research suggests (Martinez et al., 2013; 
Martínez et al., 2014), this may be because they are left with little option than 
to trek through more dangerous remote areas along the border or for longer 
periods of time, in order to avoid detection by US authorities.
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Source: United States Border Patrol, 2014.
As noted in Figure 2.4, migrant deaths across the United States–Mexico border 
have not been evenly distributed across time and geography. The portion of the 
border where the most migrants have died is in the Tucson Sector of Arizona. 
A significant number of deaths have also occurred in California and Texas, with 
the fewest recorded in New Mexico. Drawing on records from the Office of the 
Medical Examiner in the state of New Mexico, one study reported just 25 migrant 
deaths between 1993 and 1997 (Eschbach et al., 1999). A more recent study 
reported 11 migrant deaths in New Mexico between 2002 and 2003 (Sapkota 
et al., 2006). New Mexico has historically had low levels of unauthorized migration 
from Mexico and Central America, largely explained by the remote geography, 
limited roadways and lack of populated areas on either side of the border (with 
the exception of the Las Cruces–El Paso metropolitan area, which encompasses 
part of south-eastern New Mexico and the western most tip of Texas). Given this 
consideration, what follows is a detailed look at each of the three states where 
migrant deaths have occurred in the highest numbers: California, Arizona and 
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Figure 2.4:		 Migrant	 deaths	 recorded	by	 the	United	 States	Border	 Patrol	 by	
sector,	fiscal	year	1998–2013
Source: United States Border Patrol, 2014. 
California
California was among the first to experience the Clinton administration’s 
intensification of border enforcement and its strategy of prevention through 
deterrence, with the launch of Gatekeeper in the San Diego Sector in 1994 
(Andreas, 1998, 2009). Beginning that year, the California portion of the United 
States–Mexico border was heavily fortified in stages, working gradually from 
west to east. Figure 2.5 provides data on migrant deaths over time in California 
from various sources, including research by Eschbach and colleagues (1999), 
Cornelius (2001) and the United States Border Patrol. Data for the Yuma area is 
omitted from the figure, as the Yuma Sector of the Border Patrol encompasses 
an area which includes small portions of eastern California and western Arizona. 
Estimates from Eschbach et al. (1999) come from medical examiner and coroner 
offices records and vital registries from across border states, while the Cornelius 

















Rio Grande Valley, TX
Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration
57
“include deaths occurring on the Mexican side of the mountains, deserts, 
canals and rivers that straddle the southwest border” (669). For this reason, 
Cornelius (2001, 2005) estimates of migrant deaths are consistently higher than 
reported by other sources. While Eschbach et al. (1999) and Cornelius (2001) 
are transparent in terms of how they arrived at their estimates, the same cannot 
be said for the United States Border Patrol estimates of migrant deaths across 
the border.9 Nevertheless, the three data sources clearly illustrate that deaths 
increased almost immediately following the increase in border fortification. In 
just one year, deaths of migrants in California more than doubled, rising from 
23 in 1994 to 61 in 1995 (Cornelius, 2001). According to the research, the effect 
was not a result of an increase in attempted crossings. As noted by Cornelius, 
“some portion of the increase in fatalities from 1995 to 2000 can be attributed to 
a rising volume of unauthorized Mexico-to-United States migration during that 
period; however, the per-year increases in mortality are much larger than the 
increases in Border Patrol apprehensions” (2001:670).
Figure 2.5:		 California	migrant	death	estimates	by	data	source	(excluding	
Yuma	area),	1993–2013
Sources: Eschbach, K. et al., 1999, Death at the border, International Migration Review, 33(2):430–454; 
Cornelius, W.A., 2001, Deaths at the border: Efficacy and unintended consequences of US immigration 
control policy, Population and Development Review, 27(4):661–685; United States Border Patrol, 
2014.
As was the case along most of the border, there were deaths each year in 
California before the security changes of the 1990s. Prior to Gatekeeper, it was 
9 The authors of this report reached out to U.S. Customs and Border Protection seeking clarification on the 
methodology utilized to count migrant deaths along the border, but had not received a response by the 
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not uncommon for migrants to be struck by vehicles as they attempted to run 
across freeways near the border in the urban areas of San Diego. However, as 
documented by researchers from the University of Houston (Eschbach et al., 
1999, 2003) and Cornelius (2001), the deaths in California changed in both 
number and cause following Gatekeeper. Between 1994 and 2000, California saw 
a 509 per cent increase in fatalities, with most occurring in remote geographies 
rather than along highways as before (Cornelius, 2001). Using the 1994 deaths 
as a baseline (all deaths that year occurred before Gatekeeper began), Cornelius 
notes that from 1995 through 2000 migrant deaths from traffic fatalities in urban 
areas remained stable, while fatalities as a result of environmental factors such 
as heat stroke or drowning rose significantly, accounting for 78 per cent of all 
deaths (ibid.).
Migrant deaths in California are primarily due to drowning and exposure. 
Hundreds have drowned in the All American Canal and in the highly polluted 
New River near Calexico in Imperial County (Eschbach et al., 1999; Cornelius, 
2001). There are also reports of migrants drowning in the Pacific Ocean trying to 
reach the shores of California (Isacson and Meyer, 2012). Hundreds more have 
perished in the remote and mountainous regions of southeastern California, 
especially in the desert regions of southern Imperial Valley, where summer 
temperatures average 44 degrees Celsius (Eschbach et al., 1999; Cornelius, 
2001; Jimenez, 2009). There is almost nothing in the extant literature on the 
demographics of migrant deaths in California, although it appears that the vast 
majority of the decedents have been Mexican (ibid.). 
As noted in Figure 2.5, the deaths in California increased rapidly in the 1990s, 
and then decreased in the 2000s as remote portions of Arizona became the 
main point of entry of unauthorized migration. In 1998, migrant deaths in the 
two main sectors of California (San Diego and El Centro) accounted for more 
than half of all border deaths nationwide (US Border Patrol, 2014) as noted in 
Figure 2.4. By the year 2000, these sectors reported 106 deaths, less than a third 
of the total of the border-wide total of 380 (US Border Patrol, 2014). In 2013, 
the two sectors reported a combined total of 10 migrant deaths. Migrant traffic 
shifted to Arizona, as California became increasingly difficult to cross due to the 
enhanced security presence following Gatekeeper. 
Arizona
The shift towards Arizona began in 2000, and by 2002, the Tucson Sector of 
Arizona had about a third of all border deaths, despite only accounting for about 
14 per cent of the geographical length of the border (Anderson, 2008). In 2000, 
roughly 38 per cent of all apprehensions occurred in the Tucson Sector, but by 
2002 this share decreased to only 36 per cent (US Border Patrol, 2014). The 
Arizona version of Gatekeeper, called Operation Safeguard, was launched in 
1994, but was not significantly resourced until 1999, when it became clear that 
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Gatekeeper was pushing the majority of migrants to attempt their crossing in 
Arizona (Andreas, 1998; Cornelius, 2001; Orrenius, 2004). Following Safeguard, 
and then again following the increase in border militarization after the terrorist 
attacks in New York on 11 September 2001, migrants were pushed into the most 
remote stretches of the Sonoran desert. 
The southern Arizona route usually begins in a Mexican town near the border, 
such as Altar, where migrants prepare for the journey and meet their coyotes 
(human smuggling guides). The coyotes then lead groups of migrants across the 
border on foot, usually crossing the actual international boundary very soon 
into the journey. The most dangerous portion of the journey is generally after 
the border itself has been crossed, as migrants walk for several days, evading 
Border Patrol, through remote geographies until reaching a highway or urban 
area, such as Tucson, for transportation to the interior. During the journey, they 
are traversing the Sonoran desert, known for intense heat and aridity, with 
temperatures regularly over 37 degrees Celsius in the summer months. The 
highest concentration of deaths has occurred within the sparsely populated 
Tohono O’Odham Indian Reservation (Humane Borders, 2014; Isacson, Meyer 
and Davis, 2013). 
Figure 2.6:		 Deaths	recorded	by	the	Pima	County	Office	of	the	Medical	
Examiner	in	Tucson,	Arizona
Source: Arizona OpenGIS for Deceased Migrants, January 2001–July 2014.
The Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner (PCOME) in Tucson, which 
first began to systematically classify individuals believed to be unauthorized 
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migrants as undocumented border crossers or “UBCs” in 2001,10 has consistently 
provided the most detailed and comprehensive data regarding migrant deaths 
of all sources, but the jurisdiction of the PCOME is limited to southern Arizona. 
The PCOME provides medico-legal investigation of death to the majority of the 
counties comprising the Tucson Sector, with the exception of Maricopa County 
to the north, and the other counties to the north of Maricopa. Numbers from 
the PCOME also do not include deaths that occur in Yuma County to the west 
of the Tucson Sector (see Figure 2.6). Very little is known of the numbers and 
characteristics of those who die in these counties not covered by the PCOME, 
but a comparison of the PCOME data with the United States Border Patrol data 
from the Tucson Sector reveals that the additional migrant deaths represented 
in these regions is minimal. Figure 2.7 illustrates extant estimates for migrant 
deaths in Arizona by various sources, including Eschbach et al. (1999), Cornelius 
(2001), the United States Border Patrol and the PCOME. As noted, migrant death 
estimates provided by the United States Border Patrol and the PCOME are highly 
correlated in the positive direction (r = 0.98; p < 0.000) (Martinez et al., 2013).
Figure 2.7:		 Arizona	migrant	death	estimates	by	data	source	(excluding	Yuma	
area),	1990–2013
Sources: Eschbach, K. et al., 1999, Death at the border, International Migration Review, 33(2):430–454; 
Cornelius, W.A., 2001, Deaths at the border: Efficacy and unintended consequences of US immigration 
control policy, Population and Development Review, 27(4):661–685; Martínez, D. et al., 2014, 
Structural violence and migrant deaths in southern Arizona: Data from the Pima County Office of the 
Medical Examiner, 1990–2013, Journal on Migration and Human Security, 2(4):257; United States 
Border Patrol, 2014.
10 In 2005, a team of researchers from the University of Arizona’s Binational Migration Institute systematically 
reviewed the PCOME records from 1990 to 2000, and coded undocumented border-crosser deaths utilizing 
the same coding schemes used by the PCOME from 2001 and on (see Rubio-Goldsmith et al., 2006; Martinez 
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The PCOME experienced a more than tenfold increase in migrant deaths in a 
very short span of time (Rubio-Goldsmith et al., 2006; Martinez et al., 2013). In 
the years prior to the “funnel effect” in Arizona, from 1990 to 1999, the PCOME 
investigated the deaths of an average of 12 migrants per year. Following the 
implementation of the border-wide Clinton administration strategy in the early 
2000s, the average increased to over 160 per year between 2000 and 2013 
(Martinez et al., 2013). The Tucson Sector has been the busiest of all nine Border 
Patrol sectors for over a decade, with the highest number of apprehensions, 
drug seizures, Border Patrol agents and deaths (Isacson, Meyer and Davis, 2013). 
A 2013 report published by the Binational Migration Institute (BMI) of the 
University of Arizona analysed data from the PCOME between 1990 and 2012. 
Data was updated to include figures for fiscal year 2013 as well as positively 
identified individuals from prior years, and published in the Journal on Migration 
and Human Security in 2014. Because the PCOME records provide the most 
detailed information available on the characteristics of deceased migrants in 
southern Arizona, the data presented in the next section of this report is drawn 
from these two versions of the BMI’s report (Martinez et al., 2013; Martínez et 
al., 2014). 
The cause of death in southern Arizona is primarily exposure to the elements, 
accounting for over 45 per cent of all migrant death cases in the PCOME records. 
This is followed by undetermined causes (38%), motor vehicle accidents (8%), 
other miscellaneous causes (5%) and homicide (4%). 
There has been some fluctuation over time in terms of leading causes of death 
in southern Arizona. As reported by Martínez and colleagues (2014), the share of 
deaths due to exposure to the elements has decreased over time while the share 
of undetermined causes has increased. Nevertheless, it is believed that many of 
the cases where an undetermined cause of death is listed are actually exposure 
deaths given the remote geography where the remains were recovered, but 
this cannot be determined with certainty (Martinez et al., 2013; Martínez et 
al., 2014). Deaths due to motor vehicle accidents have decreased in southern 
Arizona, from 20 per cent of all cases investigated from 1990 to 1999, to 11 per 
cent between 2000 and 2005 and 6 per cent between 2006 and 2013. Deaths 
due to homicide have remained unchanged over time in terms of their share of 
all causes of death (Martinez et al., 2013; Martínez et al., 2014).
While the PCOME provides excellent and comprehensive data, it is important 
to note that many demographics are limited to those decedents who have 
been successfully identified. Out of a total of 2,413 (believed-to-be) migrant 
deaths investigated between 1990 and 2013, 820 cases or over one third 
remain unidentified (Martínez et al., 2014). The causes for such a high number 
of unidentified remains relate in part to ecological factors that cause remains 
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to decompose very rapidly. The number of unidentified remains also relates to 
challenges the PCOME and others face in developing a comprehensive, regional 
DNA identification system (Jimenez, 2009; Reineke, 2013; Isacson, Meyer and 
Davis, 2013). 
Table 2.1 provides data on the countries of origin of migrants identified at the 
PCOME from 1990 to 2013, as reported by the BMI. Of those identified in this time 
period, 81.6 per cent were from Mexico. Guatemala accounted for the second 
highest country of origin represented, at a much lower 7.5 per cent of total 
identified migrants examined at the PCOME. Following Guatemala, El Salvador 
and Honduras accounted for 2.4 per cent and 1.5 per cent, respectively, of all 
countries of origin of migrants identified at the PCOME. Country of origin was 












Costa Rica 0.3 4
Colombia 0.2 3




Republic of) 0.1 1
Unknown 4.9 77
n = 1,583
Source: Martínez, D. et al., 2014, Structural violence and migrant deaths in southern Arizona: Data from the 
Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, 1990–2013, Journal on Migration and Human Security, 
2(4):257.
Note:  Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
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The PCOME records, as reported by the BMI researchers, indicate that 80 per cent 
of the decedents were male, with a mean age of 31 years – although information 
on a person’s precise age is only available for people who are successfully 
identified. While the majority of decedents were between the ages of 20 and 
39, 13 per cent were between the ages 10 and 19. As noted by Martínez et al. 
(2013, 2014), the typical migrant death investigated by the PCOME between 
1990 and 2013 can “be described as a male near the age of 30 from central or 
southern Mexico who died of exposure while attempting to avoid detection by 
U.S. authorities” (Martínez et al., 2013:19).
The BMI report notes an important shift, however, with Central Americans 
accounting for an increasing percentage of the dead. A statistically significant 
change was noted between the 2000–2005 and 2006–2012 periods, with the 
percentage of non-Mexicans increasing from 9 per cent to 18 per cent (Martínez 
et al., 2014). This change parallels trends of irregular migration across the entire 
United States–Mexico border, which saw an increase in migration from Central 
America in the same period, especially in Texas (Isacson and Meyer, 2012; US 
Border Patrol, 2014).
Texas
Texas was in fact where the first large-scale operation to “secure the border” 
was undertaken, later used as a model for the Clinton strategies. In 1993, during 
intense national concern about undocumented immigration over the border, 
El Paso Border Patrol Sector Chief Silvestre Reyes launched Operation Blockade, 
(later renamed Operation Hold the Line after pressure from Mexican officials), 
which won considerable acclaim and attention following dubious claims of 
success (Cornelius, 2001). Blockade/Hold the Line was then used as a model for 
the federal programs under Clinton, which included Gatekeeper, Safeguard, and 
eventually Operation Rio Grande in 1997 in South Texas. 
Figure 2.8 illustrates migrant death estimates in Texas from 1993 to 2013. Data 
sources include the seminal research by Eschbach and colleagues (1999), work 
by Cornelius (2001) and statistics compiled by the United States Border Patrol. 
These estimates include migrant deaths in the El Paso area. When compared 
with California, where migrant deaths have decreased rapidly over the past 20 
years, and Arizona, where deaths have increased exponentially over the past two 
decades, migrant deaths in Texas have remained relatively steady over the past 20 
years, increasing at times in 2000, 2005 and 2012–2013. As noted in Figure 2.8, 
the United States Border Patrol statistics provide the most comprehensive trend 
estimates of migrant fatalities in Texas. Nevertheless, this data does not provide 
information on demographic characteristics of the deceased or causes of death. 
On the other hand, data published by researchers at the University of Houston 
(Eschbach et al., 1999) contains the most complete and detailed information 
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on migrant demographic characteristics and causes of death, but are limited 
to deaths that occurred between 1993 and 1997. Despite this limitation in the 
Eschbach et al. 1999 data, we draw upon this source to provide information on 
causes of death in Texas, but given the dated nature of the study these figures 
should be interpreted with caution.  
Figure 2.8:		 Texas	migrant	death	estimates	by	data	source	(including	El	Paso	
area),	1993–2013
Sources: Eschbach, K. et al., 1999, Death at the border, International Migration Review, 33(2):430–454; 
Cornelius, W.A., 2001, Deaths at the border: Efficacy and unintended consequences of US immigration 
control policy, Population and Development Review, 27(4):661–685; United States Border Patrol, 
2014.
The greatest danger to migrants in Texas has historically been the unpredictable 
currents of the Rio Grande. The river boundary between much of southern Texas 
and Mexico also makes the counting of deaths complicated, as some remains are 
recovered on the US side, and some on the Mexican side. An additional number 
of bodies are swept out to sea from the Rio Grande to the Gulf of Mexico, 
never to be included in any counts. Both the University of Houston researchers 
and those from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report note more 
drownings reported on the Mexican side than on the US side. The University 
of Houston researchers report that between 1993 and 1997, Mexican officials 
counted an average of 130 to 140 cases of drowned migrants in the river per 
year, while US officials only counted an average of 40 (Eschbach et al., 1999). 
The ACLU report notes that Mexican sources reported the recovery of 88 bodies 
from the Rio Grande on the Mexican side, whereas the United States reportedly 

















Eschbach et al. 1999 Cornelius 2001 U.S. Border Patrol
Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration
65
Similar to Cornelius’ research (2001) in California, Eschbach and his colleagues 
also noted an increase in deaths due to heat, cold and dehydration between 
1993 and 1997 in Texas, likely due to the shifting of flows to more remote desert 
regions in response to increased border securitization. 
The most significant change in numbers of migrant deaths in Texas occurred 
after 2010. In 2012 and 2013, while deaths in Arizona remained at near all-time 
highs, counties along the Texas border began to report very high numbers of 
migrant deaths. Between 2011 and 2012, deaths in Texas increased 73 per cent 
(US Border Patrol, 2014). One county in particular reported very high numbers, 
especially in relation to its size. Brooks County, which is nearly 10 times smaller 
than Pima County, Arizona, in terms of geographical area, reported 129 deaths in 
calendar year 2012 compared with 20 in 2010 (MacCormack, 2013; Miroff, 2013; 
Martínez et al., 2013). This increase is confirmed by United States Border Patrol 
figures, which estimate the deaths in the Rio Grande Valley and Laredo Sectors at 
66 and 65 in fiscal year 2011, at 150 and 90 in fiscal year 2012, and at 156 and 56 
in 2013, respectively (US Border Patrol, 2014). This increase likely is the result of 
three key factors: 1) increased border enforcement efforts in Arizona which have 
pushed migrant flows into South Texas; 2) deportation practices which currently 
repatriate a high number of deportees to areas just south of Texas from where 
they then try to cross again; and 3) increased migration from Central America 
(South Texas is geographically closer to Central America).
Rather than drowning in the Rio Grande as in the past years, a high number 
of migrants in Texas in recent years are dying in the remote ranch lands of 
southern Texas. The migrant trail in this region usually follows a similar path 
whereby migrants cross the river on foot or in small rafts, and are then picked 
up by smugglers in vehicles on the US side. They are then driven north on major 
highways headed towards Houston until the first major checkpoint, which 
is near Falfurrias, Brooks County, about 70 miles north of the international 
boundary. The migrants are let out of the vehicles before the checkpoint, and 
then trek for miles in remote, dense brush in hopes of avoiding detection by 
Border Patrol at (and around) the checkpoint. It is in these remote brushlands, 
primarily private ranch land, where migrants are dying in high numbers from 
heat stroke and related causes (Kovic, 2013). Because these deaths occur on 
private land, remains may be less likely to be found and recorded. In Arizona, on 
the other hand, migrants are much more likely to cross through state, federal 
or indigenous land than private land, which may increase the likelihood that 
the remains of migrants are located by officials and reported to the proper 
authorities for investigation.
There is little to no data about the countries and regions of origin of those migrants 
who have died in South Texas over the past two decades. An exception is a 2012 
presentation by Dr Corinne Stern, Chief Pathologist of the Webb County Medical 
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Examiner, in Laredo, Texas, which reported demographics and causes of death 
for almost 200 deceased migrants examined between 2007 and 2011 (Stern, 
2012). During this time, the Webb County Medical Examiner was responsible 
for medico-legal death investigation to seven counties in south-western Texas in 
addition to Webb.11 Dr Stern reported that 91 per cent of the decedents were 
male and only 9 per cent female (ibid.). The leading cause of death for migrants 
examined by Webb County was hyperthermia (42%), followed by drowning 
(32%), undetermined causes (14%) and motor vehicle accidents (7%). Most 
of those identified were Mexicans (79%), with Hondurans and Guatemalans 
accounting for 8 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively (Stern, 2012). 
At the time, Dr Stern’s data did not include Brooks County, the county with the 
highest number of migrant fatalities in South Texas today. Although there is very 
little data available regarding the demographics of border-crossers in the Rio 
Grande Valley who have died in recent years, it is likely that a higher percentage 
of them are Central Americans than in Dr Stern’s 2012 study because of the 
increase in apprehensions of Central Americans in the area. The United States 
Border Patrol apprehensions of non-Mexicans in the Rio Grande Valley Sector 
increased from 20,890 in 2011 (accounting for 35% of apprehensions) to 96,829 
in 2013 (accounting for nearly 63% of apprehensions) – an all-time high (US 
Border Patrol, 2014). 
The increase in migrant deaths in South Texas is concerning beyond the fact of 
more loss of lives. The counties where these migrants die, such as Brooks County, 
are some of the poorest counties in the country. There is no medical examiner 
for miles, and instead remains fall under the jurisdiction of the Justice of the 
Peace. For several years, hundreds of remains discovered in Brooks County were 
buried as unidentified prior to autopsy, anthropological analysis or sampling for 
DNA (Kovic, 2013). In June 2014, researchers exhumed 52 graves of suspected 
unauthorized migrants in Falfurrias, Texas, for further examination (Reynolds, 
2014). Despite a drastic increase in migrant deaths, Brooks County has received 
no federal support for the increase in costs associated with investigating the 
deaths. Although remains discovered in Brooks County are now sent to the 
Webb County Medical Examiner’s Office located in Laredo, it is unclear what the 
conditions are for deaths in neighboring counties. 
Comparisons across California, Arizona and Texas
Estimates of migrant fatalities along the entire United States–Mexico border 
over time are extremely difficult – if not impossible – to calculate. Our goal in 
this section is to triangulate several data sources to paint a broader picture of 
how migrant deaths have been geographically dispersed across the border over 
time. We do this in two ways: 1) by providing migrant death estimates across 
California, Arizona and Texas; and 2) by calculating approximate migrant death 
11 These counties include Val Verde, Maverick, Zavala, Dimmit, La Salle, Zapata and Jim Hogg. 
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rates (standardized to 100,000 United States Border Patrol apprehensions) in 
each state over the past 20 years.
Figure 2.9 shows estimates for migrant deaths in California, Arizona and Texas 
from research conducted by Eschbach et al. (1999), Cornelius (2001) and the 
United States Border Patrol statistics, and records from the PCOME. For years, 
in which there are multiple estimates of migrant deaths for a particular state, 
we reported the mean of said data points. In cases where only one data point is 
available, we simply report that value (see Figures 2.5, 2.7 and 2.8).  
Figure 2.9:	Migrant	death	estimates	by	state	(excluding	Yuma	area),	1990–2013
Sources: Eschbach, K. et al., 1999, Death at the border, International Migration Review, 33(2):430–454; 
Cornelius, W.A., 2001, Deaths at the border: Efficacy and unintended consequences of US immigration 
control policy, Population and Development Review, 27(4):661–685; Martínez, D. et al., 2014, 
Structural violence and migrant deaths in southern Arizona: Data from the Pima County Office of the 
Medical Examiner, 1990–2013; Journal on Migration and Human Security, 2(4):257; United States 
Border Patrol, 2014.
Note:  El Paso area is included in the Texas count.
As indicated in Figure 2.9, migrant deaths were much higher in California and 
Texas in the mid-1990s than in Arizona. However, flows shifted to remote 
areas of southern Arizona following border militarization efforts as part of the 
“prevention through deterrence,” ultimately leading to an increase in migrant 
fatalities in that state as well as border-wide. While migrant deaths in Texas 
decreased steadily between 2006 and 2010, there has been a sharp increase in 
fatalities in that state over the past three years (2011–2013). We hypothesize 
that this increase is due to three previously discussed factors: 1) increased 
enforcement in Arizona that has pushed migrants into South Texas; 2) increased 
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Central America. Today, migrant deaths are lower than ever before in California, 
but remain near all-time highs in Arizona and Texas.
While the data provided in Figure 2.9 helps paint a more complete portrait of how 
estimates of migrant deaths have changed across time and space, it fails to take 
into consideration the impact that changing migration flows have on increasing 
or decreasing migrant deaths in California, Arizona and Texas. We address this 
limitation by providing an approximate “migrant death rate” for each year in 
these three states. We calculate migrant death rates by dividing migrant death 
estimates provided in Figure 2.9 by the United States Border Patrol apprehension 
statistics (used as a proxy for migration flow) in sectors corresponding to each 
state, and standardize the quotient to 100,000 apprehensions. Note that 
migrant death estimates and apprehensions statistics for the Yuma Sector were 
not included in this analysis because it encompasses an area where the states of 
California and Arizona overlap.
Figure 2.10:		Approximate	migrant	death	rate	by	state	(excluding	Yuma	area),	
1990–2013
Sources: Eschbach, K. et al., 1999, Death at the border, International Migration Review, 33(2):430–454; 
Cornelius, W.A., 2001, Deaths at the border: Efficacy and unintended consequences of US immigration 
control policy, Population and Development Review, 27(4):661–685; Martínez, D. et al., 2014, 
Structural violence and migrant deaths in southern Arizona: Data from the Pima County Office of the 
Medical Examiner, 1990–2013, Journal on Migration and Human Security, 2(4):257; United States 
Border Patrol, 2014.
Note:  El Paso area is included in the Texas rate.
As depicted in Figure 2.10, the approximate migrant death rate in California has 
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100,000 in 2013. Nevertheless, this decrease is not as prominent as the rate of 
decline in the raw count of deaths illustrated in Figure2.9 because apprehensions, 
or unauthorized migration flows, have dropped at a faster rate in California 
relative to deaths. On the other hand, the migrant death rate has increased 
exponentially in both Texas and in Arizona since the early 2000s. Despite recent 
increases in counts of migrant fatalities in Texas in 2012 and 2013, the death 
rate in Arizona was substantially higher than in Texas in 2013 (155 per 100,000 
apprehensions compared with 97 per 100,000 apprehensions). A comparison of 
the migrant death rate in Tucson Sector (160 per 100,000 apprehensions) and 
the Rio Grande Valley Sector (101 per 100,000 apprehensions) in 2013 illustrate 
a similar relationship.
Even without exact counts, it is clear that the death of migrants along the United 
States–Mexico border is a serious human rights concern. Border policies and 
restrictive visa regimes have especially been hard on the poor and marginalized, 
who often do not qualify for entry through existing US visa programmers and 
cannot afford the years it may take to qualify for a temporary worker visa. 
The evidence is overwhelming that the strategy of prevention through 
deterrence has been increasingly deadly for migrants who must travel through 
irregular means, and it is unclear whether or not it has had the desired effect of 
decreasing unauthorized border crossings. While it is likely that some potential 
migrants have been deterred from crossing as a result of increased border 
enforcement efforts, a 2012 report by the Pew Research Center suggests that 
“the weakened U.S. job and housing construction markets . . . growing dangers 
associated with illegal border crossings, the long-term decline in Mexico’s birth 
rates and broader economic conditions in Mexico” also likely play a role in the 
recent decline in unauthorized migration flows (Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-
Barrera, 2012:6). The related case of migrant deaths in Mexico is quite different, 
although the fact of vulnerability and marginalization remains.
2.3.2 Mexico
The number of migrants who have died in Mexico is unknown, although 
anecdotal evidence suggests death is common. As one unnamed humanitarian 
priest in Mexico commented to a researcher, “Mexico is a cemetery for Central 
Americans. A cemetery without crosses” (Vogt, 2012). It is important to note 
that very few migrants report abuse from local Mexican citizens. The reported 
perpetrators are overwhelmingly organized criminals. According to a report 
by the Mexican newspaper Milenio, the Mexican forensic services contain the 
remains of 24,102 unidentified bodies (Ramsey, 2012). However, it is unknown 
how many of these may be the remains of migrants. 
The context leading to migrant death in Mexico contributes to the lack of 
information and exact numbers. As noted, migrants in Mexico share travel 
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routes with organized criminals smuggling drugs into the United States. Just as 
the migrants are preyed upon by organized crime, human rights defenders are 
at risk when attempting to protect migrants and research their disappearances 
(UNHCR, 2011; Pereyra, 2013). Families of the missing are also afraid to come 
forward to report cases (ibid.). However, there is evidence that when migrants 
and their families do come forward, officials are often reluctant to open an 
investigation (Human Rights Watch, 2013). A 2011 UN Working Group on 
Enforced Disappearances also reported consistent lack of investigation by 
Mexican authorities into reports of disappearances (UNHCR, 2011). 
Although overall counts are lacking, some mass murder events have gained 
international attention in recent years. In late August 2010, 72 migrants 
were murdered in San Fernando, Tamaulipas, by Los Zetas, a drug trafficking 
syndicate. Their bodies were discovered on a ranch by the Mexican military. The 
72 included 58 men and 14 women, mostly from Central and South America. 
Later on, in 2011, Mexican authorities discovered mass graves containing a total 
of 193 victims, also in San Fernando, Tamaulipas, many of whom were migrants. 
A particularly disturbing event occurred in May 2012, when the severed torsos 
of 49 victims were discovered scattered along a major highway in Cadereyta, 
Nuevo León. Although those responsible, Los Zetas, indicated that the dead 
were members of a rival gang, authorities have not ruled out the possibility that 
they were migrants, and investigations are ongoing. 
As mentioned, migrants in Mexico also perish by accidental means, including 
falling from trains or getting lost in the remote areas of northern states near the 
US border (Isacson and Meyer, 2012). However, there are no conclusive counts 
available estimating the number of such fatalities. 
2.4 Record keeping and limitations to existing counts
Five key factors contribute to incomplete death counts in both Mexico and the 
United States: 1) the clandestine nature of undocumented migration; 2) the 
geographical conditions where remains are found; 3) the fear migrants and 
human rights defenders face in reporting or researching cases; 4) inconsistencies 
in defining methods and scope; and 5) lack of federal accountability and attention 
towards the problem of migrant death in general. 
Because those dying along migrant trails in Mexico and the United States do 
so outside official, state-sanctioned avenues for immigration, much of their 
movement is outside state surveillance. They live “shadowed lives” (Chavez, 
1997) and their deaths, especially while in transit, are in many ways invisible. In 
their efforts to evade Mexican security forces, organized crime or Border Patrol, 
migrants attempt to obscure their identity. Investigators at the PCOME in Tucson 
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have learned to treat identification cards with suspicion, as many migrants carry 
false identification media. Migrants are often told by coyotes to change their 
clothing before the trek across the border to blend in to the scenery and avoid 
detection. Some migrant remains have even been found with “cheat sheets” – 
study guides like teaching Central American migrants how to speak and act in 
ways to help them pass as Mexicans during their journey. 
Whether it is attempts to avoid identification like those mentioned above, rules 
from coyotes for migrant groups before crossing, or the remote geographies 
migrants use to travel, the goal is to enter the United States or Mexico undetected. 
The lack of data on the overall number of migrants to successfully cross the 
Mexico–Guatemala border or the United States–Mexico border means that 
understanding migrant deaths will, to some extent, always be limited. Although 
the authors believe that relatively complete counts of the dead are within the 
ability of the federal authorities in both cases, knowing changes over time and 
rates of migrant death versus successful crossings will be limited by the absence 
of an accurate denominator. 
Migrant deaths in various contexts around the world can be characterized as 
what forensic experts call an “open disaster,” as opposed to a “closed disaster.” 
An example of a closed disaster is a plane crash, where a passenger manifest 
generally exists, and a contained number of victims are involved. An open 
disaster, on the other hand, “is a major catastrophic event resulting in the deaths 
of a number of unknown individuals for whom no prior records or descriptive 
data are available” (INTERPOL, 2009:3). Examples of an open disaster include 
hurricane Katrina in 2005 or the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, where the scene 
initially involved an unknown number of victims and missing persons. Although 
the remains of the deceased may or may not all be recoverable, the key 
characteristic in an open disaster is that an unknown number of missing persons 
could have been involved in the event. Open disasters require more intensive 
research to establish the number of potential victims. In addition to being “open” 
to an undetermined number of cases, the counting of victims in this context is 
also challenged by the vast geographical space where migrants travel. Stretching 
from South American countries to Canada, migrants are disappearing and dying 
in multiple countries, and often in some of the most remote regions of those 
countries. 
The same geographical factors that lead to a high number of deaths in Mexico 
and the United States also lead to challenges in counting migrant remains. In 
Mexico, the migrant trail is so deeply occupied by organized crime that it is 
difficult to discern homicide victims who were migrants versus those who were 
non-migrants. In addition to falling prey to organized crime, a number of migrants 
also perish due to the elements in northern Mexico on their way towards the 
United States–Mexico border. The geographical challenges in this area are more 
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akin to those of the United States, where the discovery of migrant remains is 
delayed due to geographical factors. 
The remote geographies and harsh ecologies where migrants travel in the United 
States pose specific challenges to counting. Migrant remains are destroyed by 
arid climates, preyed upon by wild animals, swept away by floods following 
seasonal rain patterns, hidden by those afraid of prosecution, or lost at sea. Of 
course, in addition to posing challenges to a complete count of migrant remains, 
these factors also deeply challenge the identification process. An estimated 
2,000 migrants are reported to be missing along the United States–Mexico 
border (Colibrí Center for Human Rights, 2014). 
The lived experience of fear for migrants and their families, existing at all points 
along the migrant journey from home to destination, prevents many relatives 
and surviving migrants from reporting cases of death and disappearance. As a 
large number of Central American migrants are fleeing violence in their home 
countries, reporting a death or disappearance to the authorities in this region 
could pose an additional level of risk to those relatives still in the country. Along 
the migrant trail, fellow migrants who witness abuses or deaths could be afraid 
to report to the authorities for fear of deportation or reprisals. Similarly, in the 
United States, many families are afraid to call authorities regarding a missing 
person for fear of deportation, which could lead to further family separation. Also, 
in Mexico, as previously mentioned, human rights defenders face increasingly 
severe security risks as they look into cases of violence and criminal activity. 
The final two key factors contributing to limited data about migrant deaths are 
deeply interrelated. The inconsistency in methods for defining, reporting and 
counting migrant deaths is related to lack of attention at the federal level towards 
centralizing such counts. As stated by Maria Jimenez in the 2009 ACLU report: 
“There is no coordinated process to systemize counting the dead. Estimates vary 
with the source, the criteria used to identify remains as those of undocumented 
migrants, and the method for registering the dead” (24).
In the US context, the four border-states where migrants are dying each have 
a different system for investigating and tracking deaths. California operates on 
a coroner-medical examiner system, with two key counties recording migrant 
deaths. Arizona operates on a medical examiner system, with two to three 
different offices examining deceased migrants. Only one office in Arizona 
(PCOME) counts migrant remains specifically. New Mexico has a statewide 
medical examiner system, which means that the data is likely quite accurate for 
the small number of remains discovered in that state. Texas is where problems 
are the most severe, with 15 counties bordering Mexico, and a confusing Justice 
of the Peace medico-legal system. Thus, along the border, each state, sector, 
county, or district records deaths slightly differently, and many do not count 
migrant deaths as a specific category of fatality. 
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Some counties in the United States may have requirements for recording a death 
that might inadvertently exclude migrant cases in particular. The University 
of Houston researchers referenced earlier (Eschbach et al., 1999) found that 
medical investigators in Imperial County, California, require “a body part that 
is essential to life” such as a skull or a spinal column to be recovered for a 
death certificate to be filed (1999:438). It is unknown whether this is still the 
case. The researchers also mention the case of a sheriff in Texas who “would 
arrange for a death certificate on a human skull only if the decedent’s family 
became involved” (ibid.). These methods may exclude cases of migrant remains 
in particular because it is not uncommon for migrant remains to become highly 
fragmented before recovery (Anderson, 2008), and the decentralized nature of 
missing migrant investigation may prevent a family from being involved before 
the investigation ends (Reineke, 2013). 
Many of these problems could be solved with a federal requirement or mandate 
to count migrant remains, along with systematic guidelines and criteria. It may 
be true that Border Patrol records are complete. However, the methodology for 
such counts is not transparent, and various researchers have found the agency’s 
estimates to be incomplete (Eschbach et al., 1999; GAO, 2006; Jimenez, 2009). 
Given that the local methods for reporting migrant deaths are inconsistent and 
decentralized, it is highly unlikely that a complete count exists.
2.5 Conclusion and recommendations
The initial crisis of the loss of lives of thousands of migrants in North America 
over the past two decades is compounded by lack of information about such 
fatalities. Incomplete data on missing and deceased migrants in Mexico and 
the United States limits the scope and effectiveness of efforts to prevent such 
deaths. There is no complete count, let alone detailed statistical analysis of the 
demographics and causes of death for deceased migrants in the Americas. The 
most detailed, complete and systematic effort to enumerate migrant deaths and 
provide a profile of the deceased as well as information on leading causes of 
death in any single region has come from the efforts put forth by the PCOME in 
Tucson, Arizona. The methods utilized by the PCOME can and should be used 
as a blueprint by jurisdictions encountering recent surges in migrant fatalities. 
Adhering to such consistent and precise methodology is imperative, as the lack 
of understanding of the phenomenon of migrant fatalities in the Americas will 
stunt efforts to save lives, repatriate the dead and prosecute those involved in 
homicides or forced disappearances. 
Migrants throughout the Americas constitute a vulnerable population, requiring 
extra protections by international, State and local governing bodies. Although 
exact numbers are unavailable, it is clear that migrants are facing severe threats 
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to their security in both Mexico and the United States. They are dying and 
disappearing at an alarming rate, a rate that should raise concerns regarding the 
safety and security of all persons in regions affected. 
The following recommendations are limited specifically to the problem of 
enumerating dead and missing migrants. 
• United States
 − The United States Border Patrol must make its methodology for 
enumerating migrant deaths along the border public. Further, the agency 
should provide basic demographic data on the deceased (age, biological 
sex, place of origin, etc.), information on leading causes of death and 
identification rates across Border Patrol sectors.
 − Local border jurisdictions should follow the example and criteria of the 
PCOME in Arizona for counting migrant fatalities of both identified and 
unidentified individuals. This effort should include working closely with 
forensic anthropologists, local authorities, Border Patrol agents and 
foreign consulates.
 − Civil society organizations, academics and representatives from local 
governments along the border should convene a meeting to establish 
shared guidelines for the enumeration of migrant deaths along the border 
to cross-check Border Patrol counts.
 − Local jurisdictions should follow federal and state laws as well as 
professional best practices when investigating migrant deaths.
• Mexico
 − Mexican Government officials should improve rates of investigation into 
the deaths or disappearances of migrants as reported by families or 
human rights defenders.
 − Federal and local authorities, especially in the medical examiner system 
(i.e. El Servicio Médico Forense), should make available data regarding the 
number of recovered remains along migrant routes, including unidentified 
remains.
 − Human rights defenders, migrant rights and humanitarian organizations, 
and relevant federal and local officials should convene a meeting to 
determine best practices for the enumeration of migrant deaths and 
disappearances.
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Tracking Deaths in the 
MediterraneanChapter 3 
Tamara Last1 and Thomas Spijkerboer2
3.1 Introduction
The recent surge of popular interest in and increasing public awareness of 
migrant deaths in the Mediterranean has turned the question of how many 
have died into an urgent matter. Attempts to respond to this question have 
produced varying estimates. This variation is partly attributable to the politically 
controversial nature of the subject of border-related deaths: different political 
and institutional actors have different stakes in the answer to this question. In 
addition, there is a general paucity of information about those who have died 
attempting to cross the southern external borders of the European Union (EU) 
without authorization, especially when compared with the amount of data 
generated about the arrival, interception, rescue, detention and deportation 
of migrants – statistics which can serve to justify funding and intensification of 
border control. 
This chapter investigates the various estimates of deaths that have been 
produced – where they come from, how they are used, what they add to 
debates, proposed solutions, policy and policy development, awareness of the 
issue and human rights advocacy, among others. It shows that existing estimates 
are insufficient for documenting how many people have died trying to cross 
the southern EU external borders. The chapter also reviews the possibilities for 
improved data on border-related deaths.
There are numerous reasons why it is important to document the number 
of people who have died attempting to cross into southern Europe without 
authorization. For one, this information would enable us to appreciate the extent 
of migrant mortality in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, knowledge of when, 
where and how migrants die is important to determine the factors contributing 
to these deaths, so that further incidents may be prevented through changes in 
policy or practices. The lack of reliable and accurate data prevents debates from 
* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM).
1 Tamara Last is a PhD candidate at the VU University Amsterdam.
2 Thomas Spijkerboer is a Professor of Migration Law at the VU University Amsterdam.
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moving forward towards evidence-based solutions. If there are elements to 
migrant mortality in the Mediterranean that are related to policies and practices 
of State authorities – in particular if a relationship can be established with 
border control policies and practices – this would raise human rights concerns. 
As there is an increasing volume of funds at the national and EU levels being 
channelled into border control efforts, the intended and unintended effects 
of such activities should be publicly known if these activities are to maintain 
democratic legitimacy. A lack of reliable information also hinders policymakers’ 
and civil society’s engagement with the issue more generally, contributing to the 
neutralization and legitimization of border-related deaths that, as Weber (2010) 
argues, explains why European societies have so long turned a blind eye to the 
problem. 
Finally, we need to know who is dying so that we understand who faces the risk 
of death at the border, whether there are particularly vulnerable groups and, 
importantly, in order to notify the families of the deceased. Without confirmation 
of the death of their relatives, family members are not only denied closure but 
may also be unable to inherit or remarry (Grant, 2011; Moorehead, 2014; and 
Weber and Pickering, 2011).
3.2 Brief historical and geographical overview
The main routes for irregular migration across the Mediterranean area to the EU 
are the following: from Turkey to Greece – both by sea and by land in the Evros 
region (the Eastern Mediterranean route); from Tunisia and Libya to Italy and 
Malta (the Central Mediterranean route); from Morocco to mainland Spain by 
sea, as well as to the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, by land and sea (the 
Western Mediterranean route); and from the West African coast (Cabo Verde, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Senegal) to the Canary Islands. Less common are the 
sea routes from Egypt to Crete and Italy, from Algeria to Sardinia, and from 
Algeria to Spain. The sea route from Albania to Italy, which was an important 
route especially in the late 1990s, no longer plays a very significant role. Instead, 
irregular migrants crossing the Adriatic Sea and the Strait of Otranto depart 
from Greece in an attempt to reach Northern and Western Europe. There seems 
to be little boat migration to Portugal and Cyprus, which may be related to 
their geographical location and to the sea conditions and currents along their 
coastlines. See Figure 3.1 for detections of irregular migrants along selected 
routes to the EU in 2013.





Source: Frontex Risk Analysis, 2014.
The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Europol 
and Frontex have created an online interactive animation (iMap3)  showing the 
shifts of mixed migration flows towards and across the southern EU external 
borders over the period 2000–2013. It illustrates how routes fade in and out of 
use over time, as strategies are developed by border agencies in response to 
irregular entry, by migrants and facilitation networks to circumvent obstructions, 
leading to new responses, and so on.4 Figure 3.2 shows shifts in routes based on 
Frontex data on detections of illegal border crossings.  
3 See http://www.imap-migration.org/index.php?id=471&L=0%20.
4 For an analysis focusing on the Canary Islands, see Godenau (2014). 
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Figure 3.2:	Fluctuations	in	popularity	of	routes	to	Europe,	2009–2013
Source: Frontex Risk Analysis, 2014.
In addition to travelling clandestinely by boat, migrants also use regular means 
of transport. Many will enter the EU with, for example, tourist visas, and then 
overstay, but they may also travel without any authorization, for example, by 
using forged documents or hiding from border checks. In both cases, migrants 
use regular means of transport in order to effectuate irregular migration. 
Migrating clandestinely by boat is not the most common mode of migration; 
migrants travel by air, cargo and passenger ships; and by car, bus, lorry or train. 
The general estimate is that only about 10 per cent of irregular migrants enter 
Europe by sea (Triandafyllidou and Vogel, 2010; and De Bruycker, Di Bartolomeo 
and Fargues, 2013). Nonetheless, existing data suggests that migrant deaths 
occur overwhelmingly during clandestine sea voyages (Kiza, 2008:221–224).
The relatively low number of migrant deaths before 1990 may be related to the 
fact that it used to be much easier to reach Europe by regular means, even in 
the absence of official government authorization to immigrate. The introduction 
of visa obligations for many countries of origin, coupled with carrier sanctions, 
may have led to a shift from regular means of transport, such as airplanes and 
ferries, to irregular means of transport like fishing boats. The cessation of boat 
migration along the Albania–Italy route and the subsequent shift to, among 
others, passage from Libya to Italy has been related to border control practices 
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As to the countries of origin, existing data suggests that in the 1990s migrants 
on the Western and Eastern Mediterranean routes predominantly originated 
from Morocco and Algeria, and Turkey and the Middle East respectively (Carling, 
2007; and FRA, 2013). However, the origin of migrants using these routes has 
diversified and includes people from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and 
South Asia. Migrants who travel clandestinely by sea, in particular the Central 
Mediterranean route, are often fleeing conflict zones such as Afghanistan, 
Eritrea, Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic (Figure 3.3). 
Figure 3.3:		 Detections	of	 illegal	border	crossing	along	EU	external	 land	and	
sea	borders	by	nationality,	2013
Source: Frontex Annual Risk Analysis, 2014. 
In response to irregular migration by sea, European countries have stepped 
up border control over the past two decades. This has taken various forms, 
such as Italy’s naval blockade in the Adriatic in the late 1990s; Spain’s high-
tech surveillance system called Sistema de Vigilancia Exterior (SIVE) and its 
cooperation with West African countries in the late 2000s; Italy’s controversial 
pushbacks of migrants to Libya in 2009; the razor-wire fences in Ceuta and 
Melilla; and the demining of the Evros region, followed by the construction of a 
high-tech fence in 2013. At the EU level, a specialized EU border agency, Frontex, 
was created. Frontex has coordinated multiple operations to combat smuggling 
and trafficking and prevent irregular migration at sea; these operations include: 
the Gate of Africa, which targets stowaways travelling between Morocco and 
Spain; Hera, focused on the region between West Africa Senegal and Mauritania 
in particular, and the Canary Islands; Poseidon, in main land and sea crossing 
points between Greece and Turkey, Greece and Albania, and Bulgaria and Turkey; 
Hermes, between Tunisia, Libya and Algeria, and the southern Italian islands of 
Lampedusa, Sicily and Sardinia; Aeneas, in the Ionian Sea between Turkey and 
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sub-Saharan Africa and Spain, where migration happens partly in response to 
the protracted crisis in Mali; and Nautilus, in the region between Libya, Malta 
and Italy.5 Another significant development at the EU level is the introduction 
of Eurosur, an integrated surveillance and intelligence system for the entire 
Mediterranean.6 It seems plausible that these innovations in border policies and 
practices have influenced the itineraries of migrants, which in turn may have led 
to a relatively higher migrant death toll, as argued by several authors (Fekete, 
2003; Carling, 2007; Spijkerboer, 2007; Grant, 2011; and FRA, 2013). 
3.3 Risks associated with unauthorized travel
People who attempt to cross the southern EU external borders without 
authorization face a number of risks. One risk they all share is that of interception 
by authorities. As unauthorized, “illegalized” border-crossers, being caught by 
border guards or other State officials may result in migrants being detained and/or 
deported, subjected to violence perpetrated by these officials, forced overboard 
by smugglers in fear of being caught, or “pushed back” (being removed out of 
the jurisdiction of the intercepting State without any possibility to claim asylum 
or humanitarian protection). However, being caught on the ‟right” side of the 
border can result in rescue and/or an opportunity to lodge an asylum claim.
The different modes of unauthorized border-crossing also carry specific risks. For 
stowaways in regular means of transport, the risks are mostly related to where 
migrants hide to avoid being detected and caught. These places may include: 
underneath lorries, where migrants face a danger of falling among moving 
vehicles; wheel bays of planes, where migrants are at risk of freezing to death, 
suffocating or falling; sealed containers on cargo ships or on the back of lorries, 
where there is a danger of suffocation; and engine rooms or propeller bays of 
ships, where migrants are at risk due to machinery and/or suffocation. For those 
who cross the land borders between Morocco and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta 
and Melilla, the dangers faced are from the razor-wire fences that fortify these 
borders as well as violence from the Moroccan police and pushbacks by the 
Spanish Guardia Civil. The land border between Greece and Turkey is mostly 
marked by a deep and fast-flowing river, so the risks are similar to those faced 
at sea (which is explained in detail in the succeeding paragraph). This border 
region was also the site of thousands of unexploded landmines until 2009, 
according to the Greek Government, and has vast areas of dense forest in which 
it is easy to become lost, and thus face the dangers of starvation, dehydration 
and hypothermia, among others. 
5 Frontex provides an overview of its operations at http://frontex.europa.eu/operations/archive-of-
operations/.
6 Established by Regulation 2051/2013, OJ 2013 L295/11.
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Being at sea (or crossing the Evros river) carries a wide range of risks, some 
applicable to persons at sea generally, and others specific to unauthorized 
migrants. The general risks of being at sea include bad weather, rough seas and 
poor visibility. The dangers associated with such conditions are heightened for 
irregular migrants for various reasons. While faced by all sea vessels, migrant 
boats are at greater risk of losing direction or running out of supplies of food 
or, more devastatingly, drinking water. Often every space on a boat used to 
carry unauthorized migrants is reserved for additional paying passengers rather 
than food, water or fuel; furthermore, these boats are more likely to get lost 
as they may be operated by inexperienced captains with little to no navigation 
equipment on board. Migrant boats tend to be of very low quality, increasingly 
so since the likelihood of confiscation has increased with stricter surveillance. 
Since the boat will presumably be lost, smugglers have an incentive to invest 
as little as possible in the boat itself. Those who cross from West Africa to the 
Canary Islands may quite easily miss the mark and drift out to the Atlantic. Boats 
that run out of fuel can drift for weeks, passengers dying slowly of dehydration, 
starvation, hypothermia or sun stroke. Migrant boats are also at greater risk of 
shipwreck and capsizing due to overcrowding, inexperienced crew and captain, 
and substandard quality of the boats, which means that leaks and motor failure 
occur frequently. 
Rescue operations themselves are inherently quite dangerous, especially in bad 
conditions, because they involve careful manoeuvring and transfer of passengers 
from one vessel to another. Rescue of migrant boats, especially unseaworthy 
boats, is risky because of overcrowding and poor stewardship. Unauthorized 
migrants are also, of course, the target of interception operations, which carry 
the same risks as rescue operations if not more, because border guards are not 
usually trained as coast guards and border patrol boats do not always carry 
rescue equipment. The fact that the passengers on board migrant boats are 
not generally accustomed to being at sea, sometimes cannot swim and may be 
fearful of State authorities contributes to the risk of rescue and interception 
operations ending in fatalities. 
As a result of disputes between State authorities over the location of rescue and 
disembarkation responsibilities, migrants also run the risk of not being rescued. 
Distress calls have been known to go unanswered or ignored (Strik, 2012; Heller 
and Pezzani, 2014). Private vessels may not assist a migrant boat in distress due 
to the related risks and financial losses that stand no chance of compensation, 
and because they fear their assistance may lead to arrest and prosecution for 
supposedly assisting illegal immigration. Rather than being rescued, migrant 
boats may be “pushed back” to the high seas or to another coast. Human rights 
reports insist that this was common between Italy and Libya/Tunisia,7 between 
7 European Court of Human Rights, 23 February 2012, application 27765/09, Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy.
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Spain and Morocco (MSF, 2013), and between Turkey and Greece, both in the 
Aegean Sea and in the river Evros (PRO ASYL, 2013). Being pushed back increases 
the chances of running out of supplies, getting lost or drifting, thus subjecting 
migrants to prolonged exposure at sea. 
3.4 How many die? Existing data and its quality
The most comprehensive, Europe-wide set of data is the list of fatalities of 
UNITED for Intercultural Action (UNITED), an international non-governmental 
organization (NGO) based in Amsterdam.8 This list is based on media reports, 
and each entry mentions the source on which it is based.9 UNITED’s List of 
Deaths was started as a monitoring mechanism in 1993 by a network of civil 
society actors to record the deaths of refugees and migrants they attribute 
to the immigration and border control policies of Fortress Europe. The latest 
published version of the list includes 17,306 cases from 1993 to November 2012. 
However, UNITED utilizes a broad definition of “border death,” including those 
who die in detention centres, those who die as homeless people, the victims 
of  racist attacks in Europe, those who lose their lives crossing  borders within 
the EU (for instance between France and the United Kingdom), and anywhere 
on the journey to Europe, meaning  not only in the physical border region but 
also in the Sahara Desert, for instance. When filtered for a narrower definition 
of ‟border deaths,” as those which occur during the attempt to cross a southern 
EU external border, the total number comes to around 14,600.  
The other frequently referenced list, which is comparable in methodology, is 
the one of Fortress Europe, run by Italian journalist Gabriele Del Grande since 
2006.10 Fortress Europe uses news media as its primary source and civil society 
organizations as a secondary source, similar to UNITED. However, while UNITED 
lists numerous sources for cases which were widely reported, Fortress Europe 
only provides one. The Fortress Europe blog lists a total of 19,812 migrants 
who died or went missing on their way to Europe from 1988 until the end of 
June 2014. This total is higher than that of UNITED, which is in part due to the 
extended temporal coverage, and mostly due to the more extensive coverage 
of the Egyptian (Sinai)–Israeli border and the Sahara. UNITED, on the other 
hand, covers Greece and Spain more comprehensively (see Figure 3.5). The total 
number of border deaths reported by Fortress Europe for the Mediterranean 
region only (deaths which occur during attempts to cross the southern EU external 
borders without authorization) is 14,757 from 1988 until the end of June 2014. 
This figure is close to that of UNITED for the same region and definition of border 
deaths; however, even in their coverage of the Mediterranean, the two lists are 
far from identical, both revealing gaps in the accuracy of the other. Nonetheless, 
8 See www.unitedagainstracism.org. 
9 At the bottom of the “List of Deaths,” all sources on which UNITED has relied are listed.
10 See www.fortresseurope.blogspot.com. 
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they both demonstrate a similar trend in the total number of border deaths over 
time (see Figure 3.4). 
Figure 3.4:	 Comparison	of	UNITED	and	Fortress	Europe	lists	of	border	deaths	
in	the	Mediterranean,	1993–2011
Source: Data extracted by authors from UNITED and Fortress Europe.
The fact that the two major sources of data on border deaths are themselves 
sourced from news media raises significant concerns vis-à-vis the reliability 
of press reporting. Big incidents are generally well recorded: the higher the 
number of deaths, the more attractive the news story is to journalists. Some 
places receive more media attention than others because they have developed 
into “border theatres” (Cuttitta, 2014); therefore, we can suspect that deaths 
in these places are reported more systematically in the media, as in the case of 
Lampedusa. Local media is generally more reliable at reporting individual bodies 
found on beaches, or by local fishermen or other private seafarers. Nevertheless, 
news media is a problematic source for three reasons: 
• Media reports news. If deaths happen all the time, it stops being news. At 
other times, border deaths may not have been considered as relevant as they 
are now. Sometimes they are reported as faits divers, as page fillers, while, 
for example, shortly after big accidents media attention for individual deaths 
may be more intense. These factors lead to undercounting.
• The details that are important to journalists for the story are not necessarily 
the same details that are important to social science or forensic investigations. 
For academic research, detailed information about the circumstances of 
death, the cause of death and the precise location where death presumably 
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gaps and diversity of information found in the UNITED, Fortress Europe, 
The Migrants Files and APDHA lists. Moreover, the journalist picks up on 
information available at the time of writing. As in the case of environmental 
or industrial disasters, the immediate body counts or reports of how many 
are missing are not often the most accurate. If there is no follow-up article, 
the facts may never be published. 
• Although it is likely that the total counts are underestimates, there is a 
chance of overcounting when using the news media. For example, media 
may report 10 people missing, and three weeks later report two bodies found 
in an advanced state of decomposition somewhere along the coast. These 
could be two of the 10 missing, but one cannot be sure unless a survivor can 
identify them. Should one assume 10 migrants died, or 12? 
In its annual report on human rights at the frontiers of Spain, Asociación Pro 
Derechos Humanos de Andalucía (APDHA, Andalusian Association for Human 
Rights) also publishes information about migrants who died or went missing on 
their way to Spain. Numbers from the APDHA tend to be higher than figures from 
other sources for the Western Mediterranean route. However, the APDHA does 
not specify the source/s of each case, and includes deaths of migrants presumed 
to be on their way to Spain, but which in fact occur, for example, in the desert in 
Niger (APDHA, 2014:53).
Over the years, various academics have used UNITED, Fortress Europe and/or the 
APDHA in combination with other sources to attempt more accurate estimates 
by checking and cleaning the data provided by these databases. Local, short-
term studies (Godenau and Zapata Hernández, 2008; Carling, 2007; Cuttitta, 
2006) lead to higher numbers than the ones from UNITED and Fortress Europe 
but for smaller areas (Spain and Sicily, respectively) and for short periods. Most 
likely, this is the case because big NGO networks such as UNITED rely on national 
and regional media, while a local study such as Cuttitta (2005) included all 
local Sicilian media, for instance. Kiza (2008) reviewed the data available as of 
2008 and built a more scientific database, MigVicEU. Using the UNITED list as 
a starting point, Kiza checked and confirmed the details of each case by adding 
and triangulating different sources, and narrowed the focus of the database to 
those who died on their way to Europe, excluding those who, for example, died 
in detention centres. Similarly, in 2013, a consortium of journalists started The 
Migrants Files, aimed at improving the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the 
UNITED and Fortress Europe data, which was their starting point.11 However, the 
resulting databases of The Migrants Files (publicly available) and Kiza are still 
based primarily on news media and demonstrate similar trends of fatalities over 
time as the UNITED and Fortress Europe lists (see Figure 3.5). 
11 See www.journalismfund.eu/migrants-files. 




Source:  UNITED; Fortress Europe; APDHA; Carling, 2007; Kiza, 2008.
Note: 2014 data is until the end of June.
The information provided in the UNITED list ranges according to the quality and 
detail of the sources. In some cases, name, gender, age, nationality, place, date, 
cause and circumstances of death, and how many bodies were found by whom 
are provided, whereas in others the description can be as simple as the month or 
year, and an estimated number of persons who “drowned in the Mediterranean”. 
Fortress Europe lists the date, the (supposed) country or region of origin, and 
a description which, again, ranges dramatically in the amount of detail. As 
Pickering and Cochrane (2012) found when attempting a gender analysis of a 
dataset derived from the UNITED List of Deaths, there are insufficient cases with 
comparable information to be able to draw conclusions about who dies where, 
of what and why.
Yet another issue is whether the existing sources contain information on the 
cause of death. For some, the cause of death is directly related to the border: 
mines in Evros (until 2009); razor-wire fence in Ceuta and Melilla; shootings 
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African border guards. The data presently available suggests there are more 
deaths directly related to border control at land borders than at sea. For the vast 
majority, however, the cause of death is only indirectly related to border control. 
Most boat migrants seem to die of drowning, hypothermia and dehydration, 
while most stowaways seem to die of suffocation and dehydration. As far as we 
can tell from the data currently available, factors contributing to causes of death, 
both directly and less directly related to border control, are the risks associated 
with unauthorized travel, attitudes towards and dehumanization of ‟illegal” 
migrants, detection-avoidance tactics and profit-driven behaviour of smugglers, 
and lack of experience of migrants with the open sea.
In addition to the sources from civil society, some official figures are published. 
The Spanish Ministry of Interior has released numbers on an ad hoc basis,12 
probably derived from operational reports by Guardia Civil and La Sociedad de 
Salvamento y Seguridad Maritima (SASEMAR), the integrated Spanish sea search 
and rescue system. When departures from Algeria became more common, the 
Algerian Government announced total figures per year of those known to the 
Algerian navy and coast guard to be dead or missing at sea on the way to Europe 
(Fargues, 2013:14). However, this data is not individualized but provided only in 
aggregated form, which makes it impossible to test its accuracy and to compare 
it with UNITED and similar sources. The Italian Special Commissioner for Missing 
Persons has compiled a list of unidentified corpses and human remains in Italy, 
the vast majority of which are thought to be migrants (Cattaneo et al., 2010). 
However, it is not yet complete, and it will not list any identified migrants. Thus, 
the published official statistics raise more questions than they answer. Agencies 
that deal directly with migrants attempting to cross the southern EU border 
without authorization, such as the national coast guards and Frontex, do not 
include data on deaths in their annual reports or statistics. 
As a result of the paucity of official statistics, UNITED’s List of Deaths and the 
Fortress Europe blog have remained the primary sources of data on border-
related deaths in the Mediterranean. Although there has been an increase in 
visualizations of data (see, for example, the maps produced by Migreurop13), and 
papers and reports on the subject over the last 10 years, sources of data have 
not developed, therefore it is questionable to what extent knowledge of the 
subject has moved forward in any substantive way. 
Civil society groups and journalists have so far taken on the role of keeping track 
of the number of deaths and missing migrants in the Mediterranean; without 
them there would be very little information available. However, it seems that 
UNITED has either stopped counting or is no longer making its List of Deaths 
public, as the last version available online is dated 1 November 2012. The efforts 
12 Data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior is in PowerPoint presentations on file with the authors. 
13 See http://www.migreurop.org/?lang=en.
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of The Migrants Files journalists and academics such as Carling (2007) and 
Kiza  (2008) seem to be focused on cleaning and checking past cases rather than 
monitoring the ongoing system. Local civil society groups still record information 
about shipwrecks and other incidents involving fatalities, but their primary aim 
is not to generate public knowledge but to assist in the identification, burial and 
repatriation of bodies, and in searches for missing persons. 
Some individuals caught up in the process of dealing with border deaths or 
unauthorized border crossings have kept their own records. In the research 
they are presently undertaking, the authors have discovered coroners who keep 
databases of every autopsy they have done of irregular migrants, civil registrars 
who have taken it upon themselves to create special lists of cases that come 
to them for registration, and cemetery offices which keep separate records 
of all the irregular migrants they have buried. However, these actors do not 
aim to publicize their databases, but keep them out of a sense of professional 
responsibility and the feeling that someday someone might come asking about 
them. Thus, while total estimates have varied and diversified, publicly accessible 
data has in fact reduced over the last two years – UNITED has ceased to put 
new entries in the death list online for instance – and there has been little to 
no publication of official government statistics to supplement civil society 
monitoring efforts. 
3.5 Methods and sources for a more accurate 
and comprehensive count 
Established scientific methods of counting deaths in difficult contexts such as 
conflict zones, namely surveys of random, representative samples of households, 
are not appropriate in the case of border deaths due to the clandestine nature 
of the border crossing, the transnational element of the migrants’ deaths, and 
the difficulties associated with locating families in such a range of countries 
of origin. There are, however, numerous potential sources of data on border 
deaths through the generation of paperwork during the process of investigating, 
registering and burying a dead body that is brought, by boat or tide, to countries 
along the Mediterranean shore. The authors are carrying out a research using 
such sources in Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain. These official sources each come 
with specific limitations. 
In Spain, border deaths are counted as ‟unnatural” or ‟suspicious,” which means 
that a court must declare the body judicially dead and open an investigation. 
In Italy, border deaths are considered unnatural and the public prosecutor of 
the province (the Procura) decides whether to open an investigation or not. 
In Malta, a magistrate presides over the investigation into the cause of death 
and – particular to Malta – the assessment whether or not the person died in 
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Maltese territory. In Greece, the public prosecutor appears to play a less active 
role in the investigation, but nonetheless presides over the case and authorizes 
autopsies and so on. Since the case files of Courts of Instruction (Spain), public 
prosecutors (Greece and Italy) and magistrates (Malta) contain copies of police 
reports, coroner reports, orders to register and bury, and other paperwork 
generated during the investigation, they ought to be the ideal sources of data 
on border deaths. However, there are two major problems: firstly, case files are 
not comprehensively archived and are usually destroyed after a period of 5 to 15 
years, so they are difficult or even impossible to locate. As border death cases are 
not allocated a special category or separated from other case files, even where 
databases of cases exist, there is no way to search for them with the limited 
information we currently have. Counting on this source would involve having to 
search through rooms of chaotic files containing all case files and perhaps one or 
two border death case files. Secondly, even if all border deaths were registered 
(which might not always happen in Italy or Greece) and the case files could all 
be located, such documents are generally regarded as confidential and require 
special access permission which may not be granted on a large-scale basis 
necessary to identify border death cases. In all four countries, the authorities 
involved in the criminal investigation do keep digital records, but in their present 
form these cannot be used for compiling information about migrant deaths.
Coast guards in Greece collect statistics, but we do not know what their 
methods or inclusion/exclusion criteria are; therefore, we do not know if there 
are methodological differences between units, making this source unreliable 
for the time being. The police in all countries collect data because they are 
always involved in the process when a body is found, but they do not share their 
methods of collecting data and will not always be willing to provide this data, in 
some cases, because the data is simply not processed in any way. Furthermore, 
methods might differ between units and countries.
Coroners are usually involved when a dead body is recovered but do not 
necessarily archive autopsy reports and even when they do, they cannot easily 
disclose such reports given their confidentiality and sensitivity. Moreover, these 
only contain x information about the cause of death and possibly a few forensic 
clues regarding the person’s identity. DNA samples are now required to be taken 
from all unidentified bodies in Greece, and submitted to the DNA Laboratory 
in Athens for profiling, creating a potential source of statistics. Unfortunately, 
however, the low number of samples submitted indicates that not all coroners 
who deal with border deaths do this.
By law, all dead bodies found in the national territories of southern EU Member 
States should be entered in the civil/public registry before they can be buried. In 
most countries, this also extends to any dead body brought to their shores from 
the high seas. Deaths are one of the three vital events that are systematically 
recorded by the hundreds of local civil/public registries whose jurisdictions 
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cover the European coastlines of the Mediterranean. Previously, these records 
had been on paper, but by May 2013, records were digitized in all southern EU 
countries,14 making them easier to collect. However, in their present form, these 
cannot be used for compiling information about migrant deaths.
There are no specific laws dealing with the burial of unauthorized border-crossers 
and therefore their bodies have been scattered among government, religious and 
specially designated cemeteries in all countries. Since cemetery offices usually 
keep some record of who is buried where, tracing all the burial sites would be a 
useful approach; this is a considerable task, though, as decisions over burials are 
a subject of negotiation between local authorities and communities, with only 
occasional interference from national or regional government authorities. Also, 
bones are regularly removed from these cemeteries – a common practice in 
many places for religious purposes and to create space in graveyards – and there 
is no obligation to keep special records of migrants. Depending on the practice at 
each individual cemetery, records may or may not specify location and cause of 
death, and may or may not archive information concerning bodies whose bones 
have been removed from the grave. Moreover, some bodies are identified and 
repatriated to the migrants’ families and would therefore be missing from any 
count based on this source.
Although some courts, coroners, police and coast guards, civil registrars and 
cemeteries are willing to share the information they have, and others may 
be persuaded by permission from a higher governmental authority, there is a 
further problem: these sources are scattered across the border regions of the 
Mediterranean, and there has been no national- or European-level initiative to 
collect and record these deaths systematically. Moreover, the bodies that wash 
up or are brought to the North/West African, Turkish and Balkan coasts may be 
harder to trace due to poorer infrastructure for processing the dead, such as the 
potential lack of coroners, courts, civil registrars or even police involved in their 
processing and registration. 
All data sources on border deaths are limited in one way or another, so all 
statistics are inevitably incomplete. Each source will lead to a sample based 
on the necessarily limited information available from that particular source. 
Regardless of the source, yet another problem is that some deceased migrants 
have ‟disappeared” because neither their departure nor their arrival was 
recorded and their bodies sank; others may have been (officially or unofficially) 
14 Greece was last to digitize; the transition period was completed in May 2013. Spain has been using digitized 
death certificates since 2006 and Italy since 2001. Both have retrospectively digitized death certificates 
for the period of interest for this project (1990–2014). Valletta Public Registry’s digitized database of Acts 
of Death now includes all deaths going back to the early 1900s. Valletta is the registry for Malta, as it also 
registers all deaths recorded at the only other public registry in Malta in Gozo, so this database is complete. 
However, the common problem among all these digital death registration systems is the lack of ability to 
search for border death cases without prior knowledge of names, places and dates of birth, dates of death 
or dates of death registration. 
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reported missing but their bodies are never found. It will never be possible to 
find evidence of every body, every person who attempted the journey and did 
not survive, even if mechanisms are established in the future to record migrant 
deaths. The issue of “grey numbers” – which include people who died while 
crossing the Mediterranean but whose bodies were not recovered or whose 
deaths were not recorded – can never be entirely overcome. 
In light of this, the aim of data collection on migrant deaths has to be limited 
to getting the most reliable number of and information about migrant deaths. 
If we want to know how, when, where, how many and why people have died 
attempting to cross the southern EU external borders over the last two decades 
or more, as well as who they are, we have to make the best of the various sources 
of data available. 
This leads to three methodological challenges:
• Counting using official sources
In order to have comparable data on the entire region, it is necessary to identify 
available trustworthy sources existing in the region, which use identical or at 
least very similar methods. This makes sources such as local political actors 
or regionally focused NGOs problematic. In addition, as some NGOs collect 
information on deaths of both migrants crossing the EU’s external borders 
and of those who die once inside the EU (the internal border),15 it can be 
challenging to isolate only deaths that occur at the external border. However, 
the information that is needed is already collected during the government-
led forensic investigation and death registration process. This information 
is just spread out over hundreds of local jurisdictions, making it time 
consuming and expensive to collect. In addition, the information is held by 
local government authorities and judicial bodies with varying levels of public 
accessibility due to legal barriers, such as privacy laws, and political concerns, 
namely for public criticism because of the manner in which bodies are dealt 
with. The presence of such obstacles and concerns means that the research 
will, at best, take longer and at worst have a large error margin in addition to 
the grey numbers problem described above.
• Restoring identity to ‟illegal migrants” and clandestinos
As Grant (2011) has argued, another aim of investigating migrant deaths is 
to restore the identity of the deceased and, where possible, to inform their 
surviving relatives. Many migrants do not carry identification documents 
or destroy them on the way, making it very difficult to identify them even 
in the cases where their bodies are found. Relatives and others searching 
for missing migrants are also unlikely to turn to the police or other forensic 
15 See Chapter 1 for an introduction to the concept of the external and internal borders. 
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institutions: if they are irregularly in Europe they fear they would face 
problems with their immigration status or that they could cause problems 
for their missing relative if he or she is in fact still alive, but they may also be 
generally hesitant to turn to the authorities because of a general mistrust 
of government agencies. Families searching for missing relatives usually 
turn to migrant community networks, smugglers (Kovras and Robins, 2013), 
and well-known humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross, which 
has decades of experience in reconnecting dispersed families. However, 
coordination and inter-agency cooperation in forensic investigations into 
unidentified bodies and missing persons, both between State authorities and 
international organizations or civil society groups, is particularly problematic. 
Most of the forensic investigation is not accessible to the public but in closed 
court files, coroners’ reports, police reports, DNA laboratories and so on. Lack 
of obligation or motivation to cooperate makes it very difficult to: (a) match 
antemortem and post-mortem data for identification; and (b) identify persons 
who have been reported missing in one place but whose bodies are found 
elsewhere. 
• Recording causes of death
Knowledge of the causes of death may be relevant for figuring out ways to 
reduce the number of migrant border-related deaths. When putting together 
such kind of information from different countries, two main problems arise. 
Firstly, the privacy and data protection laws of some of the countries involved 
treat the cause of death as a non-public issue, which makes collecting and 
processing data problematic as information on the cause of death is not 
readily available on death certificates.16 Secondly, the use of standardized 
coding for causes of death differs widely both across and within relevant 
countries (Mathers et al., 2005). This weakens the quality of the aggregated 
data from different countries. 
3.6 Conclusions and recommendations
The numbers of migrant border-related deaths currently available vary 
considerably because they are not based on the same counting methods, 
sources or definitions of “border deaths”. Furthermore, political factors may 
influence the count of border-related deaths. The underlying motivations of 
data collection efforts by different institutions may influence whether figures 
are overstated or understated, and due to the amount of missing and hazy 
information on migrant deaths, counts are hardly verifiable. All of the presently 
available datasets are based on media reports, which – valuable as they are – 
16 This is the case in Spain as of 1994 and in Italy for the entire period of interest (1990–2014). In Greece and 
Malta, causes of death, where it was possible to determine, are clearly stated in death certificates. 
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are inherently problematic. Such obstacles can be overcome, to some extent, by 
collecting data already available in public records in Mediterranean countries, 
mostly at the local level. It is, however, impossible to produce wholly accurate 
figures due to the dark number of migrants who have gone missing at sea. In 
addition, all sources of information on migrant deaths at the border have specific 
limitations, as outlined previously.
It is, however, imperative to have migrant death data that is as reliable as 
possible, for at least two reasons. First, when death occurs on such a massive 
scale, all actors involved, including States, NGOs and international humanitarian 
organizations, have a responsibility to investigate the causes of such tragedies in 
order to identify possible interventions. Second, missing migrants’ relatives have 
the right to know whether their loved ones have died in the attempt to reach the 
destination country, and if so where their remains are.
In our own research, we are collecting data on migrant deaths from 1990 to 
2013 in Gibraltar, Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain. We seek funding to add 
Cyprus and Portugal, and to do pilot studies in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania 
Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia and Turkey, in order to find out how reliable data 
can be collected there. We take death certificates in civil registries as our main 
source, on the assumption that every dead migrant will leave a paper trail in 
those registries. In order to identify the cause and location of death,17 and to 
check whether data from the registries is complete, we triangulate by relying on 
data from the public prosecutor (in Spain and Italy), the cemeteries (in Italy), the 
coroner (in Malta) and the coast guard (in Greece). By so doing, we are confident 
that we will be collecting data – which is as reliable as possible – on the number 
of migrants who were found dead on the European side of the Mediterranean, 
and were consequently buried there. A meta-analysis of existing estimates of 
migrants who have tried to cross the Mediterranean from 1990 to 2013 will then 
enable us to estimate how migrant mortality has developed during this period. 
Finally, we will try to establish whether a relationship can be found between 
the development of border policies and practices of European States, and the 
evolution of migrant mortality.
While data collection and in-depth research is ongoing, actors directly involved 
in the procedures described in this chapter can do more to compile reliable 
information on migrant deaths and, importantly, the identities of the dead.
For one, coast guards and police forces could do more to keep records, also 
of people reported missing by survivors; coordinate with other agencies and 
coast guards to ensure there is no overlap of documentation, and communicate 
this information to the public. Forensic investigations into unidentified migrants 
whose bodies are found at sea or along the coasts should make bigger efforts 
17 This is crucial in order to distinguish border-related deaths from others that are unrelated, for instance, if a 
migrant drowns while working as a life guard – taken from our field work in Malta. 
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to establish identity, working together with organizations that families of the 
dead are more likely to trust. Clear protocols for investigating deaths should 
be designed for police and other forensic actors to be able to respond to the 
transnational and clandestine nature of these particular “unnatural” deaths. 
This may necessitate cooperation with embassies, international organizations or 
actors in other countries, perhaps through frameworks such as those provided 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or through civil society 
networks. In any case, for places that have been receiving migrants, both dead 
and alive, for two decades now, it is remarkable that no specialized procedures 
have been developed by State authorities for identifying and respecting the 
dead and their relatives in this context.
In addition, attention should be focused on enforcing existing regulations in this 
area. For instance, all migrant deaths should be properly registered in a place 
where their bodies are found or brought to land from the sea, using any and all 
forensic information available to complete registration forms. All bodies should 
be traceable from the moment they are found to their burial, using a consistent 
labelling system in the case of unidentified bodies. Mandatory DNA sampling of 
unidentified bodies should be standard practice, and facilities should be created 
to enable families to provide DNA samples to run for matches. There should 
be a clear procedure and chain of responsibility for collecting, registering and 
storing personal possessions found with the body, as they are often vital for 
identification. Organizations such as the ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières 
have considerable expertise which European States have the opportunity to 
draw upon in designing and enforcing procedures in this area. 
Finally, as the chapter has illustrated, there are multiple opportunities for States 
to collect and process data on border-related deaths. Now that death registries 
in southern EU Member States have been digitized, it would be relatively easy for 
data on death certificates to be collected centrally for the purpose of generating 
detailed statistics going beyond the number of migrant deaths per year per 
country. National statistics offices would be likely candidates for undertaking this, 
in particular because they already use information gathered from civil registries 
to produce national demographic and health statistics. However, some might 
question whether the State is the right actor to be collecting and publishing 
this kind of data. As we noted above, State institutions may have stakes in 
the outcomes of data collection on border-related deaths, as do all actors, 
evidenced by their current exclusion of migrant mortality from the volumes 
of irregular immigration-related statistics on arrivals, interceptions, rescues, 
asylum applications, detention and deportation. Therefore, an alternative 
would be to entrust an independent body at the national level, such as the 
official human rights monitoring institution, with collecting such information. As 
migrant mortality in the Mediterranean appears to be a European phenomenon 
related to European policies, it would make sense to put in place a European 
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Observatory, possibly as part of the Fundamental Rights Agency, to oversee data 
collection and ensure statistics generated at the national level remains scientific 
and objective. This would enable the phenomenon in the region as a whole to be 
monitored by an institution not directly linked to border control. This institution 
could also investigate possible policy responses to reduce the risk of death for 
migrants attempting to cross the external EU borders without authorization. 
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boat	on	which	he	 crossed	 the	Mediterranean	 tragically	 sank	on	10	October	
2013.18
After paying a smuggler 1,300 Libyan dinars (about USD 1,075) for the trip, 
Louay Khalid was locked in a house for about two weeks with around 450 other 
aspiring migrants. They were not allowed to leave the house and were told that 
if they did they would be shot. Eventually, they were loaded onto trucks before 
being stuffed onto a heavily overloaded boat that was steered by other migrants. 
Once I saw the vessel . . . I could immediately tell that we were too many 
people. They were people everywhere you could look – people in the 
engine room, people on the mast even – literally everywhere.
Shortly after departure, police approached 
the boat twice, urging the vessel to return. 
However, the migrants continued their 
journey until maritime police appeared. The 
police requested the vessel to stop its journey, 
but the vessel kept on moving, at which point, 
the police fired shots and began to “round” 
the vessel, throwing ropes to jam the engine 
fan. Even though passengers were crying and 
parents holding their children closely to them, 
the firing continued until the cabin broke down. During the commotion, two 
women gave birth. Finally, the police left. The following day, the migrants called 
the Red Cross in Lampedusa for help. When an airplane arrived after four hours, 
the people on board attempted so desperately to attract its attention that the 
vessel capsized. When the plane returned with life buoys, many of the people 
had already drowned.
I was wearing a lifejacket . . . that saved my life. The people who were 
inside the boat all died.
Finally, a helicopter provided life jackets, and two speedboats rescued some of 
the women and children. Floats were provided for approximately 40 survivors, 
who waited another day and night before being taken into custody in Malta.
18 This story summarizes the encounter given by Louay Khalid to IOM Malta’s Martine Cassar. It is adapted 
from the transcript of the original interview at the Hal Far Center, Malta, in April 2014.
“I was wearing a 
lifejacket . . . that saved 
my life. The people who 
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Christopher Horwood1 with contributions from Arezo Malakooti2/Altai Consulting
4.1 Introduction
The sub-Saharan African migratory flows going north from both the western 
and the eastern (including the Horn of Africa) sides of the continent have been 
changing in recent years, partly in response to variable migration policies and 
the modification of control and repression measures along the route. These 
changes have traced new maritime and overland routes for irregular migrants, 
organized by criminal networks using local go-betweens and smugglers, and 
involving collusion between themselves, and at times police, soldiers and other 
stakeholders. 
The demand by sub-Saharan irregular migrants to move north has been 
predominantly driven by interest in the better opportunities offered by the 
Maghreb countries, particularly Libya, but more importantly by the fact that Egypt, 
Libya and Morocco offer the best springboards for crossing the Mediterranean. 
According to the (Office of the) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), over 60,000 migrants (not only sub-Saharan Africans) made the sea 
crossing in 2013 alone. In the first six months of 2014 over 60,000 had already 
arrived in Italy, the European country receiving the vast majority of arrivals (BBC, 
2014).3 Italian coast guards “rescued” 5,000 migrants in a single weekend in late 
June; in another rescue attempt a few days later, tens of migrants were found to 
have suffocated on board a vessel (ibid.). Observers and experts warn that these 
flows are set to increase in the medium to long term. The most obvious measure 
of the human cost of the smuggling of migrants – and in some instances, human 
trafficking – is the number of people who lose their lives every year while 
attempting to travel. This chapter contextualizes the relevant migratory flows 
from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and offers a topography of the most 
prevalent causes and locations of death.
* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM).
1 At the time of writing, Christopher Horwood is the Founding Coordinator of the Regional Mixed 
Migration Secretariat (RMMS), based in Nairobi and part of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). See 
www.regionalmms.org for more information on the RMMS.
2 At the time of writing, Arezo Malakooti is Senior Consultant at Altai Consulting. See www.
altaiconsulting.com for more information on Altai Consulting.
3 In its 2014 Risk Analysis (p. 33), Frontex cites detection of 52,419 crossings from mainland Africa to 
European destinations in 2013, from a number of different routes.
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Figure 4.1: Migratory routes from Sub-Saharan Africa
Source:  Adapted from UNODC, The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, 
2010; and iMap, 2012 MTM Map on Irregular and Mixed Migration Routes.
4.2 Brief historical and geographical background:  
The migration context
4.2.1 Similarities and differences between the two routes
Analysis of the migration context from East Africa and the Horn of Africa, and 
from West and Central Africa (sub-Saharan Africa) reveal some similarities and 
certain clear differences.
Both areas have fast-rising populations and large numbers of impoverished 
youth, who are ready to take great risks to find improved livelihood and security 
options through migration. While those coming from the Horn of Africa are 
predominately fleeing insecurity and searching for asylum, and the West and 
Central Africans are more likely to be economic migrants, all are drawn to Libya 
and often onward to Europe for the economic opportunities that exist there as 
well. 
Both regions also have a thriving and organized multimillion-dollar migrant 
smuggling trade. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
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(UNODC), “each year, some 55,000 migrants are thought to be smuggled from 
East, North and West Africa into Europe, generating about USD 150 million in 
revenue for criminals” (UNODC, 2014). The smuggling networks are almost 
impossible to police, monitor or restrain, which is compounded by the fact that 
State officials from security, border control and immigration authorities may be 
complicit enablers of the smuggling business. Where trafficking exists, in some 
cases authorities have also been implicated.4
Migrants die predominantly in deserts and at sea, as these are the most 
dangerous parts of the journey. These deaths are generally the result of 
deliberate mistreatment, indifference, or torture by smugglers, or misadventure 
by migrants themselves. Along all routes, cases of sexual violence against female 
migrants are commonly reported – particularly concerning those from the Horn 
of Africa – as well as explicit sexual exploitation and frequent disappearances 
of girls and women.5 In the Sinai, sexual violence against males has also been 
documented (Human Rights Watch, 2014a).
Along with these similarities, there are also differences between the experiences 
of migrants from East Africa/Horn of Africa and West/Central Africa, to and 
from North Africa: the migration context in East Africa and the Horn of Africa 
is restrictive and intolerant despite regional frameworks and agreements that 
should make movement between States permissible. In the absence of free or 
regular mobility, migrant smuggling is the dominant mode of mobility because 
most migrants have to break immigration laws to cross international borders 
within the region.
By contrast, in West and Central Africa, the level of intraregional mobility is high. 
In the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)6 region, about 
8 million migrants reside in countries not of their origin, in a context where 
smugglers have little relevance because citizens share free movement protocols 
(IOM, 2014). Exploitation of migrants and trafficking may exist, but movement 
within the ECOWAS is not restricted and therefore the level of refoulement, 
deportation, expulsion and hostility is arguably lower than in East Africa and 
the Horn of Africa. This freedom of movement also makes the journeys less 
clandestine in nature and, again, therefore arguably creates a safer context 
for the migrants (Altai Consulting, 2013:37). Once migrants from West and 
Central Africa arrive in Niger, though, smugglers become more relevant; they 
4 For example, see FIDH, 2012.
5 This is increasingly a problem for female migrants from the Horn of Africa, particularly in the context 
of kidnapping and extortion, and is well documented. For West African female migrants, sexual 
abuse appears to be systematic and opportunistic in terms of smugglers and officials abusing their 
power while moving or encountering migrants; in some cases, women and girls are forced into 
short- or medium-term sexual servitude. Here, again, smuggling can become trafficking.
6 The 15 member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
Chapter 4 From Sub-Saharan Africa through North Africa: Tracking Deaths along the Way
112
are required to lead migrants through the Sahara and to help them enter Libya. 
Smuggling in this area has become more established than it is in East Africa and 
the Horn of Africa; the quartiers or les ghettos in the towns where migrants 
accumulate, and the involvement of police, soldiers and border officials appear 
to be more ‟normalized” and accepted than in the East, where human smuggling 
across Sudan and into Libya is a relatively new phenomenon. Much of this 
can be attributed to the fact that many of the local economies are now highly 
dependent on smuggling, encouraging authorities to turn a blind eye (Altai 
Consulting, 2013:66).  
In terms of the aspirations and intentions of migrants, there is also a difference 
between those going north from West and Central sub-Sahara, who are not 
necessarily trying to cross over to Europe – although this trend is starting to 
change – and those coming from East Africa and the Horn of Africa, who are 
far more likely to want to cross the Mediterranean as soon as possible (Altai 
Consulting, 2013:72–76). Many West and Central Africans will find long-term or 
seasonal work in the richer, middle-income Maghreb countries, while migrants 
from the Horn of Africa going north and west tend to only be transiting and 
look to Europe for safety and protection, many of them finding the racism and 
abuse they suffer in Libya, also experienced by many West and Central Africans, 
extreme and intolerable (Altai Consulting, 2013:72–76). Previously, when the 
Israeli border was passable in the Sinai desert, migrants travelled to East Africa 
and the Horn of Africa to Egypt in order to enter Israel to both remain in Israel 
and to move onward into the Middle East and Europe.
Another major difference between the two geographical contexts is the range of 
ways migrants may perish during their journeys. In addition to causes associated 
with the hardship of journeys, migrants leaving East Africa and the Horn of Africa 
towards the north commonly die from a wide range of violations and situations 
of deliberate murder by smugglers and handlers. These deaths may be linked 
to the rise in cases of kidnapping and abduction of migrants for extortion. 
By contrast, north-bound migrants originating from West and Central Africa 
normally die in the desert or at sea, and due to the dangers inherent in crossing 
such challenging terrain. Cases of deliberate murder or kidnapping by traffickers 
and other criminals (apart from cases involving women and girls) tend to be 
more rare. 
4.2.2 Key drivers
Since the 1990s, when Libya, riding high on oil wealth, professed an inclusive, 
open-border pan-Africanism, hundreds of thousands of sub-Saharan and North 
African migrant workers flocked to the country for employment. Official estimates 
of migrants in Libya put the number at 2.5 million before the overthrow of the 
regime in 2011 (IOM, 2011a). By 2000, pan-Africanism had soured, and was 
replaced by racism and xenophobia against black migrants that has, if anything, 
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become more entrenched since Moammar Gadhafi’s overthrow and death in 
2011. Nevertheless, the impression that Libya can provide good employment 
opportunities for sub-Saharan Africans continues to draw tens of thousands of 
migrants every year. Many have no intention to cross over to Europe when they 
first set out from their countries of origin; however, a greater share are now 
crossing the Mediterranean, pushed out by the harsh and ill treatment from 
authorities and locals in post-revolution Libya (Altai Consulting, 2013:109). 
Moreover, competition for low-skilled jobs has increased with the larger flows of 
low-skilled migrants entering the country, meaning the availability of jobs is not 
always as strong as those arriving may have imagined.
In addition to the lack of economic opportunities in countries of origin, many 
of these countries are also plagued by political instability, which in some cases 
becomes the primary reason for departure. At any one time, among the dozens 
of sub-Saharan countries, there have been and continue to be combinations 
of oppressive regimes, civil wars, failing or failed States and chronic complex 
emergencies, all causing movement and/or flight.7 Migrants from these countries 
flee in search of asylum in safer environments and tend to come to Libya as a 
transit point to Europe. The lack of a framework for asylum in Libya, coupled 
with arbitrary detention and harassment, pushes them out and on to Europe.
Additionally, changing climatic conditions, natural disasters, and the pervasive 
influence of poor governance and endemic poverty compel people to move in 
what are increasingly regarded as mixed and complex flows. Seasonal migration 
to Libya is common for migrants originating from Sahelian States who suffer the 
consequences of recurrent drought in the area.
Moreover, this trend of migration to Libya, as final destination or transit country, 
is likely to continue. Sub-Saharan African countries have some of the highest 
fertility rates in the world, with 40 of the highest 50 in the world located in 
sub-Saharan Africa. According to UN calculations, the current population of sub-
Saharan Africa is over 900 million and, with current growth rates, is expected 
to more than double, reaching over 2 billion by 2050. The end-of-century 
expectation is 3.8 billion. Currently, people under 15 years old account for 
43 per cent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa and the “youth bulge” in 
all sub-Saharan countries is set to increase as population figures rise (UN DESA, 
2012).
The pressures these demographics pose for economies, food security, physical 
security, services and facilities will be, and is already, huge. When compounded 
by rising inequalities in access to and opportunities in job markets, as well as an 
absence of equitable distribution of income and resources, it seems clear that 
7 Over the last decade, the West and Central region has been characterized by conflicts in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and more recently the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Nigeria. 
Meanwhile, in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, conflict in Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia and now 
South Sudan, and reportedly oppressive regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea have compelled millions of 
people to move as forced migrants.
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the future management of this large, expectant population will be problematic 
to say the least. One outcome that can be fully expected will be the compulsion 
to seek better opportunities outside sub-Sahara – outmigration. As long as such 
movement is restricted and illegal, irregular, clandestine and smuggler-managed 
movement will continue.
4.2.3 West and Central Africa context
West Africa
West Africa provides the strongest example of intraregional migration flows 
in sub-Saharan Africa, with an estimated 70 per cent of migratory movements 
taking place within the subregion, mainly linked to employment. According to the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2014), in recent years irregular 
migration at the interregional level between West and Central Africa towards 
Europe via the northern coast of mainland Africa has increased substantially. 
Many countries in the region which were previously considered as countries of 
origin are increasingly becoming transit and destination countries, and irregular 
migration is on the agenda of most governments in the region. The journey from 
West Africa to Europe is not always made all at once: the majority of migrants 
remain in North Africa for different periods of time, often to earn more money 
to finance further movement.
Migration from West and Central Africa is not new. In particular, every coastal 
country has its own migration history. For example, migration from Senegal 
dates back to the colonial era; when France governed its African colonies, many 
Senegalese were trained as civil servants, teachers and craftsmen, and sent to 
work across West Africa as auxiliaries to the colonial administration. Then, in the 
1980s the exodus to Europe began as a result of successive droughts, deepening 
economic problems and fast-paced urbanization (IRIN, 2006). Tens of thousands 
of Senegalese traversed the Sahara Desert to cross the Mediterranean from 
Mauritania and Morocco, often ending up in the informal labour sector of 
France or Italy, even if those countries were not their first port of entry. But 
when those two countries, at the end of 2005, increased patrols to intercept 
irregular migrants, many Senegalese migrants opted for the longer and often 
lethal sea journey to the Canary Islands (Spanish territory) instead. Since 2007 
and 2008, due to high numbers of deaths at sea and increased anti-trafficking 
and anti-smuggling initiatives, migrants have been either going overland with 
the intention to break into Spanish territory through the enclaves of Ceuta and 
Melilla, or have been using boats to cross the Mediterranean. Each country and 
each group of migrants have their own history and specific context, but national 
elaboration is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Data on the number of migrants emigrating out of West Africa is neither available 
nor collected in any formal way. However, the number of migrants seen in Libya 
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and Morocco and the number of those crossing the Mediterranean give an 
indication and rough estimates suggest numbers could be as high as 100,000 or 
more every year.
West African migrants heading north to Libya, whether intending to cross the 
Mediterranean or not, typically travel to either Mali or Niger and from there 
they either enter Libya directly, or via Algeria (Altai Consulting, 2013:36). Reseau 
Exodus, a project that worked with the police in Niger to collect data on registered 
migrant flows towards Libya, recorded just over 40,000 people leaving Agadez 
travelling north over nine months in 2013.
It may be useful to see the routes taken north separated into three generic 
groupings:8
• Mauritania and Senegal to the Canary Islands 
The westernmost of the three major routes used by irregular migrants from West 
Africa towards Europe is focused on ports on the Atlantic coast, where boats can 
be steered to the Canary Islands or even to the Spanish mainland. After being 
disrupted by stricter enforcement in recent years, departure points have been 
successively pushed southwards and the Atlantic route has declined rapidly. 
However, between 1998 and 2007 the sea route from Mauritania or Senegal to 
the Canaries was the premier choice of many migrants. According to a report by 
UNODC, 31,678 irregular migrants, the peak figure, arrived in the Canary Islands 
in 2006 with high levels of maritime mortality (UNODC, 2011). 
• Western overland route to North Africa
The Western Mediterranean overland route from North Africa to Europe can 
start in any city in West or Central Africa. The main overland routes of the 
Western Mediterranean route run from Senegal through Mauritania to Morocco, 
or via Gao in Mali north to Algeria and Morocco. Irregular migrants from West 
Africa who arrive in Morocco by one of the variants of this route may remain 
there for years, making attempts (most often repeated) to enter Europe via 
Spain – including forcing entry and storming the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. 
While 2005 was a peak year for forced entry by migrants, 2013 and 2014 saw 
a resurgence of groups entering through fence-storming. A surprisingly high 
number of group storming events are successful and can involve more than a 
thousand migrants; these often cause injuries and sometimes fatalities.9
8 These three categories borrow from the UNODC (2011) separation of routes. For more recent and 
more detailed descriptions of specific routes used, fees paid and vulnerabilities faced on different 
routes, refer to Altai Consulting, 2013.
9 For instance, see: BBC, “African migrants storm into Spanish enclave of Melilla” (BBC, 28 February 
2014), available from www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26382589; CNN, “Would-be immigrants 
storm Spanish enclave on Moroccan coast” (CNN, 19 March 2014), available from http://edition.
cnn.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/spain-immigrants-melilla-morocco/.
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• Eastern overland route to North Africa
The easternmost of the overland routes commonly used by migrants from West 
and Central Africa is the Central Mediterranean route, accessed via Agadez in 
the Niger and Gao in Mali. These two towns are key departure points for access 
to the Maghreb, especially via Tamanrasset to the Strait of Gibraltar and on 
to Spain or, more popular since 2011, via Sabha to the Libyan coast, for those 
intending to reach Italy. According to some UN studies, “there are substantial 
numbers of West Africans who, having reached North Africa by one or another 
route across the desert, move from one country to another in North Africa in 
search of work or on the lookout for an opportunity to find a boat to Europe” 
(UNODC, 2011).
When certain routes are obstructed or border control is well enforced, smugglers 
have a vast region of alternative unmonitored routes to choose from. The Sahara 
Desert stretches from the east to the west like a wide band between sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Maghreb, offering numerous, albeit treacherous, routes hidden 
from authorities. Migrants from both the West and the East (and Horn) have to 
cross the desert. A crackdown by Spanish and African authorities on the Canary 
Island route over recent years has meant more traffic through the Sahara. 
Central Africa
Unlike in West Africa, migration in Central Africa is mostly associated with conflicts 
and subsequent population displacement. The majority of migrants from the 
region either remain within the African continent or move towards Europe. 
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) includes, among 
its instruments, a protocol of free movement and the right of establishment 
of ECCAS citizens, but the implementation of these protocols, unlike those in 
ECOWAS, is weak. Nevertheless, the oil and timber industries have recently 
made Equatorial Guinea and Gabon into countries of destination for migrant 
workers. Further north, Niger and Chad receive a significant number of migrants 
from the region attempting to reach Libya and, in many cases, Europe.
Migrant profiles
West African migrants in Libya tend to be mainly irregular economic migrants of 
working age. They are typically attracted to Libya because of the employment 
opportunities that it presents, and the prospect of higher wages. Usually migrants 
come from poor, rural areas and possess low education and skill levels. A 52-year-
old Nigerian migrant from the region of Zinder explained: “I used to work as a 
shepherd in Niger, but there are not enough cows anymore to make a living so 
I had to leave and find work elsewhere” (Altai Consulting, 2013:80). As Libya 
is a resource-rich country with a high GDP per capita, certain industries suffer 
from labour shortage, making the country an obvious destination for economic 
migrants. However, competition for low-skilled jobs in Libya has become intense, 
and not all migrants are able to find work.
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Migrants who come from neighbouring Sahelian countries, such as Chad, Mali, 
Niger and Sudan, often engage in seasonal migration. This is perpetuated by 
recurrent drought in the Sahel, which leads to food insecurity. Migrants tend 
to stay close to the border and work the land in agricultural areas; they are 
very unlikely to move to the major cities. While the majority of these migrants 
enter the country irregularly, they tend to cross the border relatively more easily 
because they have created certain relationships at checkpoints, along the route 
and with local tribes that control the borders, which helps facilitate their entry 
(Altai Consulting, 2013:80).
There are also unaccompanied minors coming from West Africa in increasing 
numbers. They are usually sent to Libya by their families in order to make money 
that they can send back home to the family. Sometimes when they arrive in Libya, 
they hear about Europe and decide to try their chances there, but the majority 
of these minors have little intention to move on to Europe (Altai Consulting, 
2013). 
A smaller number of women travel from West Africa to Libya, generally making 
the journey to join their husbands who are already there. This was observed 
among Malian and Nigerian women, and in these cases their husbands organized 
the journeys for them from afar, with a trusted chaperone or smuggler.
4.2.4 East Africa and the Horn of Africa context
The nature of migration in East Africa and the Horn of Africa region is complex, 
with countries in the region simultaneously hosting and assisting internally 
displaced persons, refugees, returnees, victims of trafficking and labour 
migrants. According to IOM’s 2013 analysis, the region had the largest increase in 
the number of refugees globally in 2012, bringing its refugee (including refugee 
stock) and IDP population to over 9 million in 2013.
However, a high number of economic migrants also move within or out of 
the region. When interviewed, many who might apply (and be accepted) for 
asylum elsewhere or in Europe also made it clear that economic necessity was a 
common and critical factor for their movement.
For example, in recent years as many as 80,000 Ethiopians are recorded per 
annum as arriving on the shores of Yemen. Additionally, between 2,000 and 
5,000 Eritreans leave their country every month and at least 20,000 Somalis 
and Ethiopians make the journey to South Africa, according to recent estimates 
and statistics (RMMS, 2013). There are also flows of Ethiopians moving to Libya 
via Sudan. As such, the region is characterized by mixed migration flows,10 
originating from or transiting within East Africa or the Horn of Africa to a much 
10 Mixed (migration) flows is defined in IOM’s 2011 Glossary on Migration as, “complex migratory 
population movements that include refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants and other 
migrants, as opposed to migratory population movements that consist entirely of one category of 
migrants.”
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higher degree than West Africa, where currently most migrants can be defined 
as economic migrants. Migrants move out of the region in all directions, but 
three key destinations are the targets for the majority of them: Southern Africa, 
normally through a combination of Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique; the Gulf States, mainly Saudi 
Arabia via Yemen; and Libya and the North African Mediterranean coast. The 
third route, to the north coast of Africa, and the deadly risks and vulnerabilities 
migrants face making this trip are the focus of this chapter.11
An unknown number of migrants from East Africa and the Horn of Africa 
make their way north and north-west to the Mediterranean coast. There is 
no mechanism to monitor numbers: they travel clandestinely, with smugglers 
through the most remote areas, often avoiding towns and checkpoints. A new 
report by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) (2014) titled Going 
West: Contemporary Mixed Migration Trends from the Horn of Africa to Libya 
and Europe indicates in its summary:
In particular, this report responds to the sense that the “westward” 
direction is increasingly being used by smuggled migrants who find 
themselves thwarted when trying to use alternative (and previously 
extensively used) routes that take them east (Yemen to Saudi Arabia) and 
north (through Egypt into Israel). The southern route is still “open” and 
much used by smuggler/migrants, but information and research indicates 
that the new trend is “Going West”.
Some indication of the western route’s rising popularity can be found in the 
numbers of Ethiopian, Somali and particularly Eritreans found on boats crossing 
the Mediterranean, and migrant claims that large numbers of compatriots 
are in Libya, waiting to cross. In 2013, detections of Eritreans and Somalis in 
the Mediterranean totaled 16,922, or 16 per cent of all detections in the 
Mediterranean that year, the vast majority of which departed from Libya 
(Frontex, 2014). 
Migrant profiles
Sub-Saharan migrants are, not surprisingly, mainly male and of young, working 
age. According to Altai Consulting’s 2013 study, 80–85 per cent were male and 
they tended to be between the ages of 18 and 35, although there are increasing 
numbers of unaccompanied migrants found in the flows of economic migrants 
(Altai Consulting, 2013; RMMS, 2013).
Migrants from East Africa and the Horn of Africa move for a variety of reasons, 
a characteristic of the mixed nature of the flows. Somalis have been fleeing war 
and instability for years, and while they are known to be adept at establishing 
economic enterprises, they are primarily refugees from conflict and have 
11 For a detailed account of flows to South Africa and Yemen, please see Chapter 5.
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enjoyed prima facie refugee status (in terms of group determination) for over 
two decades.
Migrants fleeing forced military conscription and religious or political persecution, 
particularly in Eritrea, are not only seeking asylum but also looking towards 
destinations that provide economic opportunities. Migrants heading for Libya 
from Somaliland, on the other hand, are normally educated youth from middle-
class families as well as poorer families who do not see any future in Somaliland, 
as they cannot find jobs to meet their educational levels or aspirations. While 
some Ethiopians cite tribal tensions (localized conflict in the Ogaden region) and 
political oppression (particularly by members of the Omoro Liberation Front) 
as reasons for fleeing the country, the bulk of Ethiopian migrants tend to be 
uneducated young men from subsistence communities searching for better 
employment and livelihood opportunities.
Unlike West African migrants going north to Libya, many of whom intend 
to work in Libya for some time before returning home, most migrants from 
the Horn of Africa have no intention of living and working in Sudan or Libya, 
but instead set their targets on Europe. This is likely because the factors that 
caused them to flee their countries of origin encourage them to search for 
locations where they can receive protection and build new lives; in some cases 
they are following networks of friends and relatives that have previously been 
set up in European countries. Eritrean and Somali migrants arriving in Europe 
are usually provided with some form of protection; for example, 86 per cent 
of those granted international protection in Malta in 2012 were from Somalia 
and 12 per cent were from Eritrea (Altai Consulting, 2013). Ethiopian migrants 
looking for seasonal or periodic employment purely for income are more 
likely to try their chances in the Gulf States and Yemen, where many migrants 
“recycle”12 themselves despite the very high risks they face on the “eastern 
route”.
4.3 Calculating deaths 
According to a recent report by the UNODC (2011:136), existing estimates 
concerning numbers of sub-Saharan African migrants who have died attempting 
to go north are likely to seriously underestimate the true figures. The report 
suggests that any estimates of mortality figures would likely need to be multiplied 
by three in order to come to a more accurate estimate. Note that this report also 
predates the current increasing migrant flows and highlights the complexity of 
trying to assess numerically the human cost of migration. While many migrants 
claim to have seen corpses in the desert or to know of friends who disappeared 
12 Migrants recycle themselves when they try to migrate again despite being deported or expelled 
or otherwise previously thwarted. Migrants who recycle themselves are those who previously 
migrated, returned voluntarily for reunification with their families or for other reasons, and are 
trying again to migrate irregularly.
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or were killed en route, the evidence is anecdotal and cannot easily be translated 
into figures, even if deaths at sea appear to be more systematically documented.
Before considering actual deaths of sub-Saharan migrants, certain special 
contexts creating an environment in which death is possible, and even probable, 
deserve mention. The abuses that thrive in the smuggling trade, the special case 
of Eritrean commoditization and victimization, and the particular conditions in 
Libya set the scene for understanding how and why deaths occur as sub-Saharan 
migrants move north.
4.3.1 Smuggling:  The protection-free underworld
Brokers, fixers and unofficial “travel agents” are other names for smugglers who 
openly solicit customers in numerous towns and cities in sub-Saharan Africa. In 
many cases, these smugglers are sought out by tens of thousands of migrants 
who demand their services (Altai Consulting, 2013). After discussing routes and 
fees, the migrants are in the hands of the smugglers and on their way. Once 
the journey begins, migrants enter a world where they lose their freedom and 
safety, they are normally strictly controlled, have no more decisional power or 
rights, and are often brutalized. Smugglers are usually armed, and essentially 
“own” the migrants until they decide to release them, blurring the lines between 
smuggling and trafficking in some cases (RMMS, 2013).
Countless testimony and witness statements from migrants testify to beatings, 
mistreatment, negligence, and the lack of food, water, space, air, medical 
provisions or shelter, which they endure in the care of their smugglers. Migrants 
are often deceived, misled and cheated. Men are beaten and abused; women 
can be raped and forced into sexual servitude to repay fictitious debts. Migrants 
may be abandoned in the desert, given false directions, only taken a portion of 
the agreed distance, forced into unpaid labour, handed over to gangs, militias 
or border officials, and face an uncertain future in detention, with abuse and 
possible deportation (Altai Consulting, 2013). When and why this abuse crosses 
over into death or murder at the hands of the smugglers is difficult to define 
or enumerate, but it is probably closely connected to the economic value the 
migrant represents for the smuggler.
Smuggling is a robust and vigorous “industry,” where demand seems inexhaustible 
and growing, and where those who are set to restrict or end smuggling are 
too often corruptly profiting from the trade through complicity. According to 
a report on Niger, migrants, diplomats and an internal government report all 
suggest that “often, the very people meant to police the immigrant routes are 
involved in the business themselves,” and that could be repeated in most other 
countries where migrant smugglers operate (Lewis, 2014). “The corruption will 
never end,” said the president of Agadez Regional Council in 2014, in reference 
to activities surrounding smuggling (Lewis, 2014). In Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan, 
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various reports and investigations have shown that some officers in all parts 
of the national security apparatus work closely with smugglers and traffickers 
(Lewis, 2014).
Efforts to curtail the smuggling of West African irregular migrants through 
the Sahara have rarely had a lasting impact. An extract from a recent media 
investigation in Niger is emblematic of the resilience of the smuggling trade all 
across sub-Sahara:
Police raided dozens of transit houses, where would-be emigrants stay 
until heading off across the desert for North Africa and Europe beyond, 
and arrested a handful of smugglers and officials. About 50 policemen in 
the region around Agadez were replaced. Niger’s Government says large-
scale migrant smuggling, which in effect was officially tolerated for years, 
has now ended. But interviews with migrants, smugglers and officials in 
Agadez and in the capital Niamey tell a different story. . . . “Nothing has 
changed,” said Bachir Amadou, who works as a guide for Ghanaians headed 
for Libya. . . . An official at a regional bus company said that following 
a dip in numbers after the crackdown, “the flow [of migrants] is up 
again.”. . . [According to the President of the Agadez Regional Council,] 
“These networks are reorganizing themselves and becoming stronger.” 
(Lewis, 2014)
Not surprisingly, in such a protection-free environment, where migrants are 
moved clandestinely and as mere commodities to earn profit for the smugglers, 
abuses take place with impunity. However, the most egregious abuses 
perpetrated against migrants tend not to happen on the much older established 
routes taken by West African migrants, but only along newer routes from the 
Horn of Africa going north, to Egypt, and west into Sudan and Libya.
4.3.2 Special case of commoditization and victimization  
of Eritreans
A markedly violent form of trafficking – in cases where the dominant trend is for 
human smuggling to turn into trafficking – has developed in recent years in Egypt 
and Sudan. Here, smugglers, traffickers and local officials work together to prey 
on Eritrean migrants leaving their country through Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, 
and increasingly through Libya to Egypt. Migrants are deceived and kidnapped 
on their journeys, or even snatched from refugee camps (in eastern Sudan and 
northern Ethiopia) and sometimes from the streets of Cairo.13 They are held for 
ransom by violent criminals who sell them up a chain that normally takes them 
into the Sinai desert. Migrants are frequently held in compounds of houses for 
weeks or months while their captors torture them until friends or relatives, 
13 According to UNHCR’s report, incidences of kidnapping from refugee camps have reduced 
dramatically by mid-2014, as camp security and monitoring as well as international support of local 
police has been improved. 
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mainly in the diaspora, pay high ransoms; the average payment per migrant 
released has been a staggering USD 22,000, although in some individual cases 
USD 50,000 has reportedly been paid (van Reisen, Estefanos and Rijken, 2013). 
Furthermore, on release, individual victims may be sold on to other smugglers 
and forced to pay a further ransom. There appears to be an increasing trend 
of Eritreans being held captive in Sudan (in addition to and as an alternative to 
the Sinai), as the appetite for trading migrants as commodities spreads, and as 
conditions in the Sinai become less favourable for traffickers.14
A recent study titled The Human Trafficking Cycle: Sinai and Beyond (van Reisen, 
Estefanos and Rijken, 2013) estimates that between 25,000 and 30,000 Eritreans 
became victims of trafficking in the Sinai between 2009 and 2013, and that 
10,000 died there, although these estimates have been the source of debate. 
There are no estimates available for 2013 alone, but using the conservative 
estimate and dividing it evenly over five years, that would mean 5,000 victims of 
trafficking in 2013 with 2,000 deaths (RMMS, 2014b).15 This means, on average, 
five to six migrants do not just die but are killed by their captors every day. It is 
also estimated that the ransoms paid the “Sinai trafficking industry” over the last 
five years amount to, conservatively, USD 600 million.
These estimates suggest trafficking was and may still be a highly lucrative 
business. But the level of violence and torture smugglers and traffickers use 
seems to be limitless, and the survivor statements make for grim and painful 
reading. In addition to the general violence used against all kidnapped migrants, 
women in particular, and also males, face extensive sexual abuse including 
gang rape over sustained periods. Much publicized claims of organ theft have 
not been verified but may also be taking place. It appears that while reports of 
torture camps and victims of torture from the Sinai are decreasing, increasing 
testimony from migrant survivors tell of ‟new” torture camps in Libya.
Ethiopian smuggled migrants crossing from Djibouti and Somaliland into Yemen 
– over 200,000 between 2011 and 2013 inclusive – face similar treatment at the 
hands of Yemeni traffickers/criminals. Equally extraordinary levels of violence 
and abuse are used but to extract far lower ransoms – between USD 500 and 
USD 1,000 per person (UNSC, 2012). 
Ransom, Collaborators and Corruption: Sinai Trafficking and Transnational 
Networks, a 2013 report from Tufts University (Jakobsen, 2013), restated the 
findings of other observers that trafficking networks operate with the close 
14 The traffickers have been disrupted and disturbed by militarization in the Sinai that started in early 
2013 and continues. Many of the trafficking compounds are close to the Israeli border where the 
Egyptian army has been pursuing insurgents. The disruption of the traffickers’ “trade” has nothing 
to do with police action against them. Despite the fact that the Egyptian Government has been given 
names and addresses, there are no vehicle registration numbers or other identifying information of 
all the major traffickers in the Sinai. Instead, these people operate with complete impunity.
15 However, military activities in the area have disrupted trafficking and smuggling networks 
considerably, suggesting this estimate may be on the high end.
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involvement of certain State officials from Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan. A report 
from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2012, titled Report of the 
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, specifically implicated senior Eritrean 
military officers, not only in cross-border transactions, and movement and sale 
of migrants to traffickers, but also in the abduction and subsequent sale of 
Eritreans from within the country.
Even though Israel completely sealed its border with Egypt in early 2013, 
effectively ending that route as a possibility for sub-Saharan migrants going 
north, reports indicate that trafficking and kidnapping of Eritreans continues. 
Months of Egyptian military action in the Sinai have also reportedly disturbed and 
reduced the criminal activities relating to migrants, but new reports suggest the 
same manner of victimization and commoditization of Eritreans (and Ethiopians) 
continues in parts of Egypt, in Sudan and also in Libya (RMMS, 2014b), even 
if in some cases the number of referrals of assistance for victims of torture is 
declining.
4.3.3 Libya: No protection16
Before the revolution started in early 2011, an estimated 1.5–2.5 million foreign 
workers were contributing to Libya’s economy, among a total population of 
approximately 6.4 million (FIDH, 2012). From the onset of the conflict that 
ignited the revolution, migrants were particularly threatened and started fleeing 
en masse. According to IOM, nearly 800,000 migrants fled to neighbouring 
countries during the revolution (quoted in FIDH, 2012).
As the Government of Libya currently maintains no asylum process, all migrants 
who enter the country without official authorization are treated as irregular 
migrants and detained, some of them deported. Many migrants report having 
been detained in Libya without any reason given for their detention and without 
being informed of how long their detention would last. Many migrants have 
spoken of “ununiformed” police officers detaining them (Altai Consulting, 
2013:105; RMMS, 2014b). 
According to the International Federation for Human Rights (2012), in the 
context of political fragmentation, administrative chaos and militarization that 
characterizes post-revolution Libya, ex-rebel groups (Katibas) took it upon 
themselves to assume responsibility for maintaining law and order, beyond the 
control of government authorities. “This ‘mission’ taken on by former rebels, 
based on security considerations against a backdrop of racism and xenophobia, 
results in widespread practices of arbitrary arrest and detention of migrants and 
asylum-seekers, in total disregard of human rights” (FIDH, 2012). According to the 
Federation’s findings from 2012, based on visits to thousands of migrants held 
16 Unless otherwise referenced, the details in this section are extracted from Altai Consulting, 2013.
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in numerous, scattered detention centres, a key instrument of Libyan migration 
“policy” was arbitrary arrest with significant levels of violence in detention.17
In addition to detention, migrants also speak of being harassed and robbed by 
gangs and militia in Libya, often violently: “We have been robbed many times, 
they raid the house and steal our things,” said a 49-year-old Nigerian woman in 
Libya. An 18-year-old man from Guinea explained: “The main risk is the insecurity 
here in Libya; there is violence, shooting, racism and theft” (Altai Consulting, 
2013).
By late 2013 and into 2014, Amnesty International (2013) found that the Libyan 
Government had taken over most of the detention centres, listing 17 centres 
actively holding approximately 5,000 ‟illegals” (i.e. irregular migrants).
4.3.4 Dying to migrate north
The appetite of sub-Saharan migrants to make the journey through the Sahara, 
sometimes taking years, and cross the sea only appears to be growing. Agencies 
describe a 300 per cent increase in the number of irregular migrants crossing 
the Mediterranean in the first four months of 2014, compared with figures from 
the same period in 2013 (Frontex, 2014). With these rising numbers, death toll 
increases, too:
. . . Many people are so desperate that they are willing to take their 
chances. That cost more than 300 people their lives on October 3rd [2013], 
when a boat originating from Libya was so overloaded and unstable that 
it capsized when a fire on board the vessel caused its passengers to panic. 
Most of those who drowned were Eritreans. (Pleitgen, 2013)
During some periods of 2014, the Italian Coast Guard intercepted thousands of 
would-be migrants in multiple boats in a single day. Figures released at the end 
of July from Italy’s Mare Nostrum operation showed some 93,000 migrants had 
been rescued since the start of 2014.18
The increase in this flow from Libya and across the Mediterranean seems to be 
attributable to two main factors. The first is that many sub-Saharan migrants 
see the post-revolution chaos in Libya as an opportune time to make the sea 
crossing from the Libyan coast, given the less stringent monitoring of the borders 
and coastline. This, of course, is starting to change with Libya having officially 
closed four of its borders. The second factor is that migrants currently in Libya, 
even those who have lived and worked there for some years, are increasingly 
being pushed out and onto Europe by the growing instances of racism, violence, 
arbitrary arrest and harassment in the country.
17 It is rumoured that independent militia groups open detention centres in order to create the market 
for their smuggling endeavours.
18 As quoted in media. For example, see: www.timeslive.co.za/world/2014/08/11/italy-rescued-
nearly-100000-migrants-at-sea-this-year.
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Death in the desert crossing
In addition to deaths at sea, crossing the desert is also rife with dangers. The 
routes leading from the Horn of Africa and West Africa to Libya (and other North 
African destinations) necessarily pass through the desert, either the Sahara or 
the Algerian desert, depending on which routes migrants follow. This leaves 
migrants vulnerable. When deaths do occur, they are usually due to the perilous 
nature of desert crossing, and also to migrants’ contact with unscrupulous 
smugglers, traffickers, certain State officials and, in some cases, violent non-
State actors.
Sub-Saharan migrants die in unknown numbers in the desert. According to a 
migrant interviewed in Niamey, desert conditions are very difficult: 
Entire lorries full of migrants disappear. . . . It is a tragedy, a real tragedy. 
(UNODC, 2011:63)
The Sahara Desert is a vast band that migrants from East Africa and the Horn 
of Africa as well as West and Central Africa must cross to reach the North 
African seaboard countries. The other desert of relevance is the Sinai, Egypt, 
where previously (before January 2013, when the border was hermetically 
sealed between Israel and Egypt) migrants passed through to get into Israel. 
Now migrants, mainly Eritrean, die in the Sinai predominantly from violence at 
the hands of traffickers and other criminals, having been taken into the Sinai 
deliberately to be extorted, as explained previously.
Migrants die in deserts from a combination of mistreatment, indifference, 
misadventure and lack of preparedness. They may also die from violence in the 
desert through banditry, at the hands of State officials and smugglers, or vehicle 
accidents due to overcrowding, bad roads and dangerous driving. However, as 
most, but not all, migrants move through deserts under the aegis of smugglers 
or independent transporters, their deaths cannot be merely seen as accidents. 
Smugglers are clearly culpable directly or indirectly for many, if not most, of the 
fatalities.
A recent study by Altai Consulting (2013), which included detailed migrant 
interviews, contained numerous reports of thirst and exhaustion during desert 
journeys, sometimes leading to death: “Migrants reported having to bring their 
own food for the journey, so they often carried, and subsisted on, biscuits and 
dates because they were easy to carry. Coupled with the low nutritional value 
of their diet, migrants often did not have enough water to drink, as this was 
provided by the smuggler. There were also some reports of smugglers adding 
petrol to water in order to alter the taste so that migrants wouldn’t drink too 
much. Many of the migrants spoke of dehydration and exhaustion, some also 
spoke of friends or fellow passengers dying as a result.”
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The desert climate, particularly the cold in the nights, reportedly leads to 
sickness among some migrants. For some, the lack of medical treatment and 
their general level of exhaustion may lead to deteriorating health and, eventually, 
death. If migrants become sick, it is not unusual for smugglers to dump them 
in the desert in order to prevent the sickness from spreading to the rest. 
A 35-year-old man from Mali explained:
Two persons in the group died when the smuggler left them in the desert.
(Altai Consulting, 2013)
The UNODC states that: “While figures on fatalities can be difficult to ascertain, 
media reports indicate that between 1996 and 2011, at least 1,691 people died 
while attempting to cross the Sahara” (Altai Consulting, 2013). It is probable that 
the true total is far higher.
Knowledge of deaths of migrants is normally learned through media coverage, as 
there are no official statistics or groups systematically collecting this information. 
It should be assumed that the cases of death reaching national and international 
media or official attention are only a portion of the real figures. It seems that 
when a dozen or more migrants are found dead together in the desert, news 
of the “tragedy” is known. Behind these publicized cases, numerous individual 
cases or smaller groups are probably never made known, except through stories 
of surviving migrants. Many migrants disappear and are never found. In such 
remote and harsh climates, bodies left behind soon disappear leaving almost no 
trace. 
In May 2014, a report from one media source illustrates the difficulties of finding 
remains and determining precise numbers of fatalities:
At least 13 of the dozens of migrants from Niger abandoned by smugglers 
in the Sahara Desert last week have been found dead in southern Algeria, 
a local official and a military source in Niger said on Friday. . . . Another 
33 people from the same convoy of mainly women and children were 
believed to have died elsewhere but their bodies had not been found 
yet. ‟These people appear to have gone looking for shelter but died from 
the lack of food and water,” a Niger military source told Reuters. . . . The 
source put the estimate for the dead at 30. (Reuters, 2014)
Equally, deaths of migrants in groups where smugglers remain with the survivors 
are less likely to be publicly known, as the smugglers make every effort to keep 
the deaths secret. More often than not, the publicized cases are groups of 
abandoned migrants who die and are then found later by others. Rarely, if ever, 
are those responsible apprehended, and investigations are not conducted to 
establish who is responsible for migrant deaths.
Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration
127
CNN was one of many media actors covering a dramatic discovery of multiple 
migrant deaths in September 2013. Given that at least 48 of those found dead 
were children or teenagers, it is possible they were on their way to find low-
paying jobs in neighbouring Algeria: 
Stranded in the unforgiving expanses of Niger’s Sahara Desert after their 
vehicles broke down, scores of people, almost all of them women and 
children, slowly died of thirst. The migrants had been trying to reach 
Algeria. . . . Instead, they died of dehydration, unable to escape the sandy 
wastes of the Sahel. A total of 92 bodies have been found, Niger security 
forces told CNN on Thursday. . . . Many of the bodies were severely 
decomposed and appeared to have been partially eaten by animals. 
(Smith-Spark and Damon, 2013)
Increasingly, as more is known of migrants going west from the Horn of Africa 
to Libya, deaths of migrants in the desert are being reported. One such report 
in April 2014 illustrates that the abandonment and death of smuggled migrants, 
including Ethiopians, Eritreans and Sudanese, is far from unusual:
Nine immigrants have died among around 300 abandoned by smugglers in 
the scorching Sudanese-Libyan desert, with the others in poor condition. 
. . . The smugglers left them in the desert, on the border between Sudan 
and Libya. (Al Jazeera, 2014)
In another witness report from a Somali man in the Netherlands who traveled 
with smugglers across the Sahara:
In the middle of the desert [south-eastern Libya] they threw away 20 
persons. The desert is very dangerous, there is no water, there is no food, 
it is 50 degree Celsius. Eight of them [migrants in the group the he was in] 
died. Some of them drank their urine. The Libyan police was [sic] patrolling 
the area and saw them but they did not help. (RMMS, 2014b:45)
One 20-year-old Somaliland woman told RMMS about her journey from 
Somaliland to Tripoli. She was part of a group of 56 young Somalilanders taken 
to Libya by smugglers. Of the 56, only 22 survived. The smugglers let them 
walk through the desert in Sudan for days, and people who died from injuries 
or dehydration were left behind. This high proportion of deaths is probably 
untypical, but without more data we cannot be certain; this points to the great 
challenge of collating accurate figures of sub-Saharan migrants who die in the 
desert as they travel north.
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Death in the sea crossing
“There wasn’t enough room [on the boat] but luckily we made it to Lampedusa. 
There are 25 or 30 people on these small boats. If you are lucky you make it, if 
not you end up in the water.” (Interview with an Eritrean migrant in Switzerland) 
(O’Dea, 2012)
The details of the scale of death at sea (particularly in the Mediterranean) 
involving irregular migrants is covered in detail in Chapter 3, but an outline of 
trends and examples is presented here as death is a common part of the migrant 
story from North Africa to Europe.
As with calculating numbers of migrant deaths in the desert, estimating fatalities 
at sea is problematic. Navies and sea patrols operating in the Mediterranean, 
national authorities in North Africa, and those on the shores of Greece, Italy and 
Malta are only able to enumerate the thousands of deaths they come across, but 
what of those of which there is no trace? 
Following the widely reported drowning of over 200 migrants travelling from 
Libya to Europe in March 2009,19 stories of deaths crossing the northern sea 
passage (the Mediterranean) have become increasingly common. Before then 
the dramatic stories of deaths and efforts to enumerate totals concerned the 
Atlantic crossing from mainland Africa to the Canary Islands (Spanish territory). 
While travelling “west” geographically, these West African migrants were going 
north in so far that landing on the Canaries was their ticket into Europe:
More than 27,000 illegal migrants have turned up on the Spanish Canary 
Islands off the West African coast this year alone, thousands more than 
in 2005, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). 
Spanish authorities say the bodies of more than 500 suspected migrants 
have been found this year in the ocean around the Canaries. (IRIN, 2006)
A 2006 report from IOM suggested that thousands of deaths at sea had occurred 
in one year alone. Over 31,000 people tried to reach Canary Islands illegally from 
West Africa last year, according to IOM. Of those, at least 6,000 died on the way. 
We crammed onto a boat that should normally fit about 30 people. 
Everyone was praying just to make it to the islands. People were 
vomiting; some were seeing visions and spirits. Two men, delirious from 
dehydration, jumped off the boat on the way. Ten others died on board 
and were thrown into the sea, Pape said. (IRIN, 2007)
19 See, for example: The Guardian at www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/31/migrants-libya-
drown-italy; or NBC News at www.nbcnews.com/id/29967891/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/
hundreds-feared-dead-migrant-boat-sinking/.
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Agreements between Mauritania and Morocco with Italy and Spain put pressures 
on the westward sea route, which has led to the rise in cross-Sahara migratory 
route and the deadly Mediterranean passage.
As of June 2014, Italy had already received roughly 60,000 arrivals, and in one 
weekend in April, Italy picked up around 4,000 migrants in the Mediterranean 
(Schemm, 2014). According to reports from UNHCR, approximately 500 migrants 
died or went missing as they attempted the crossing in 2012. In 2011, at the 
height of unrest in Libya and Tunisia, more than 1,500 migrants were reported 
as dead or missing (Dockins, 2013).
Media reports stating how, over a short period of time, a weekend, for instance, 
Italian authorities “rescue” hundreds if not thousands of migrants, illustrate how 
rapidly the numbers are escalating.20 As mentioned, deaths in the Mediterranean 
are not the focus of this chapter and are examined in more detail in Chapter 3.
Death at the hands of traffickers
Northbound sub-Saharan migrants die from gun wounds, torture and extreme 
violence, and/or neglect while held by traffickers. Apart from cases of death, 
there are thousands more in which migrants suffer sexual violence and other 
severe human rights abuses that may include organ theft.21 This is a problem 
primarily associated with the victimization of Eritrean and other migrants from 
the Horn of Africa, and occurs mainly in Egypt and Sudan. Some analyses, as 
mentioned previously, estimate that as many as 10,000 migrants have been 
killed or have died in the Sinai at the hands of traffickers in a four-year period 
(2009–2013) alone (van Reisen, Estefanos and Rijken, 2013).
In an extraordinary statement, one Sinai human trafficker told researchers in 
2013 that he was responsible for the death of 1,000 Eritreans and other sub-
Saharan nationals (van Reisen, Estefanos and Rijken, 2013). In a Human Rights 
Watch report in 2014, another trafficker claimed: 
I torture them so their relatives pay me to let them go. . . . Three of 
them died because I beat them so hard. I released the one who paid. 
(van Reisen, Estefanos and Rijken, 2013:63)
20 Since October 2013, almost 43,000 people have been rescued by the Italian Navy (UNHCR, Central 
Mediterranean Sea Initiative Action Plan, UNHCR Bureau for Europe, Updated 13 May 2014).
  On 15–18 July 2014, Italy's search and rescue mission saved more than 1,700 migrants in the 
Mediterranean (www.trust.org/item/20140715143854-k89dj/?source=fiOtherNews3).
  In the latest tragedy involving migrants, up to 19 persons are thought to be dead as a boat carrying 
asylum-seekers found itself in difficulties around 80 miles from Lampedusa. (www.maltatoday.com.
mt/news/world/41382/19_migrants_die_in_latest_boat_tragedy_#.U8vy3VZS--g)
21 As discussed in Chapter 5, the issue of death by organ theft is controversial. There have been regular 
reports from the Sinai that organ removal is practiced by criminals against migrants. There appears 
to be evidence that numerous migrants (normally Eritreans) have been killed for their body parts 
and organs, according to some sources. However, some academics, activists and human rights 
organizations working in the region are doubtful of the veracity of the evidence from Egypt and 
those presenting it, despite the fact that the World Health Organization in a recent report called 
Egypt a regional hub for the trade.
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Migrant witness reports from Libya also suggest that kidnapping and extortion 
of migrants from the Horn of Africa is a rising phenomenon. There appears to be 
a fine line between State officials and non-State militias, and even the actions 
of civilians:
They [migrants] live in fear, they are at the mercy of the whims of those – 
Libyan armed forces, militias or civilians – who hold them in their power, 
and they are viewed as a useful commodity to be brought, sold and 
exploited as forced labour. (JRS Malta, 2014)
Hundreds, if not thousands, of migrants have been, and continue to be, held by 
militia groups who initially claimed to be defending the integrity of the country’s 
borders against pro-Gadhafi black migrants (Altai Consulting, 2013; FIDH, 
2012). Increasingly, it seems some of these armed non-State actors detaining 
and “handling” the large flows of migrants may also be profiting from their 
captives through labour and sexual exploitation, holding them for ransom and 
other trafficking activities. Certainly, much violence, sexual abuse, racism and 
xenophobia is reported by surviving migrants. Some reports mention fatalities 
occurring in these unofficial detention centres due to brutality, neglect or outright 
murder. As described previously, migrant detention centres are scattered around 
Libya, and it seems that those who try to escape  run a high risk of being shot. 
I saw how a pregnant woman tried to escape prison in Libya after she 
gave birth. The guards shot her dead and killed the baby by stepping on 
it. (RMMS, 2014b:56)
Calculating numbers of people who are killed by traffickers and non-State actors 
is fraught with difficulties due to the clandestine nature of their activities, the 
inability of others to scrutinize the criminals’ behaviour, and the culture of 
impunity compounded by the strong anti-migrant and racist attitudes towards 
sub-Saharan migrants in Egypt and Libya.
Death by State officials
This category of death includes cases where migrants are shot by security 
guards and border officials. These cases are reported by migrants transiting or 
entering Spanish territory in Morocco (Ceuta and Melilla), as well as in Morocco 
itself, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya and Sudan. In rare instances, the news of migrant 
shooting reaches international media, as with the case in February 2014, when 
15 migrants drowned after Spanish guards shot rubber bullets at them as they 
tried to swim into the enclave of Ceuta (Schemm, 2014).22
Every year thousands of migrants enter Morocco irregularly and periodically 
attempt mass break-ins through or over the triple-layer fence surrounding the 
two Spanish enclaves. Many are successful, but both the Moroccans and Spanish 
22 Apparently, these migrants were not directly killed by the bullets, but critics of the shooting claim 
that the fear and injuries caused by the shooting caused the drowning.
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guards use force to prevent the mass influxes and forcibly return to Morocco or 
the Algerian border those they can catch “in the act”.
“Dozens are wounded with every attempt. There are often fatalities,” claimed 
one report that continued to quote a migrant saying, “nothing in the world is as 
hard as that fence and there is always a loss of life” (RMMS, 2014b).
When Eritrean and other sub-Saharan migrants tried to enter Israel through 
the Sinai, there were regular reports of bullet injuries and fatalities along the 
border where Egyptian soldiers appeared to fire at migrants without restraint. 
The Eritrean border guards are apparently licensed to shoot on sight any person 
who try to leave their territory through unofficial methods, but the authors are 
not aware of recorded fatalities.
Migrants may also die while held (and abused) in formal or informal detention, 
in a wide variety of locations throughout the Maghreb and Sahel countries 
where  – due to their irregular status – they have to face detention, deportation, 
sentencing and punishment. There are few stories of this nature but it is known 
that often in remote locations, behind closed doors, certain State officials 
treat migrants as they choose, convinced there will be no investigation or 
accountability demanded if migrants go missing or die in their hands. More 
often, if some State officials are practising extortion and abuse, or are complicit 
in criminal activities, they become part of the wider machine that commoditizes, 
exploits and sometimes causes the death of migrants. A dead migrant needs 
to be disposed of and even covered up while a migrant who is alive may be 
exploited for profit and/or sold on to others.
In 2011 and 2012, militias in Libya held large ad hoc detention centres for sub-
Saharan migrants. In 2013, these were ostensibly taken over by the “new” 
Ministry of the Interior, but a grey zone remains between the activities of the 
State and the armed militias who still wield power. Amnesty International 
estimated in 2013 that approximately 5,000 migrants, asylum-seekers and 
refugees were held in 17 detention centres in “prison-like conditions indefinitely 
for migration-related offences pending deportation” (Amnesty International, 
2013:5). As it elaborated its findings, Amnesty International went on to describe 
different centres: 
In the holding centres in Sabha, detained migrants appear to have been 
systematically subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment. 
There is no estimation of the number of deaths that may have occurred but 
migrant reports, especially from those who have reached Europe and feel free to 
discuss their stories, suggest killings were not infrequent in Libya. Certainly, they 
talk of close complicity of State officials with criminal elements. The following 
quotes are taken from interviews conducted for the RMMS Going West study of 
mid-2014:
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The police take the money and release these people. But the police 
themselves call another group and then the migrants are arrested again 
by another group, not the police and not the government, but the militia. 
They took us for four months and held us in a small village. (Somali man, 
interviewed in the Netherlands, who travelled from Somalia to Europe)
Very senior officials and militia are involved and even the Government 
cannot stop them. [There is a] need for the central Government to be 
stronger. (Senior Somali community leader in Tripoli, Libya)
Officials of the Libyan navy have a connection with the “connection men”. 
They share the money with them, every connection man has a connection 
with the army or navy. If they quarrel they will capture the boats and put 
the people in prison. (Eritrean man in Italy)
4.4 Conclusions: Methodological challenges  
and information gaps
While we have a clear grasp of the lethal risks migrants face making these 
journeys, there are evidently serious gaps in terms of our ability to enumerate 
human rights violations or actual fatalities. For all the witness statements, 
migrant interviews and media coverage, a close approximation of the number 
of deaths is hard to reach. Deaths at sea are perhaps better recorded due to 
the prevalence of patrols, surveillance, the frequency of shipping traffic, the 
increasing interest demonstrated by western media, and the greater accessibility 
to information and images depicting tragedies.
Methodologically, the closure of these information gaps is very problematic. 
Most deaths occur in remote locations or clandestine situations, and frequently 
where local officials and often local communities are either complicit with 
perpetrators or indifferent to the fate of migrants.
The most effective way to collect information on migrant deaths may be to 
compile it from interviews with migrants at strategic points of the journey, and 
after their arrival in Europe. If the information collected is relatively fresh, the 
details of each case may prevent duplication, and for discrete periods of review 
a “snapshot” might be collected. For example, for a one-month period in one 
year resources could be deployed to capture information from direct interviews 
with migrants and other sources, such as hospitals, police records and morgues. 
The exercise may prove to be costly and insufficient, but could go some way 
to increase our knowledge of the number of deaths, killings and other human 
rights violations that occur along migration routes in the region.
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The secondary, and arguably far more complicated, problem will be to translate 
increased knowledge of fatalities into a multi-country, multisectoral policy 
response aimed at reducing deaths and irregular migration. Current and past 
efforts in the region to suppress or curtail undocumented human movement and 
the “support networks” that often facilitate it (smugglers and other associated 
actors) have evidently not been successful, and as long as interventions are not 
comprehensive or collaborative it is unlikely they will achieve much. At best they 
simply shift the routes elsewhere, and at worst they increase cost and risk to 
migrants, many of whom are determined to move at any cost and at any risk.
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Migrant Experiences
Death in the desert
Without hopes of getting a good job after school, 20-year-old Ayan decided to 
leave secondary school in Somaliland and try her luck in Europe. Her journey 
turned out to be much harsher than she had expected, and she saw many die 
on the way. Eventually, she returned home.23
Ayan did not tell anyone about her departure. She used her own money to reach 
Addis Ababa, where she arrived without a penny left in her pocket. When she 
found a group of smugglers who did not demand money until reaching Libya, she 
began her journey through the desert. After a six-day walk, which the smugglers 
indicated would be only 30 minutes, the travellers were transported through the 
desert towards Tripoli on four-wheel drive vehicles.
On the way a pregnant lady died. We tried to bury her, but the smugglers 
said that now we should just think of ourselves.
One day, the troop was chased by rival 
smuggler bands known to sell human organs. 
In the dark, everyone was loaded off the 
vehicles and hidden in the desert for two 
hours. This way, the drivers tricked the organ 
smugglers into believing the trucks were 
empty. Throughout the rest of the journey 
they continued to encounter obstacles; the 
group slowly shrank. Whereas Ayan departed 
in a group of 56, only 22 survived. The others 
died one after the other on the way, some of 
starvation or dehydration; others got stuck in deep mud or were left behind 
when injured. Nineteen members of the group died in a car accident. 
One lady from the group sank down in the soil. They tried to drag her up 
but in this attempt to help her, one leg beneath the knee was cut off and 
she later died of her injuries.
When they arrived in Tripoli, the surviving men were tortured with electric 
shocks, and the women were raped. Ayan had gone through an operation before 
starting her journey, and the wound had become infected. Luckily, she was 
released when her family paid the cost of her trip to the smugglers. Her family 
arranged for her to be taken to a hospital for treatment, and sent her money 
to return home. Traumatized and discouraged, she decided to return and stay 
home. She is thankful to be alive and hopes to go to university. 
23 This story is based on an interview conducted by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat in July 
2013. 
“I realized that the 
dignity I have here in my 
homeland and the dignity 
I met in other countries 
were not the same.”
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Christopher Horwood1
Figure 5.1: Migratory routes in the Horn of Africa
Source: RMMS, compilation of 2013 monthly summaries.
5.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the complex, dynamic and fast-changing context of 
migration originating in the Horn of Africa. It is complex because, possibly more 
so than in other regions, migrant flows are mixed, with a huge number of forced 
* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM).
1 Christopher Horwood is the founding coordinator of the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) 
based in Nairobi. He may be reached at: chris.horwood@regionalmms.org.
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migrants mingling with economic migrants. It is dynamic because the number 
of people on the move is high and has been rising in recent years, and the 
routes taken by migrants point in all directions. It is fast-changing because the 
securitization of the region, coupled with environmental fragility and changing 
migration policies, means the flows are subject to sudden changes and affected 
by multiple factors.
In addition to these characteristics, the prevalent experience of those moving 
within, or out of, the Horn of Africa is one of hardship, neglect, brutal victimization 
and, for some, death. This chapter shows that while death is a common outcome 
for some migrants, far less is known about the scale of fatality than is known 
regarding the scale of abuse and victimization. Abuse and death may occur during 
migration in the region not only due to the harsh environmental conditions of 
many migration routes but also as a result of the “social economy” that has 
developed around migration, namely smuggling, trafficking and other forms of 
criminality, which may be compounded by collusion with certain State officials.
5.2 Brief historical and geographical background:  
The migration context
Migrants from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia (including Somaliland and Puntland) 
make up the overwhelming majority of those on the move in the region.  Those 
moving within the Horn of Africa and leaving the Horn of Africa from these 
three territories are the ones who mostly face abuse and death. Apart from 
the million (plus) Somali refugees and asylum-seekers in Yemen, Kenya and 
Ethiopia (combined), there are hundreds of thousands of Somalis who have 
moved as irregular, normally economic, migrants in recent years, and tens of 
thousands who continue to move every year. The migration contexts relating 
to the three territories differ considerably and need to be briefly described to 
better understand how and where migrants face abuse and death during their 
journeys.
5.2.1 The Ethiopian exodus
Detailed interviews from migrant coast patrol teams in Yemen show that irregular 
migrants from Ethiopia are typically young males aged 28–35 from rural areas 
who lack formal education. Fertility rates in Ethiopia are among the highest in 
the world, and with a population of over 92 million2 and wealthy neighbouring 
countries in the region and beyond, it is not surprising that smugglers have a 
steady flow of young men and women seeking their services. 
More than 600,000 Ethiopians are estimated to have left the country in recent 
decades as emigrants and currently make up the Ethiopian diaspora, mostly 
2 World Bank 2014 estimate.
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in North America, Europe and the Middle East (Human Rights Watch, 2013a). 
Ethiopians have left their country for a mix of reasons that can be broadly 
classified into political, “revolutionary” or ethnic as well as economic or survival 
necessity. Additionally, many are drawn to work outside their country as the 
“culture of migration” has become strongly embedded. 
Significant migration from Ethiopia to countries beyond the Horn of Africa began 
after the 1974 revolution, in addition to the mass exodus of Ogadeni Somali 
Ethiopians to Somalia in 1977. One calculation in 2008/2009 suggested that the 
majority of the estimated 17,000–20,000 smuggled migrants entering South 
Africa every year were Ethiopians (Horwood, 2009). More recently, the Ethiopian 
Embassy in South Africa told the International Labour Organization (ILO) that 
between 45,000 and 50,000 Ethiopians were living in South Africa in 2011, of 
which 95 per cent had entered the country irregularly (ILO, 2011).
Some use South Africa as a springboard to fly to South America and North 
America, Australia or Europe. The southern route can take many months and 
normally passes through different combinations of countries including Kenya, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Migrants may travel by foot, boat, container trucks and 
buses. Almost all move using smuggler networks with high protection deficits. 
Since 2010, South Africa has become less welcoming to irregular migrants and 
asylum-seekers, while the popular sentiment has displayed increasingly violent 
anti-migrant and xenophobic tendencies for some years. In 2008, particularly 
strong expressions of hatred against migrants resulted in riots and multiple 
deaths through public lynching. 
However, more commonly in the last decade, Ethiopian irregular migrants go 
east to Yemen (en route to Saudi Arabia) via Djibouti or Somaliland. A smaller 
number go west through Sudan to Libya or north to Egypt, and  most of them 
with the intention to cross the Mediterranean into Europe. According to ILO 
reports, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates that 75,000–100,000 
Ethiopians migrate irregularly to Libya annually (ILO, 2011). To what extent the 
change of regime in Libya has impacted this flow is not yet known, although 
reports of deaths and rights violations in Libya, as well as the presence of 
Ethiopians in boats arriving in Italy between 2012 and 2014, suggest that the 
numbers are rising.3
Ethiopians dominate irregular migration flows to Yemen. The cumulative 
number of Ethiopians arriving in Yemen over the past seven and a half years is 
at least 300,000, a conservative estimate based on findings of the daily coast 
monitoring patrols organized by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
the (Office of the) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
(RMMS, 2013a:34). The real figure is reckoned to be higher due to monitoring 
3 This is repeatedly cited in press reports in 2013 and 2014 documenting rescue at sea, deaths at sea and 
arrivals on Italian territory.
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limitations and because most new arrivals do not register but are kidnapped 
by criminal gangs and/or transported immediately to “torture camps” or north 
towards Saudi Arabia in “enforced smuggling”. 
In an interview with Migrant-Rights.org, Aida Awel, Chief Technical Adviser on 
migrant domestic workers for the ILO Addis Ababa office, said that “IOM and 
government data shows that the total number of returnees have reached 
163,018, of which 100,688 are men, 53,732 are women and 8,598 are children”. 
The recent crackdown on irregular Ethiopian migrants in Saudi Arabia – with 
160,000 migrants rough-handled in forced return to their homeland between 
November 2013 and February 2014 – is an illustration of how important the 
Saudi informal labour markets are to Ethiopians.4 Despite this, after a short and 
steep drop in Ethiopians being smuggled to Yemen in early 2014, by April 2014 
those recently expelled were trying again to cross into Djibouti and cross the Red 
Sea looking for work. It appears smugglers and traffickers can be reassured that 
their business is rapidly returning to its normal lucrative levels. By comparison, 
Ethiopian asylum-seekers in Canada, Europe and the United States of America5 
are now relatively few (and falling), numbering not more than a few hundred 
every year.6 
According to ILO (2011), “The ‘culture of migration’ is another key factor 
underlying high levels of trafficking [and migration]. Cross-border migration 
is considered as personal, social, and material success in most communities, 
creating wrong [sic] role models for the younger generation.” Recent studies 
of knowledge, attitudes and practices of Ethiopian migrants show that despite 
knowledge of the high likelihood of being subject to rights violations, brutality 
and even death, the commitment to migrate appears to be as strong as ever 
(RMMS, 2014c).
5.2.2 The Eritrean exodus
Ethiopia’s neighbour, Eritrea, is also one of the world’s poorest countries and 
is a closed and highly securitized State, widely regarded as repressive and 
authoritarian. According to Human Rights Watch, in Eritrea, citizens experience 
arbitrary and indefinite detention; torture; inhumane conditions of confinement; 
restrictions on freedom of speech and press, movement and belief; and indefinite 
conscription and forced labour in national service (Human Rights Watch, 2013b).
Eritrea has troubled relations with both the African Union and the United 
Nations, as well as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 
from which it was suspended in 2007. The Government is frequently the target 
4 See www.migrant-rights.org/2014/04/interview-the-ilos-aida-awel-on-the-future-of-ethiopias-160000-returning-
migrants/ for the full text of the interview.
5 Hereinafter referred to as the United States.
6 In 2011, 2,379 Ethiopians applied for asylum in Europe and 1,318 Ethiopians applied for asylum in the 
United States and Canada. In the first half of 2012, there were just 863 asylum applications by Ethiopians in 
Europe, and 626 in the United States and Canada. In: RMMS, “Mixed migration in Horn of Africa and Yemen: 
June 2013” (Nairobi, RMMS, 2013).
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of international censure by human rights organizations and other bodies. A 
large share of its 6 million citizens have sought to emigrate, often at great risk to 
themselves.7
Conscription is mandatory and often greatly exceeds the 19-month limit on 
active duty laid out in the 1995 Proclamation.8 Reports suggest that conditions 
during military service are severe, with inadequate food, shelter and equipment, 
together with long days of forced manual labour and extensive sexual exploitation 
of female recruits (Human Rights Watch, 2014a:114). 
Most of the 35,000 Eritrean asylum-seekers in Israel have fled conscription or 
deserted the army.9 Because of the recognized severity of the conditions, some 
Western nations offer asylum to Eritreans escaping and evading military service. 
In 2012, 90 per cent of the almost 30,000 Eritrean asylum claims filed around the 
world were granted (UNHCR, 2013). But the cost of migration is high not only in 
terms of risks migrants may face on their journey but also to family members 
remaining in Eritrea. Interviewed Eritrean refugees in the diaspora claim that 
relatives of those who had left the country are subject to fines of approximately 
USD 3,350 for each missing family member (UN Human Rights Council, 2014).
The exodus of Eritreans is high in number but attracts little international attention. 
Migrants mainly leave the country illegally, by land and head directly into Sudan, 
without obtaining the required exit permit/visa that would typically be denied 
to most of those departing. Unofficial departure or evading military conscription 
is regarded as an act of defection, treachery and political dissent that can result 
in serious individual censure by Eritrean authorities (RMMS, 2014a). Eritrean 
authorities also reportedly adopt a shoot-on-sight policy towards people found 
in locations that are off-limits, such as areas close to the national borders, or 
intercepted ‟escaping” by sea (Human Rights Watch, 2013b). Eritrean irregular 
migrants and asylum-seekers who are repatriated from other countries are also 
detained, as they are considered traitors.10 According to Freedom House (2013) 
reports, they may even face life imprisonment or the death penalty as a result.
7 Some migrants are not migrants at all but trafficked persons sometimes abducted within Eritrean territory. 
Accusations of this nature were made in 2012 in the United Nations Security Council Report of the Monitoring 
Group on Somalia and Eritrea. In: UNSC, “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant 
to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011)” (New York, UNSC, 2012).
8 Under the Proclamation of National Service (No. 82/1995), persons aged 18 to 50 years have the obligation 
of performing this national service. For persons aged 18 to 40, this obligation consists of six months of 
military training and 12 months of active duty military service, for a total of 18 months; persons over 40 are 
considered to be on reserve status if they have performed active duty service.
9 According to the official October 2013 figures from Israel’s Population, Immigration and Border Authority, 
53,636 asylum-seekers are in Israel. Of these, 35,000 originated from Eritrea, while the majority of others 
are from Sudan, with a handful from other African States. See, for example, https://www.opendemocracy.
net/5050/zina-smith-and-david-sheen/taking-mask-off-asylum-seekers-in-israel.
10 From late 2011 on, there have been increasing reports of forcible returns of Eritreans by the Sudanese 
Government. Amnesty International urged Sudan to comply with its international legal obligations and 
stop all forced returns of refugees and asylum-seekers to Eritrea. In: Amnesty International, “Sudan must 
end forced returns of asylum seekers to Eritrea”, public statement, AFR 54/039/2012 (London, Amnesty 
International, 2012).
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Consequently, many Eritreans who wish to leave have to resort to using 
smugglers. Up to 2011, Sudan hosted more than 80,000 Eritrean refugees in the 
eight refugee camps in eastern Sudan along the Ethiopian border, but due to the 
risk of kidnapping and abduction by criminal gangs the number reportedly fell 
in 2012 (Human Rights Watch, 2014c). By early 2013, approximately 300,000 
Eritrean refugees and asylum-seekers lived in Sudan, Ethiopia, Israel and Europe 
(ibid.). According to UNHCR and as quoted in various reports by the agency and 
others, the monthly number of forced and economic migrants leaving Eritrea 
was in the range of 2,000–3,000 in early 2012.11
A recent detailed study of the victimization of Eritrean migrants suggested a 
more realistic estimate of those leaving Eritrea – approximately 5,000 per month 
(RMMS, 2014b). If this is the case, then up to 60,000 may be leaving annually; 
however, an estimated two thirds or more may not register with UNHCR as they 
are seeking to settle elsewhere (ibid.). Many hope to get to Europe where they 
know they have a high chance of being accepted as refugees, and where their 
lives will likely be considerably better than in a refugee camp in eastern Sudan 
or northern Ethiopia, not least because kidnapping from those camps or on the 
way to those camps, particularly in eastern Sudan, has become a major hazard in 
recent years. For many the camps are used as a staging post and clearing house 
for secondary movement. Smugglers are reputed to operate in and around the 
camps offering migrants different deals.
5.2.3 The Somali exodus
For many years, Somalis from South-Central Somalia have been on the move. 
Most appear as refugees in the region and beyond, but many are also economic 
migrants and move irregularly where they cannot move as refugees. As a result 
of victimizing each other in seemingly endless clan and internecine conflicts, 
Somali migrant flows have been the most numerous and consistent in the last 
two decades.
Fully making use of their prima facie group status as refugees in various countries, 
including their immediate neighbours, Somali migrants are normally afforded 
international protection as refugees. This allows them to move more openly with 
less long-term dependence on smugglers and clandestine operators. They may 
face other problems as refugees, but the immediate outcome of this difference 
is that they are arguably less commonly victims of some of the causes of death. 
There are several reasons behind the continued flow of Somalis leaving as 
refugees and irregular migrants, namely landmark sociopolitical changes since 
the demise of the Islamic Courts in 2006 and the intervention of the Ethiopian 
11 For example, in October 2013, Sheila Keetharuth, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
in Eritrea, said: “The current numbers are between 2,000 and 3,000 Eritreans fleeing the country every 
month” (www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/24/us-eritrea-un-rights-idUSBRE99N1H220131024). In June 
2014, she reported that the number increased to 4,000 per month.
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army from December of that year; the resurgence of warlordism and civil war; 
the rise of Al Shabab; the multinational intervention by the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the UN-sponsored elections establishing a 
Somali central government in 2012, while many parts of the country are still 
dominated by extremists. The severe drought of 2011 and 2012 in the midst of 
political and military conflict caused huge spikes in figures of those fleeing to 
Ethiopian and Kenyan refugee camps. 
Apart from the settled Somali diaspora – currently estimated to be 1–2 million 
strong – there are, in mid-2014, over 1 million Somalis living in refugee camps 
or urban centres outside their homeland in the Horn of Africa region, mainly 
in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen. Considering the Somali population is 
approximately 9 million, these figures represent an unusually large proportion 
of Somalis on the move or displaced (Al-Sharmani, 2007).
The seemingly unending rivers of migrants flowing from a drought-ravaged and 
insecure Somalia of 2011 and 2012 have now mostly stopped. In 2013 and 2014 
the debate in Kenya is of refugee return, as Kenya reels from successive pro-Al 
Shabab terror attacks in its cities, and as anti-migrant and anti-refugee sentiment 
grows. 
However, Somalis still continue to leave as conditions in Somalia remain harsh. 
They also move to escape specific and personal persecutory threats as a result 
of their political affiliation, clan membership and gender, to evade forced 
conscription or because fighting has prevented them from having access to 
international assistance that may have provided some basic needs such as food, 
medical services, health care and livelihoods (IOM et al., 2008). 
Additionally, the role of the diaspora has become pivotal in terms of creating 
“chain migration” through the critical mass of external and economically capable 
Somalis willing to fund and encourage the migration of relatives and friends still 
inside Somalia. Like Ethiopia, a strong culture of migration now exists, which can 
be expected to continue long after peace and prosperity take root in the country. 
In terms of destinations and routes, a considerable number move north from 
South-Central Somalia into Puntland state where they may stay as “internally 
displaced” and/or choose secondary movement towards Yemen. In the past eight 
years, Somalis have been crossing the Gulf of Aden (mainly from Bossasso) at an 
average of 22,500 people per year. In eight years, over 180,000 have arrived, 
although the peak years were 2008 and 2009 (average 33,000), and declining 
numbers are now choosing this route; data from 2013 suggests just 11,000 
entered Yemen. Somalis can live as refugees in urban centres in Yemen, and 
there are approximately 250,000 registered, although on average 20,000 reside 
in the remote and poorly resourced refugee camp of Al Kharez. The Yemeni 
Government claims there are many hundreds of thousands more unregistered 
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Somalis living in the country.12 According to migrant data collected in Yemen 
in recent years, the typical division between male and female migrants is on 
average 80 per cent/20 per cent, with most migrants falling in the 18–35 age 
range.13
An unknown number of Somalis reside in Kenya as refugees and/or irregular 
migrants. The true number is suspected to be higher than the official UNHCR 
refugee figures of 430,000 Somalis, and many Somalis transit through Kenya 
en route to South Africa. Their journey south may take weeks or months with 
prolonged stops in countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, the United Republic 
of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe to earn money to finance the next leg of 
their journey, out of preference, or because of being held in detention. In 2009, 
it was estimated that some 5,500–6,500 Somalis were smuggled along this 
southern route annually (Horwood, 2009). Anecdotal information from Nairobi 
and Mombasa suggests the smuggling business from Kenya to South Africa is as 
active as ever, but there is no new data.
Another route is west. Somalis are found in Djibouti and Ethiopia (in both cases, 
in refugee camps and urban centres) as well as in Sudan and Libya, where they 
normally seek means to cross the Mediterranean into Europe. There is no data on 
the level of movement of people from South-Central using this route, although 
Frontex data indicates that over 5,000 Somalis were detected crossing the 
Mediterranean in 2013, representing a 45 per cent rise in the number detected 
in 2012. Somalis were, in 2013, the fourth largest contingent (by nationality) 
detected making the crossing, after Syrians, Eritreans and Afghans (Frontex, 
2014).
5.2.4 Somaliland
Somaliland deserves a special mention. Declaring unilateral independence from 
Somalia in 1991, authorities estimate Somaliland’s population to be 3.5 million. 
A large number of Somalis and Ethiopians use Somaliland as a transit territory 
to Puntland or Djibouti, from where they are smuggled by boats to Yemen. 
According to a Joint Assessment report by the Mixed Migration Task Force (MMTF) 
of Somaliland, the Loya-ada border town between Somaliland and Djibouti is a 
major transit point, with well-established smuggling networks and smuggling 
reportedly comprising 80 per cent of the town’s economy (MMTF Somaliland, 
2012). Somalilanders do travel to Yemen, but are relatively few in number. In 
2012, fewer than 3,000 Somaliland migrants arrived in Yemen, representing just 
3.2 per cent of all arrivals (RMMS, 2013b:63). As Somalis automatically qualify 
for refugee status, it is possible that Somalilanders going to Yemen disguise their 
true identity and register as Somalis from South-Central Somalia. 
12 All data from new arrivals of migrants in Yemen is available from the Yemen Mixed Migration Task Force, 
whose members collate migration data from the various monitoring mechanisms they have established 
around the coast and other locations.
13 Based on composite and accumulated monthly reports from data gathered in Yemen and received by 
RMMS.
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Recent reports repeatedly indicate that rather than go east to Yemen, groups of 
educated young people, often runaways, are heading into Sudan and Libya with 
smugglers. According to IOM, in August, September and October 2011, some 
3,500 young men and women from Somaliland travelled this route (IRIN, 2012). 
More recently, a local NGO estimated that about 50 people are smuggled out 
of Somaliland every month, while press reports indicate the number could be 
150 (RMMS, 2013c). In a UNHCR-funded study on mixed migration to Libya, it 
was estimated that 500–3,000 migrants per month cross the border between 
Somaliland and Ethiopia (Altai Consulting, 2013:55).
In 2012 and 2013, reports of hundreds of Somaliland youths leaving every 
month started to surface with regularity. Other migrants are known to fly using 
money and contacts from the Somaliland diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula and 
Western countries. Those using the land routes are highly susceptible to abuse, 
kidnapping and murder or death by misadventure or malice.
5.3 Calculating deaths
Before trying to answer the question of how many Horn of Africa migrants 
die, it is useful to dissemble how they die. They die in different environments, 
under different conditions and while under the care or control of different 
groups of people. What we find is that almost all deaths are caused by either 
misadventure (lack of resources and preparedness), or callous negligence, or 
deliberate violence. Some respondents of a study conducted by the Danish 
Refugee Council (DRC) and RMMS even claimed that as many as 50 per cent 
of those who begin the journey die from either exposure to the elements or 
suffocation in transit. It is impossible to verify this number but many respondents 
felt that more die during the land crossing than during the sea crossing (DRC 
and RMMS, 2012). The fact that migrants are the commodity in a relatively 
new and thriving business, where smugglers and traffickers have high profits to 
make with almost no risk of censure or penalty, only adds to their vulnerability. 
These are boom times for those in the business, whether smugglers, traffickers, 
State officials or others associated with cross-border movement of hundreds of 
thousands of people in the region. Despite the deaths and violence, the flows 
only seem to increase.
Ironically, while poverty appears to be always a major driver for migration, it 
does not appear to hold back those preying upon migrants from extracting 
extraordinary profits from them, at the same time treating them with a level of 
contempt that frequently results in their death. Here follows a topography of 
lethal outcomes affecting migrants originating in the Horn of Africa.
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5.3.1 Death from physical hardship 
“Then we boarded another boat to Mocimboa, Mozambique. The boat lost 
power and drifted into the sea. We spent 21 days in the sea. We nearly ate each 
other out of hunger as our supplies ran out. . . .” (Horwood, 2009)
Many migrants make part of their journey by foot and by open truck, either 
with or without their smuggler escorts. Many of the routes used deliberately 
pass through remote areas away from main roads, formal border crossings 
and habitation. Coastal Yemen, eastern Sudan, eastern Ethiopia, north-eastern 
Kenya, Djibouti, Somaliland and Puntland as well as north-western Sudan and 
southern Libya are some of the hottest and most arid areas on the planet. Most 
migrants are entirely unprepared for the hours and days of walking or driving 
through waterless terrain in high temperatures. They may have to swim across 
rivers, remain in a “safe house” for days with little sanitation or food (e.g. in 
Mozambique and the United Republic of Tanzania), or wait on beaches in caves 
without provisions (e.g. in Djibouti). Countless migrant stories and reports speak 
of fellow migrants dying of thirst, hunger, exhaustion, and exposure to cold 
nights and hot days. 
Even though smugglers are notorious for their neglect of migrants, they normally 
give their “clients” access to some water (often contaminated by fuel to reduce 
consumption), but those migrants choosing to make their own way through 
desert areas in groups, in particular through Djibouti, eastern Ethiopia and 
southern Yemen,  frequently report deaths.
In one assessment, one official interviewed stated that in 2012 at least 20 
Ethiopian migrants were known to have died of thirst in the middle of the desert, 
between Loya-ada and Ceel-gaal in Somaliland (MMTF Somaliland, 2012). 
We took the boat for three days without food or water. When we arrived 
in Tanzania we hid in the forest for 15 days. People died of snake bite, 
malaria and hunger.14
Those going south towards South Africa may face thirst, starvation and 
exhaustion, causing some to die, but normally such deaths are linked to being 
abandoned by their smugglers in forests or along the coast (the United Republic 
of Tanzania), or being kept for long periods in airless containers and trucks in 
extreme heat. Following subsections looking at death in deserts, on roads and 
on water illustrate how extensive death from physical hardship may be.
14 Testimony of an Ethiopian migrant, 28 years old, in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. In: C. Horwood, In Pursuit 
of the Southern Dream: Victims of Necessity. Assessment of the irregular movement of men from East Africa 
and the Horn to South Africa (Geneva, IOM, 2009), p. 69.
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Death in the desert
“During our trip through the desert, we came across the body of a dead girl that 
was half buried in the sand, probably she died of starvation.”15 
Apart from death by drowning and death by murder (see below for both), the 
most common location of migrant deaths, as reported by survivors, is the desert. 
As mentioned, almost all routes out of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia pass through 
some of the most arid, hot and shelterless landscapes on earth. In addition, these 
remote areas are selected by smugglers as least likely to attract scrutiny by State 
officials. The lava fields of western Djibouti where so many Ethiopians pass en 
route to Obock – the main departure point for boats to Yemen – are vast areas 
of jagged rock without water or local communities. In 2012, RMMS and IOM 
were informed by the Djibouti Government of a group over 30 dead migrants 
that were found by nomads. Initially the Government claimed the number of 
dead was over 80, and that finding dead bodies in the desert was common. 
They asked IOM for assistance with body bags. Those passing through eastern 
Ethiopia said there was no need for directions because the desert was lined with 
the whitened bones of fallen migrants. One migrant spoke of the typical horrors 
facing travellers in the Ethiopian deserts along migrant routes:
We started the perilous journey through Afar desert, where some looters 
attacked us, beat us badly and took the money we had. After around 
one week of walking in the desert, during which some people died of 
starvation, we reached Tajoor Mountain, where we stopped in order to 
have a rest. I was looking around me, I found some people dying, some 
were sleeping, and others were crying and asking for water or food. I was 
walking among people laying down, looking at them and thinking they 
were staring at me, but no answer from their side, then I realized that they 
were dead. There I realized that I was going through a journey of death, 
some people died during the desert crossing, some while climbing the 
mountain and some on the top of it.16
Reports from numerous victims of trafficking in the Sinai, Egypt, talk of shallow 
graves and rotting bodies in those deserts, where migrants from the Horn of 
Africa have died from neglect and murder by torture or gunfire. In addition, 
some sources have offered photos of hundreds of bodies in trench graves in the 
desert that appear to have been victims of organ removal.
In north-west Sudan and south-east Libya, more recent stories suggest numerous 
migrants from sub-Saharan Africa die and are left in the desert. One 20-year-
15 Testimony of an Ethiopian male migrant travelling towards Djibouti. In: MSF, No Choice: Somali and Ethiopian 
Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Migrants Crossing the Gulf of Aden (Geneva, MSF, 2008).
16 Testimony of Molla (not his real name), a 15-year-old Ethiopian boy, interviewed in Haradh in February 
2012. In: DRC and RMMS, Desperate Choices: Conditions, Risks & Protection Failures Affecting Ethiopian 
Migrants in Yemen (Nairobi, DRC and RMMS, 2012).
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old Somaliland woman told about her journey from Somaliland to Tripoli. She 
was part of a group of 56 young Somalilanders taken to Libya by smugglers. Out 
of the 56, only 22 survived. The smugglers let them walk through the desert 
in Sudan for days, and people who died from injuries or dehydration were left 
behind (RMMS, 2014b). It may be assumed that this high proportion of deaths is 
untypical but without more data we cannot be certain.
We will never know what numbers of migrant deaths the desert sands hide, 
but considering the frequency with which surviving migrants mention deaths 
of companions in the deserts and their frequent sightings of bones and bodies, 
they are likely to be high.
Death on the road
Following the accident on 24 April 2012, when a bus carrying 33 migrants 
travelling from Tadjoura (Djibouti) to Obock veered off the side of the road, a 
similar accident along the same route happened on 4 June 2012 and involved 
a bus carrying an estimated 82 migrants. Twenty-seven Ethiopians and one 
Djiboutian driver died while 54 Ethiopian migrants were injured and evacuated 
to different hospitals. The Djiboutian authorities claimed that there were more 
migrants who they believed fled from the scene to avoid arrest (RMMS, 2012). 
Migrants report accidents and deaths on the road with regular frequency. There 
are three common scenarios: firstly, accidents involving bad driving, difficult 
terrain and other vehicles often on “unofficial roads”; secondly, death may occur 
in situations where pick-up trucks are overloaded and travelling through deserts 
or other rough terrain, and people fall off the vehicle; in these cases, migrants 
may be abandoned dead or injured on the roadside without the ability to seek 
help; thirdly, migrants die on the roads when locked inside containers without 
water and food and, critically, without access to fresh air. Asphyxiation is the 
normal cause of death in these cases – cases that are frequently reported in local 
media or police reports. 
For example, in a news report published by IPP Media (2012), at least 45 
irregular immigrants, reportedly from Ethiopia, died and 72 others were in 
critical condition due to lack of clean air while inside a container, apparently on 
their way to Malawi via the United Republic of Tanzania.
In another typical and often heard case, a migrant reported: 
Once in Mozambique we were loaded into another container between 
three or four in the morning. By sunrise we were suffocating. We tried to 
stop the driver by banging on the walls. I don’t think he heard us. . . . He 
just wouldn’t stop the truck. About ten people started fainting. When the 
police opened the container later, I was already unconscious. I was told 
three people died. (Horwood, 2009:71)
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In addition to the two previously cited cases, another migrant reported: 
On one fateful night, 250 of us, 120 Somalis and 130 Ethiopians, were 
loaded into a container and the doors were locked. After about an hour, 
people were yelling because they were suffocating. The doors of the 
container were opened again at 7 a.m. the next morning. By then, lots of 
us were unconscious. Three people died in the whole ordeal. (Horwood, 
2009:72) 
It was always not clear if the same incident was repeated by different witnesses. 
For example, another irregular migrant who made it to South Africa told the 
same researcher how he had passed out in the first hour inside a closed container 
from Mocimboa to Nampula in Mozambique: 
Four Somalis and three Ethiopians died in that trip. Their bodies were 
buried in Mozambique. (Horwood, 2009:72) 
Death on seas and lakes
In recent years, thousands of migrants from the Horn of Africa have died in water, 
be it in the sea between mainland Africa and Yemen, in the Mediterranean, along 
the coastal waters of Mozambique and the United Republic of Tanzania, or on 
inland lakes such as Lake Malawi. As such, it is probably the top cause of death 
among migrants, although reports of death in deserts appear to be rising and 
may now be more numerous; lack of data makes this very hard to determine. 
Reports such as this, from 11 March 2014, are not uncommon: “The UN refugee 
agency on Tuesday said that 44 people were missing and feared drowned after 
a smugglers’ boat capsized off the coast of southern Yemen in what UNHCR 
described as the worst such incident this year” (UNHCR, 2014). Two months 
later, even worse statistics were recorded: “At least 60 migrants from Ethiopia 
and Somalia along with two Yemeni crew members drowned on May 31 [2014] 
in the worst such tragedy off the coast of Yemen this year, the UN has said” 
(AFP, 2014). High-quality data on migrants is available from Yemen due to the 
structures that are in place to interview and assist migrants as they arrive on 
Yemen’s shores.
Drowning is normally caused by a combination of factors. Overcrowded boats 
are highly susceptible to capsize and so the smugglers’ greed in overloading 
their vessels, combined with rough weather, easily leads to tragedy that may be 
seen as an accident or the result of malicious neglect. Also, it has been common 
for smuggler crews crossing to Yemen to avoid contact with Yemeni shore or sea 
patrols by offloading their passengers in water hundreds of metres (sometimes 
more than one kilometre) from land. The vast majority of migrants cannot swim 
and many drown when forced disembarkation at sea is practised.17 
17 As they wait for their boat ride, some migrants can be seen learning to swim in Obock, Djibouti. Given 
the inability of most migrants to swim, it may not be surprising that there are more deaths from forced 
disembarkation.
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Cases of men and women, youths and even infants being beaten, shot, raped 
and thrown into the sea have also been common and continue to be reported, 
though less commonly, since the value of delivering live migrants to Yemeni 
traffickers on shore has risen. 
There was a woman with an infant of six to eight months old. The baby 
was crying and the smuggler told the woman to shut the baby up. The 
woman replied: “I have nothing to give to him, not even water. Where can 
I get some water?” The smuggler took the baby and threw him into the 
sea, saying now he can drink water. (MSF, 2008)
In addition to deliberate killings by smugglers, some migrants die of exposure, 
dehydration or suffocation. Migrants are in particular danger when stowed below 
deck where the environment is toxic, often contaminated by petrol fumes, fuel 
mixed in water, and the feces and urine of fellow passengers (DRC and RMMS, 
2012).
We left Bossasso on a boat with a lot of people, about 130. The Ethiopians 
were separated from the Somali. The Somali were treated better and were 
on the upper deck. We Ethiopians were at the bottom. People urinated 
and vomited on us. The conditions were very hard. The smugglers beat 
us with sticks and even belts. When we arrived close to the shore, they 
ordered us to jump out. Some could not swim and 4 people died. (MSF, 
2008)
The testimony above used to be a common description of the journey between 
2007 and 2011 when many hundreds died at sea. Ethiopian respondents in the 
2012 DRC/RMMS study indicated a probable underreporting of deaths at sea. 
Many killings seem to occur at night and in highly congested boats, passengers 
might simply be not aware of all killings. It is also suggested that passengers 
themselves, and not just the smuggling crew, push other passengers overboard 
to increase their survival chances. Of course some incidents might never be 
known, such as the sinking of an entire boat (DRC and RMMS, 2012). Table 5.1 
illustrates what was known of drowned and missing migrants at sea between 
2006 and May 2014 inclusive, according to UNHCR Yemen.18
18 As mentioned, an experienced network of coastal patrols organized through UNHCR and NGOs produces 
monthly estimates of numbers of new arrivals, as well as deaths at sea during the crossing from mainland 
Africa to Yemen. These figures and others from Yemen are obtained from data from members of the Yemen 
Mixed Migration Task Force and certified by UNHCR Yemen.
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Table 5.1:  Migrants recorded as dead or missing at sea,  
January 2006–May 2014
Year Number recorded as dead 










Source: Compilation made using UNHCR monthly bulletins on New Arrivals in Yemen, from 2006 to 
May 2014.
Notes: a Eleven months.
 b January to May inclusive.
In recent years, hundreds have been reportedly found dead along the Yemen 
coastline, and to such a degree that local communities have had problems 
burying or disposing of the bodies. In two incidents just off the coast of Bossasso 
in 2012, boats capsized causing 98 fatalities – but not all from drowning. There 
were reports from the February 2012 incident that some tens of those who died 
were shot by smugglers as they tried to force migrants off the overloaded boats in 
stormy weather. In both cases, no boat owners or crew members were prosecuted. 
However, incidents have become less frequent since the violent days of 
2006–2009 when at least 2,787 were murdered or died at sea while being 
transported by smugglers. Compare this with the four-year period of 2010–2013, 
where just 194 were recorded as dead or missing in the same sea passage.19
The decrease in the number of deaths at sea coincides with the rise in 
kidnapping and extortion of smuggled migrants in Yemen. One explanation for 
the reduction in the number of deaths, and held by the author, is the increased 
‟commoditization” of migrants. The passengers are increasingly seen as a 
valuable commodity by the smugglers who are therefore more likely to ensure 
their cargo reaches the coast alive. The sea smugglers trade migrants with 
onshore (warned and waiting) armed traffickers, and therefore no longer make 
their money with the sea crossing alone as they did in earlier years. 
Deaths at sea also occur elsewhere. There are reports of deaths along the coast 
of the United Republic of Tanzania as migrants are transported from Kenya to 
the United Republic of Tanzania or Mozambique (which is less common). In June 
2012, a group of irregular Ethiopian migrants boarded a boat on the shores of 
Lake Malawi to head southwards. A few minutes after departing, the overloaded 
19 RMMS analysis using statistics from the members of the Yemen Mixed Migration Task Force monthly reports.
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boat sank, drowning 49 of its passengers. According to a smuggler who claimed 
to be part of a group smuggling migrants from the Horn of Africa to South Africa 
and was interviewed in the context of this accident, the use of boats to cross 
Lake Malawi gained popularity after other land routes became too risky (IRIN, 
2012). 
Death from “natural causes” including illness, suicide and general 
debilitation
“One of our friends was sick. [. . .] The smugglers beat him, his condition worsened 
until he died on the boat. His body was thrown overboard.” (MSF, 2008:17)
This is a difficult category to identify from migrants’ reports because violence, 
abuse, poor diet, dehydration, hardship, torture and detention all weaken a 
person’s ability to thrive and might even sap their will to live. 
They would starve us, they would burn us and they would not let us sleep. 
All of us were actually hoping for death because that would have been an 
escape from the torture. (Thomson, 2013)
Suicide is rarely reported by migrants. Many talk of how they wished they could 
die while being held by smugglers and traffickers, but only few appear to go 
through with it. There are other similar testimonies but they are rare.
One of them [migrants] was beaten so badly [by crew members on the 
smugglers’ boat] that he threw himself into the water and died. (MSF, 
2008) 
With weakened immunity due to general exhaustion, pain, thirst, fear and 
despondence, illness can claim a person’s life. Certainly, in northern Yemen 
there have been reported cases of deaths from different illnesses and injuries. 
In the past two years alone, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and IOM have run 
very busy clinics offering emergency health care to thousands of Ethiopian and 
Somali migrants stranded in Haradh, close to the Saudi border. Those with severe 
injuries from torture or gun shot and women with complications associated with 
gang rape and other violations are treated alongside those with illnesses. The 
Haradh morgue apparently has numerous migrant bodies of those who have 
succumbed to illness and severe debilitation, as well as torture (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014b).
In many cases, members of a migrant group die and survivors cannot say what 
exactly caused the death. Along the route to South Africa, migrants reported 
fellow travelers dying from malaria and other fevers caught from spending 
repeated nights in swampy or forested areas without shelter. People complain 
of dysentery from contaminated water, little and rotten food, and an almost 
total lack of access to health facilities. Many migrants talk of becoming sick after 
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having only fuel-contaminated water to drink. Smugglers deliberately put diesel 
or petrol in the water supply to reduce the migrants’ desire to drink.
It should be noted that in any group numbering tens of thousands of people over 
a period of months, there will always be some affected by illness and disease, but 
outcomes are not fatal when people have access to health facilities and medicine. 
This is the critical aspect of illness affecting migrants – conditions are lethal for 
most, presumably, because of the clandestine nature of their movement and 
the almost total absence of health facilities and medicine. Where facilities are 
available, migrants probably lack the freedom from their smuggler handlers or 
private resources to benefit from them. Additionally, in countries such as Egypt, 
Libya and Yemen, migrants have complained of active discrimination against 
them, resulting in hospitals and clinics, doctors and nurses refusing to assist sick 
irregular migrants and/or refugees, even in cases where, for instance, a female 
migrant may go into labour. 
Death from wild animals appears quite rare, and only a few reports mentioning 
such cause have been collected by the author in parts of Kenya and in southern 
Africa. Nevertheless, some migrants are killed by wild animals during their 
journeys. Irregular migrants travel in remote areas with little habitation and 
minimal, if any, shelter available. They often sleep exposed to the elements or 
general harsh environment and to certain predators. If they travel in groups they 
may have an advantage if and when wild animals such as lions or hyenas are close, 
but smaller groups may be more vulnerable. Other dangers from scorpions and 
snakes may be more common. Reports from UNHCR have mentioned migrants 
being attacked by sharks in the Gulf of Aden.20 
In another dramatic case, as stated in a report on news site All Africa, 17 irregular 
migrants or “border jumpers” were found dead, all believed to be victims of 
crocodile attacks and drowning: 
The bodies of at least 17 suspected border jumpers, believed to have 
drowned in the Limpopo River, were discovered by the Zimbabwean and 
South Africa police this week. Fifteen bodies were found on Wednesday 
by officials patrolling the river near Beitbridge. It is reported that the 
bodies, some of which had missing limbs, had been hidden in a cave by 
crocodiles. (Bell, 2014) 
Elsewhere, migrants were reportedly harassed by lions and elephants: 
By nightfall we were attacked by wild animals. The lion ate an Ethiopian 
man [in the group]. (Horwood, 2009)
20 See, for instance: www.unhcr.org/pages/4a1d59c1d.html; http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/least-29-
dead-smuggling-run-yemen-unhcr-horrified.
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On the Bostwanan side of the border, we found ourselves in a national 
park. Wild animals, including elephants, chased us all night. (Horwood, 
2009)
Not only do migrants find themselves lost or forced to travel through game 
reserves or national parks, but they are also usually far from any help if trouble 
comes, and as mentioned, medical assistance is typically non-existent.
5.3.2 Death as stranded migrants  
Stranded and destitute migrants have died from a number of deprivation-related 
causes. Of the considerable number of migrants on the move within and out of 
the Horn of Africa region, many become stranded in different locations. Whether 
due to abandonment, robbery, extortion, injury, illness, exhaustion, resignation, 
poverty, disorientation and hopelessness – or a combination of these causes – 
migrants are found stranded in locations such as Bossasso in Puntland, Obock in 
Djibouti, Aman in Yemen, and even refugee camps in eastern Sudan or Yemen. 
Survivors talk of some of their companions dying of hunger or thirst while 
destitute, and waiting long periods for smugglers to take them further. Many 
migrants are also stranded in major towns and large cities whether in Cairo, 
Khartoum, Djibouti City, Nairobi or Sana’a, and numerous other smaller centres.
In 2011–2013, assisting agencies reported that more than 12,000 destitute 
migrants (mostly Ethiopian) were struggling to survive in the town of Haradh 
(Yemen), along the harsh northern frontier with Saudi Arabia.21 The Government 
of Yemen stated that there were as many as 25,000 in the governorate at one 
stage during that time (Human Rights Watch, 2014b). Many of these migrants 
were either waiting to cross into Saudi Arabia or had recently been deported 
from Saudi Arabia. Some had survived kidnapping and torture, and could neither 
go forward nor did they have the means to return to Ethiopia. Reports of injuries, 
hunger and starvation, exposure to the elements (living rough) were, and 
continue to be, common, not only from Haradh but also from Obock in Djibouti. 
IOM and MSF, along with other agencies in Yemen, gave assistance to thousands 
of desperate migrants in 2012 and 2013, mostly in Haradh, and also in Aden 
and other locations. But the numbers were overwhelming. Having scaled down 
their assistance in the second half of 2013, by mid-2014 agencies are increasing 
assistance as the number of stranded migrants rises again. While agencies 
working with the most destitute may offer figures of those who succumbed 
to their conditions under their care, establishing the larger figure of all those 
that die while stranded will remain elusive. Certainly, stranded migrants find 
themselves in very harsh conditions and, when in inhabited areas, sentiments 
of the local people are often very hostile, while the only interest migrants may 
21 From a variety of agencies’ unpublished reports and IOM situational reports in 2012 and 2013, according 
to the RMMS data records. For instance, see: IOM, “Thousands of Ethiopian migrants stranded in Yemen 
desperate to go home” (Geneva, 2011).
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receive is predatory behaviour from those who would seek to exploit them. In 
larger cities, where stranded migrants can contact communities of migrants 
from their own countries or clan/ethnic groupings, the chances of survival and 
protection tend to be much higher.
5.3.3 Death due to malicious neglect or abusive practices when 
smuggled 
To some degree this category is an overarching one that includes other 
subsections already discussed. Most irregular migrants are in the “care” of 
various smugglers from the time they depart their hometowns or city hubs until 
the final leg of their journey, where they are normally abandoned at borders or 
coastlines and pointed in the general direction of their destination, or handed 
over to traffickers.
The abusive practices of smugglers against migrants are not a new phenomenon. 
Human rights academic Jacqueline Bhabha wrote in 2005, “[. . .] Opportunities 
to immigrate legally are severely limited. Migrants, including asylum seekers, 
have increasingly resorted to illegal entry and unauthorized stays, and ever-
larger numbers use the services of smugglers to evade the system, compounding 
their vulnerability to exploitation and ill treatment” (Horwood, 2009).
In East and Southern Africa, the situation is no different. The smuggling world is a 
callous, unscrupulous one of harsh treatment, maximum control, lies, deceit and 
frequent collusion by smugglers with any entity, such as traffickers and corrupt 
officials, who might further harass or mistreat the migrants in their charge. In 
fact, the smugglers’ “clients” are often treated as sole commodities and only 
valued to the extent that some profit can be extracted from them. In such a 
world, it is hardly through accident that many migrants perish. The cards are 
stacked against them. 
Unlike other “service” businesses where quality of service and standards are 
self-regulating in order to maintain customers, smugglers enjoy exceptionalism 
due to two critical factors: they are operating outside the law and without public 
scrutiny, and the very agencies that might inhibit their behaviour often act in 
collusion with smugglers, resulting in a climate of entrenched impunity.
The fact that the economics of smuggling is the callous driver that explains most 
behaviour leading to deaths of migrants is perhaps self-evident. When the boats 
and trucks and containers are over-filled, when food and water are not provided, 
when passengers are jettisoned in shoreline waters, when migrants end up in 
detention or are abandoned to die when injured or too sick – in any of these 
and other scenarios – money is behind the mistreatment. Reducing expenses 
in transporting migrants, reducing the bribes they must pay to others and 
maximizing their profits define how smugglers treat migrants. Only in the case 
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of female migrants is profit at times replaced by sexual opportunism as a key 
behavioural driver. Where women and girls are first abused and then trafficked, 
as in Yemen, the two are combined.22
Smugglers are so confident that their client base will not be eroded by bad 
reports that they often mistreat the migrants in full view, even while migrants 
have mobile phones and are able to speak to their relatives and friends about 
their ongoing hardships and tormentors. But their tormentors are also the 
migrants’ saviours if they deliver them to their destination – an irony sufficiently 
relevant, meaning that every year more migrants queue for the smugglers’ 
services despite ample awareness of the inevitability of abuse.
In terms of going south along the eastern seaboard, 88 per cent of Somalis 
interviewed in one study said their journeys were harsh with negative and 
unexpected experiences. Sixty-five per cent said they were beaten or physically 
robbed at least once as they migrated, while 6 per cent said sexual abuse of 
someone in their groups had taken place. Ten per cent spoke of death in their 
groups during the journey. Three per cent of Ethiopians spoke of death in their 
groups (Horwood, 2008:66).
Death through torture and outright murder by smugglers, traffickers and 
other criminals 
Once migrants have put themselves into the hands of smugglers to achieve 
their aims, the lines between smugglers, criminal gangs and traffickers become 
blurred. Witness testimonies of migrant deaths as outright murder or as a result 
of excessive brutality are all too common and make grim reading. 
It appears that a high number of deaths are caused by shooting migrants or 
torturing them. Migrants may be killed for: making a noise or moving while on 
board boats; for trying to escape captivity; as an example to others if ransoms 
are not paid;  (allegedly) for organ theft and from aggravated, violent robbery.
When the boat was still near Bossasso, it hit a rock. The smugglers were 
afraid that the boat would sink and started throwing people off. They took 
my grandson and threw him in the water and also some others. [. . .] The 
smugglers prevented them from getting [back] into the boat and pushed 
them down in the water. At least three people died that way. (MSF, 2008)
22 In a recent news article, a Yemeni military officer from Haradh told journalists he is one of a handful of 
Yemeni security officials who have made a fortune helping smugglers move Africans into Saudi Arabia. 
His coordination with smugglers earns him around USD 20,000 a month. It is certain that smuggling 
networks operating out of Yemen control a multimillion dollar business that may still be in its early stages 
of development. Smuggler networks taking people west, north and south from the Horn are also earning 
millions in smuggler fees alone. Rough calculations with known data suggest the total smugglers’ fees in an 
average year (in recent years) could be USD 60–80 million. This figure may be very conservative and only 
a proportion of the total, when one takes into account trafficking that occurs and the growing business of 
extortion, kidnapping and ransom demands.
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The smugglers were beating us from the beginning of the trip like animals. 
They have no mercy even if you die in front of them.23 (ibid.)
The most egregious accounts of deaths of migrants from the Horn of Africa going 
east or south currently come from Yemen, although there is rising evidence of 
similar practices in Libya. The high regularity of witness statements of murder 
is likely to be strongly associated with the new phenomenon of kidnapping 
migrants for ransom. New arrivals on Yemen’s shores repeatedly report that 
since 2011 Ethiopians (and some Somalis) have become victims of sexual 
violence, kidnapping, extortion, beatings and murder.24 It is not clear how many 
of the 84,000 Ethiopians that arrived in Yemen in 2012 were taken hostage.25 
What started as an occasional hazard in recent years now appears to be routine. 
Few migrants escape the attentions of the on-land criminals.
The majority of the 2012 DRC/RMMS research respondents who arrived in 
Yemen in the previous 18 months reported being taken hostage for reasons of 
forcing a ransom payment and some reported this occurred more than once 
(DRC and RMMS, 2012). There are also reports of women and girls being 
abducted on arrival and never seen or heard of again (RMMS, 2014d). The size 
of ransom demands appears to be increasing. In early 2012, the rates were just 
USD 100–300. By the end of the year, the rates being reported by freed migrants 
were between USD 600 and USD 800. As of early 2013, the rates increased to 
USD 1,000.26
Considering the levels of ransom demanded – still relatively low compared with 
the similar practice committed against Eritrean migrants in the Sinai – the level 
of brutality used is extreme and the criminals are ready to kill their captives.
The kidnappers would make me lie on my back and then they would get 
me to ring my family to ask them to pay the ransom they wanted. As soon 
as one of my parents answered the phone, the men would melt flaming 
plastic over my back and inner thighs and I would scream and scream in 
pain. (RMMS, 2013a:29)
They had about four or five of us tied up together and they would pour 
water on the floor and then electrocute the water so that all of us would 
get electrocuted at the same time. (ibid.)
Human Rights Watch released a report in May 2014 charting the extent of the 
violence and the silent complicity of State officials. One witness said he saw 
23 Testimony of a 50-year-old Somali from Afgaye.
24 Summaries of migrant testimony to this effect and reports as collated by UNHCR and various implementing 
partners in Yemen have been repeatedly printed in the monthly summary reports of the RMMS since early 
2012. 
25 RMMS data from collated Yemen data from UNHCR and DRC and other data gathering agencies; not 
published.
26 Information also collated from hundreds of ongoing migrant interviews conducted by members of the 
Yemen Mixed Migration Task Force and reported in RMMS monthly summaries.
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guards at one ‟torture camp” beating people with cables and burning skin with 
lighters. Some migrants in the camp had lost eyes and had broken teeth. The 
witness reported:  
From what I was hearing and feeling, I thought I would die in that place. 
I happened to survive, but others didn’t. I saw shameful things. No one 
deserves to see what I saw. (Human Rights Watch, 2014b)
In a BBC radio feature in March 2013, a migrant stated: 
If their families can’t pay, they have no use for them and torture them to 
death. (Thomson, 2013) 
An Ethiopian man told Human Rights Watch that he saw traffickers tie a man’s 
sex organ with a string and beat him with wooden sticks until the man died 
before his eyes. Another said that traffickers killed two men in his group by 
hacking at them with the blade of an axe. The chief doctor at a hospital in 
Haradh said that the hospital received bodies of at least two migrants per week. 
“Traffickers occasionally torture an African to near death and then drive to the 
wall of the Migrant Response Centre in Haradh, which is run by the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), and dump the person there” (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014c). 
One migrant, Muhammad,27 told Human Rights Watch that another man from 
the Tigray region had called his family, asking them to send the traffickers money. 
One day, the guards beat this man, too, with an axe, until he died in front of 
the other migrants. Muhammad said he did not know why the man was killed. 
Ethiopian guards later told him the traffickers had arranged for a local broker in 
Ethiopia to go to the man’s family home in Tigray to collect the money. When the 
broker arrived, the police were waiting. They arrested and detained the broker 
for a few days, but he paid his way out, Muhammad said. When the broker called 
his colleagues in Yemen, they beat the man to death (Human Rights Watch, 
2014c).
Victims told researchers in the DRC/RMMS study that some victims die as a result 
of the brutal treatment, and many suffer severe psychological trauma; however, 
no figures are available (DRC and RMMS, 2012:41). While researchers studying a 
similar phenomenon in the Sinai have made estimates on the number of deaths 
by murder, in Yemen no such estimates have been attempted. According to this 
author, the number of deaths should be proportionally high considering the 
frequency of witness claims and detailed testimony about deaths at the hands 
of traffickers and criminals. 
27 This is a fictitious name to protect the migrant’s identity.
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I was made to watch an Ethiopian woman being raped and an Ethiopian 
baby about one year old being killed. (DRC and RMMS, 2012:41)
Kidnapping of Ethiopians seems to not only occur as they travel the eastern 
route. There are reports of kidnapping of Ethiopian migrants after arrival in South 
Africa. A 2012 article on the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) 
tells of smugglers demanding an additional USD 2,400 during the last leg of the 
journey south, citing the costs of bribes and food. The smuggled migrants had to 
call friends or relatives in South Africa and tell them to have the money ready. 
The victims were kept in a house in Johannesburg for two days after arrival, until 
relatives brought the cash for release. However, to date, no reports of torture or 
murder have been made by migrants on the southern route.
Reports of migrants killed by gunfire were rare in the past but have been 
increasingly heard in the last few years. This rise appears to have coincided with 
the growth in trafficking and commoditization of Horn of Africa migrants who 
are now routinely kidnapped and forcibly held in east Sudan, Libya and Yemen. 
As smuggling (albeit aggravated smuggling) has developed into trafficking and 
criminality, so too has the use of guns become more common and reported 
deaths more frequent.
When I was in the boat, the Somali people beat us Ethiopian people, 
including me. Also they shot at us with their guns and threw the bodies 
into the sea. (MSF, 2008)
There are cases when drowned bodies of migrants are found with gunshot 
wounds. In December 2012, when 55 migrants died after a boat capsized off 
Bossasso in rough seas, survivors told police that the crew shot and killed 
migrants in an effort to get them off the boat and lighten the load. Clinics and 
hospitals in the Sinai and in northern Yemen report having patients admitted 
with gunshot wounds, while other migrants from the Horn of Africa report 
seeing shot bodies in the desert areas of the Sinai. 
Migrants regularly report that smuggler boats are met on the shores of Yemen 
by armed men who force migrants into waiting trucks at gunpoint.28
To go ashore we had to swim. When we reached the two trucks [waiting 
on the beach] we realized there were eight armed men on them. We got 
on the trucks and were transported to a house in the desert. (DRC and 
RMMS, 2012)
28 The instability of civil conflict, increased Islamic militancy and the political upheaval of 2010/2011 in Yemen 
did not deter migrants from arriving in large numbers. Arguably, the application of the rule of law and the 
resources available to address flows of irregular (illegal) Ethiopian migrants was reduced, offering smugglers 
greater opportunities to expand their operations and to carry arms.
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Migrants may be killed by their captors as a punishment for refusal to agree to 
raise their ransom or as a lesson to other kidnapped migrants. Sometimes they 
may even be caught in crossfire between traffickers and police or military, but 
most commonly they are shot when trying to escape from captivity. 
Three people were shot in the feet and one person shot in the eye was 
blinded. One person protested and tried to stop the shooting but he was 
shot in the stomach and died. (DRC and RMMS, 2012)
At times, migrants may be shot by officials: 
The Saudi police ordered me to stop but I refused and ran, then the police 
took me down with a bullet. Then they returned me to Haradh border. 
(DRC and RMMS, 2012)
Death from en route banditry 
Apart from mistreatment at the hands of smugglers, traffickers and State officials, 
migrants have reported attacks by “bandits” and gangs as they transit countries. 
Such reports from migrants have been heard from Mozambique, Sudan, the 
United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen and elsewhere in the region. In these 
cases, bandits normally attack with knives, machetes, bows and arrows, sticks, 
metal bars and guns.
One of the first reports charting the vulnerability of migrants some years ago 
stated “[. . .] the overland trip to Puntland is dangerous. Migrants report many 
abuses during this trip, including being stopped and forced to pay at numerous 
checkpoints along the road. They also reported attacks by armed bandits and 
being robbed of their money and belongings, with passengers killed in several 
cases” (MSF, 2008).
Somaliland has been notorious among migrants as a dangerous territory 
to transit on the way to Bossasso. Multiple robberies and harassment from 
authorities, as well as incidents of sexual violence and even murder have been 
reported over recent years. In such cases, the possible conspiracy between 
different interested parties in exploiting passing migrants is unclear, but if it 
exists, it probably revolves around profit-sharing, where local groups insist that 
if smugglers pass through their land they too must have a ‟piece of the action”. 
Alternatively, it may revolve around a pretense that smugglers wish to maintain 
that they themselves cannot be accused of violence and exploitation, while in 
fact profiting from having steered their groups into the hands of local bandits.
The two Tanzanian smugglers took us into the bushes before we crossed 
into Malawi. There 20 men were waiting for us. They were armed with 
machetes, pangas, knives and sticks. They robbed us of all the money we 
had as well as mobile phones. (Horwood, 2009)
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Similar statements from witness migrants are very common on the southern 
route as well as between Ethiopia and Puntland. It is hard to imagine migrants 
are not, on occasion, killed as bandits rob them in this manner. Other reports talk 
of smugglers in vehicle chases through the desert, in Libya, for example, where 
competing gangs try to hijack migrants from passing smugglers. Calculating death 
in this category is not possible and will probably never be, but the numbers of 
those who die from en route banditry might also be significant.
Death from action by State officials and while in detention
As noted in the previous category of death by gunfire, in some cases migrants 
from the Horn of Africa are shot while trying to cross borders and/or while 
evading arrest. The Egypt–Israel border police and the Yemen–Saudi border 
police appear to use firearms against migrants. But migrants also pass through 
the southern militarized zone of Libya where soldiers patrol, and encounter 
armed border guards in Kenya, along the Mozambique–South Africa border as 
well as the Eritrea–Sudan border. 
Migrants encounter police, marine patrols, soldiers, border guards, immigration 
officials, judges, guards and prison wardens during their journey. Frequent 
migrant testimonies suggest that many of these State officials brutalize and 
profit from migrants while some are also, reportedly, involved in the death of 
migrants.
Certainly, many migrants report that they are regularly threatened with death 
by State officials. 
We crossed the river and went under the fence [the South African border 
fence], but before we reached the car, the South African police caught us 
and took all our money and threatened us with death. (Horwood, 2009:77)
From Mombasa, we left on a boat to Tanzania where we were caught 
by the police, sentenced and put in prison. The Tanzanian police took all 
our clothes and money when they caught us. In custody, they beat us 
repeatedly. [. . .] After three months, we were released but the police 
chief told us that although the courts had released us we would still have 
to pay him USD 1,500 to actually leave. He threatened us that we would 
die in prison if he didn’t get his money. (Horwood, 2009)
A Tilburg University study also reported that the Eritrean Border Surveillance 
Unit is involved in the smuggling of migrants across the border (van Reisen, 
Estefanos and Rijken, 2012). The UN Security Council Monitoring Group on 
Somalia and Eritrea claimed that senior military commanders directly control 
the trafficking and movement of migrants (as well as arms) from Eritrea, some 
of whom are sold to smugglers and traffickers outside the country (UNSC, 2012). 
Reportedly, people are driven out of Eritrea hidden in trucks of the Eritrean Border 
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Surveillance Unit so that they can avoid checkpoints (van Reisen, Estefanos and 
Rijken, 2012). As indicated, Eritrea allegedly has a shoot-to-kill policy regarding 
unauthorized exit of their own nationals. It is not clear how many migrants are 
killed by border guards and military forces in these remote border areas, and it 
would be impossible to verify. 
Typically, the number of border deaths is considered highly confidential 
information that no government in the region would release; thus, figures 
remain unknown. 
Migrants are also known to die while in detention and during expulsion or 
deportation.29 Reports suggest “dozens” of Ethiopian migrants may have been 
killed in the recent crackdown and street violence that resulted in over 160,000 
Ethiopian irregular migrants being expelled from Saudi Arabia, by air, between 
November 2013 and February 2014.30 Circumstances are often clouded and 
investigations problematic. Certainly, in every country in the region and all 
transiting countries such as Djibouti, Kenya, Libya, Malawi, Mozambique, Saudi 
Arabia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia, a significant number 
of irregular migrants are in detention centres or prison. According to IOM, about 
1,300 irregular migrants, most of them from Ethiopia and Somalia, were being 
detained in the United Republic of Tanzania as of March 2012 (IRIN, 2014b). In 
Libya, migrants from the Horn of Africa are held by militias. 
It is common for migrants to make claims of having experienced considerable 
violence while in detention, and even witnessed deaths at the hands of police 
and security personnel. Given the length of time, some migrants remain in 
detention and the dire conditions in many prisons, accusations of this kind would 
need to be investigated to establish whether death was through misadventure, 
malice or natural causes. 
Death by organ removal
The issue of death by organ theft is controversial. There are infrequent reports 
from Yemen that organ removal is practised by criminals against migrants 
(from Ethiopia), while in the Sinai there appears to be evidence that numerous 
migrants (normally Eritreans) have been killed for their body parts and organs, 
according to some sources. 
Various academics, activists and human rights organizations working in the region 
are doubtful of the veracity of the evidence from Egypt and those presenting it. 
Nevertheless, photographs of hundreds of bodies with hastily sewn-up wounds 
in shallow graves apparently in the Sinai – and supposedly migrants – have 
29 One agency, the Oromia Support Group (OSG), charted unverified claims by Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti 
that deaths in detention were common. See OSG’s Report 48, Djibouti: Destitution and Fear for Refugees 
from Ethiopia.
30 Numerous media reports mention deaths but no official figures are released by the Saudi Government.
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created a big impact and inspired documentaries and news stories that have 
contributed to a strong interest in the US Congress about the issue of migrant 
kidnapping and abuse in the Sinai.31 Certainly, in late 2011, the CNN Freedom 
Project created much publicity around the issue and convinced many with the 
CNN’s reports and film.
Migrants from the Horn of Africa who have been kidnapped in either the Sinai 
or Yemen claim to have been threatened by their captors and tormentors that if 
they did not pay they would be killed for their organs. But when it comes to actual 
witnesses there are almost no migrants who have witnessed killings associated 
with organ theft. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), organ theft and sales are a growing and multimillion dollar global 
criminal enterprise, and perhaps it would not be surprising if some criminals 
have killed, or are killing migrants, for body parts – not least because, according 
to the World Health Organization, Egypt is a regional hub for the trade. This issue 
is also explored in Chapter 4, describing migrant deaths in North Africa.
Disappearance of migrant girls and women 
“Women and girls are especially vulnerable. All throughout the journey they 
disappear. They are raped and disappear in Djibouti and during the sea crossing, 
and are kidnapped upon arrival in Yemen.”32
Finally, the alarmingly high number of female irregular migrants facing sexual 
attack, abduction and disappearance from the region must be noted. A high 
percentage of female migrants who were interviewed during or at the end of 
their migration spoke of the ubiquity of rape and sexual attack. Such attacks 
commonly take place while in the hands of smugglers, kidnappers, traffickers 
and, at times, even State officials or militias while migrants are being detained. 
Health officials in Haradh, Yemen, told Human Rights Watch in 2013 that 9 in 10 
female patients as well as 1 in 10 male patients they examined had been raped 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014b).
According to testimonies, girls and women, especially from Ethiopia going to 
Yemen, and also, reportedly, from Somalia and Eritrea, are frequently separated 
from male migrants by smugglers and traffickers, and, in many cases, are not 
heard of again. Death therefore cannot be ruled out. These women become 
invisible and their new “owners” or other criminals can treat them as they wish.
31 Looking at the photos, Dr. Fakhry Saleh, the former head of Cairo's forensic department and an expert on 
the illegal organ trade, claimed in 2011 that he had never heard of organ theft involving African refugees, 
but he said it seemed highly probable that the scars on the bodies in the pictures came from organ removal. 
In: F. Pleitgen and M.F. Fahmy, “Refugees face organ theft in the Sinai”, 3 November 2011, available from 
www.edition.cnn.com/2011/11/03/world/meast/pleitgen-sinai-organ-smugglers/.
32 Testimony of a Somali woman interviewed in San’a Yenem in November 2013. In: RMMS, The Letter of the 
Law: Regular and Irregular Migration in Saudi Arabia in a Context of Rapid Change (Nairobi, RMMS, 2014), 
p. 36.
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We were taken to a mountainous region. When we arrived there, we found 
49 Ethiopian women who had been there for some time. The Yemeni 
smugglers were using six Ethiopians to torture us and these six Ethiopians 
would bring the 49 female hostages to the yard. While we watched, they 
would force them to drink their urine and physically abuse them. Some of 
the women were also raped. They were demanding that the women pay 
the ransom, but many of the women were poor and their families could 
not pay. The male captives were released after a month. Some paid the 
ransom, while others were tortured until they were sure they could not 
pay the ransom. The women were purchased by some of the locals to be 
used as housemaids. I witnessed a negotiation between the locals and the 
smugglers. They sold the women cheaply, for about 30,000 and 40,000 
Yemeni rials [between USD 140 and USD 186].33
The circumstantial evidence based on statistics of new arrivals in Yemen and 
migrant reports from Egypt, Libya and Sudan suggest this practice is common. In 
some cases, and especially in in Yemen, the disappearance of female migrants 
seems to be high, suggesting there is a high risk that these women have been 
trafficked for sale. 
Four Yemeni smugglers were on board the boat. They raped the girls on 
the boat in front of us [. . .] and those girls were already sold to Yemeni 
traffickers.34
A recent report by RMMS (2014d) suggests that more than 16,000 female 
migrants arriving in Yemen between 2011 and 2013 were most likely abducted 
on arrival and remain unaccounted. “The conclusion of this study is that many 
were never released once they were kidnapped” (RMMS, 2014d: 37). This 
dramatic finding begs many questions, including questions as to whether they 
are still alive.
While migrants travelling south along the eastern seaboard to South Africa do 
report rape and sexual violence, disappearances of female migrants do not occur 
in any systematic way. In some cases, men and boys are also victims of rape. 
They [smugglers] were very abusive in nature and often drunk. I heard 
that many Ethiopian and Somali men and boys had been raped along the 
way. Women are generally raped by smugglers and truck drivers. The boys 
get raped in police cells and prisons.35
33 Testimony of one of the migrants interviewed in May 2013 as reported in DRC Daily Protection. In: RMMS, 
Blinded by Hope: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Ethiopian Migrants (Nairobi, RMMS, 2014), p. 48.
34 Testimony of an Ethiopian boy who migrated in 2011. In: DRC and RMMS, Desperate Choices: Conditions, 
Risks & Protection Failures Affecting Ethiopian Migrants in Yemen (Nairobi, DRC and RMMS, 2012).
35 Testimony of a Somali migrant, 21 years old, in Johannesburg, South Africa. In: C. Horwood, In Pursuit of the 
Southern Dream: Victims of Necessity: Assessment of the Irregular Movement of Men from East Africa and 
the Horn to South Africa (Geneva, IOM, 2009), p. 63.
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Because so little is known regarding the outcome of abductions and 
disappearances, it cannot be said whether migrants die or are killed, but it may 
be assumed that they become undocumented and “invisible” commodities, 
bought and sold in clandestine deals, in all likelihood for nefarious purposes in 
slave-like conditions without any kind of protection or recourse to protection.
5.3.4 Death of labour migrants 
Another area where migrants from the Horn of Africa may face death is in the 
workplace while living as irregular (or regular) migrants overseas. As mentioned 
above, migrants can also face death during expulsions and detention prior to 
expulsion. To some extent, this category falls outside the scope of this study, 
but it is worth noting that some migrants die in employment, whether in the 
informal sector – in transportation, agriculture and construction, for example 
– or in private households. Numerous reports in the media and international 
organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and ILO (inter 
alia) have charted abuses and deaths of migrant workers from various countries, 
increasingly from Ethiopia and the Gulf States. Suicide of migrant workers is also 
common. In August 2008, Human Rights Watch released a study showing that 
migrant domestic workers were dying at a rate of more than one per week in 
Lebanon (Human Rights Watch, 2008).  
Hundreds of thousands of labour migrants, predominantly from Ethiopia, are 
sent to the Gulf States and the Middle East through private employment agencies 
whose practices have been criticized as frequently negligent or unscrupulous. 
The ILO published a report in 2011, suggesting many of these practices amounted 
to trafficking where, on occasion, the outcome of mistreatment was death 
(ILO, 2011). Bodies of dead labour migrants (often female) are shipped back to 
Ethiopia, for example, and some cases are recorded in the media and handled 
by the relevant embassies. It appears that in such cases a limited investigation is 
conducted to ascertain the cause of death or culpability.
5.4 Methodological challenges and information gaps
Migrants in the region, especially irregular migrants, are increasingly viewed as 
commodities and opportunities for exploitation by a number of stakeholders. It 
is clear that for smugglers, traffickers and certain State officials, migrants form 
the basis of their lucrative “business model”. The flows of irregular migrants in 
and from the Horn of Africa region are continuous and probably rising to such an 
extent that, for the perpetrators, some deaths are acceptable and inevitable in 
a context of brutality and violence. Clearly, as the business itself is clandestine, 
illegal and multinational, there is no interest to collect data or document deaths. 
Equally, in environments where anti-migrant sentiment is growing and migrant 
safety is not of primary concern to authorities, protection of migrants and 
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investigations into the causes of death tend to receive a low priority. Authorities 
are always going to be reluctant to report on deaths of migrants in detention, in 
transit or crossing borders where the integrity of the State may be questioned. 
Equally, any data that might implicate State officials or suggest corruption and 
complicity will be suppressed. While international assistance agencies and 
human rights groups might offer glimpses into the issue of migrant deaths 
through data they collect (predominantly migrant statements), they will always 
be only a small part of the whole. In addition, the presence of international and 
national agencies interested in the protection of migrants tends to be thin on 
the ground and normally far from the locations where migrants die. Meanwhile, 
local community groups or local civil society organizations are mostly absent 
from the mixed migration problematic, except in so far as they may work with 
refugees and asylum-seekers. Migrants are neither popular in countries of 
transit or their target destinations, nor are they high on local donors’ priority 
lists; consequently, few national groups work with migrants, and data concerning 
deaths is not collected.
In light of the above, no one is keeping track of deaths of migrants in the Horn 
of Africa other than a few organizations collecting incomplete and anecdotal 
reports, stories and witness statements. State authorities and media sources 
may mention numbers of dead migrants in discrete incidents when bodies are 
found in containers or washed up on shores, but these figures are just a few 
pieces of the whole puzzle. Methodologically, establishing a robust database that 
goes beyond anecdotal and circumstantial “evidence” as a basis of a numerical 
collation would be problematic. This should not, however, be an excuse for not 
recording, where possible, migrant deaths. As this chapter shows, there are 
many locations and different scenarios where migrant deaths occur in the Horn 
of Africa or affect migrants from the Horn of Africa, but at present no authority 
or entity is attempting to document them. If some relevant agency or bureau 
could be resourced and tasked to collate information on migrant deaths, we 
would have a better understanding of the wider risks and protection deficits 
facing migrants. In short, many pieces of the puzzle are out there and even if the 
whole picture will never come into view, far more could be done to enlarge our 
current, limited perception.
5.5 Conclusions and recommendations
The discussion in this chapter and the grim topography of migrant deaths within 
and from the Horn of Africa region should lead to a strong indictment of the 
communities and in particular the national authorities who encounter migrants. 
No legal or traditional code of living should permit this level of public abuse of 
migrants, guilty only of crossing international borders without documentation 
to seek a better life outside their homelands, or to escape persecution and 
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violence. Even if precise data is impossible to retrieve, this chapter gives a sense 
of how hundreds of migrants are dying annually, and thousands have died in the 
last few years, during their efforts to migrate.
Apart from social and religious moral codes of behaviour, nations are bound 
by their national, regional and international commitments. All countries in 
the region, and those outside the region where deaths occur, have clear laws 
protecting their own citizens and foreigners within their territories against 
severe human rights violations including robbery, beatings, kidnapping, torture, 
rape, murder and other violations, which sometimes cause migrants’ death. It 
is hard to escape from the explicit conclusion that so many of the deaths (and 
killings) occur in a climate of impunity where implementation of the rule of law 
would go a long way in ending such deaths and abuses.
Censure of the perpetrators of crimes against migrants needs to be unequivocal 
and strengthened. At present, the system appears to be so weak that smugglers 
and traffickers view these crimes as a low-risk, high-profit area of operation. A 
rule of law protecting migrants from egregious violations and death therefore 
needs to be fully implemented. Where it does not exist, laws against trafficking 
and smuggling need to be established and fully domesticated. Punishment of 
perpetrators should be proportional to the severity of the crimes, far from the 
derisory financial punishments some perpetrators face in the rare occasions 
when they are convicted, if they are convicted. Censure against State officials’ 
complicity with smuggling, trafficking and abuse of migrants should also be 
strengthened and unequivocal.  
Concerning the documentation of deaths of migrants, it needs to be recognized 
that the full picture of migrant border-related deaths will never be known. 
Fatalities occur in remote locations, far from the public gaze, and there are 
interests in keeping the details and figures concerning migrant deaths unknown. 
However, many parts of the puzzle could still be recognized and brought together. 
An agency or a coalition of agencies needs to be resourced and tasked to do just 
this. Some, including this author, suspect that what is known at present is just 
the tip of an iceberg of a tragedy and scandal which we urgently need to expose.
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Kasseh’s parents did not approve of his dream to travel to Saudi Arabia to find 
work. From a family of farmers in Ethiopia, Kasseh used to work in a pastry shop 
on weekends to bring in additional income. He was 15 years old when he decided 
to go to Saudi Arabia with a group of friends to find higher-paying work.36
The boys left in secret, and walked through the desert for 11 days. They did not 
have enough money to buy food, and lost one of the boys to starvation. Along 
the way, they passed the half-buried body of a dead girl, who probably had also 
died of starvation. Upon his arrival in Djibouti, Kasseh’s family sent him money 
that he used to pay for the boat crossing to Yemen. 
The food that we were able to buy was not enough . . . one of my fellows 
died in the desert. During our trip we came across the body of a dead girl 
that was half buried in the sand, probably she died also of starvation like 
my fellow.
When the boat approached the coast of Yemen, two trucks appeared on the 
beach. The passengers were made to swim to the mainland and taken to a house 
in the desert by armed smugglers. These smugglers provided the migrants with 
food and water, but also demanded ransom 
from relatives in Saudi Arabia. Since Kasseh did 
not have any relatives in the country, he tried 
the number of a friend. The smugglers’ boss 
beat him until he lost consciousness when the 
friend repeatedly hung up the phone. 
Eventually, someone lent him money and all 
the children were released. In fear that they 
might be sold to others, the youths refused 
another ride from the smugglers and instead 
walked through the desert for four days. 
Once at the border with Saudi Arabia, they 
encountered a group of men on motorcycles 
who threatened them. Fortunately, a nearby 
truck driver offered his help and brought them 
to an Ethiopian camp in northern Yemen.
On their second attempt to cross the border, they were stopped by police and 
taken into custody. After several nights in the police station’s bathroom, Kasseh 
and his friends were released. Kasseh felt sick and discouraged. Although the 
36 This story is adapted from a story published by RMMS and provided by INTERSOS, who interviewed Kasseh 
in Haradh in early 2012. 
“My only dream now is 
that somebody may stop 
these ‘trips’ that are full 
of pain and suffering 
for poor people. My 
only truth now is to tell 
my friends about what 
happened to me and 
warn them not to go 
through what I went.”
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boys in his group made it safely back to the camp, three girls who travelled with 
them were kidnapped by armed men and never heard of again.
In the camp, Kasseh received medical help, and was eventually repatriated to his 
family by the Ethiopian Embassy. He believes it is important that other youths 
are dissuaded from embarking upon such “journeys of hope”.
My only dream now is that somebody may stop these ‟trips” that are 
full of pain and suffering for poor people. My only truth now is to tell my 
friends about what happened to me and warn them not to go through 
what I went.
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Leanne Weber and Sharon Pickering1
6.1 Importance of counting migrant deaths
As we began writing this chapter about the deaths of asylum-seekers off the 
northern coast of Australia, an aerial and underwater search of unprecedented 
proportions was underway across a vast area of the southern Indian Ocean. For 
many months, the tragic disappearance of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370 made 
headlines and generated public concern around the world. The search, initially 
for survivors and then for human remains and wreckage, has mobilized cutting-
edge technologies and attracted human and financial resources from at least 26 
countries (Wardell, 2014) anxious to help resolve the mystery and demonstrate 
their good standing as global leaders. Media reports have speculated that the 
operation could eventually cost “hundreds of millions of dollars” (Wardell, 
2014).2
In purely human terms, we might agree that such an international effort is 
nothing less than we would expect in order to give some comfort to grieving 
relatives and in the interests of improving the safety of commercial flights for 
the benefit of all. The importance of counting the dead and retrieving their 
bodies is universally acknowledged as a crucial step in acknowledging their loss 
and producing an account of their deaths. However, this logic brings into sharp 
relief the very different fate that has befallen those who have been lost in waters 
much closer to the Australian mainland, due to the more routine hazards of 
unregulated travel.
* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM).
1 Leanne Weber is a Senior Research Fellow and Sharon Pickering is a Professor of Criminology, both at 
Monash University. They direct the Border Crossing Observatory, also based at Monash University. 
2 The Australian Prime Minister left no doubt about his commitment to the recovery effort and his personal 
sympathy for the bereaved relatives in this statement to the Federal Parliament:
“I have offered Malaysia – as the country legally responsible for this – every assistance and cooperation from 
Australia. This plane is lost in one of the most inaccessible parts of our globe. It is a long way from anywhere. 
But the closest land is Australia, and we are the best placed country to assist. It is highly likely that in coming 
days and weeks many of the relatives of passengers on ill-fated flight 370 will wish to come to Australia. I 
want them all to know that should they come here they will be in the arms of a decent country. I should also 
let the House know that the government has decided to waive visa fees for any relatives wishing to come to 
Australia” (House of Representatives, 2014:22).
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In this chapter, we discuss the particular social and methodological challenges 
that arise in counting and accounting for the deaths of individuals who are 
seeking to travel to Australia via irregular means, and contrast the official 
response to these deaths with the procedures followed in response to fatalities 
in other contexts. We have argued elsewhere that people die because of the 
ways in which borders between the Global North and the Global South are 
controlled (Weber and Pickering, 2011). These deaths are often foreseeable and 
can occur by deliberate act or omission. This does not mean the identification 
and explication of border deaths is straightforward, nor are the chains of 
responsibility or accountability for these deaths easily identifiable. However, 
without defensible ways to count and record border-related deaths, our journey 
to understanding, prevention and justice is delayed. We conclude that basic 
principles of equity require that those who lose their lives far away from home, 
and their surviving relatives and loved ones, receive the same level of resources, 
respect and consideration irrespective of the circumstances in which their lives 
were lost. 
6.2 Illegalized journeys to Australia by boat 
The record of Australian border-related deaths is profoundly shaped by 
geography and by the total visa system Australia operates to manage migration. 
Without a visa, air travel to Australia is impossible, unless one relies on 
fraudulent documentation. For those determined to make the journey, the 
maritime crossing from Indonesia to Australia is the only remaining option. 
The vast majority of those arriving in Australia by boat are intending to seek 
asylum and have paid a facilitator for the journey. Despite concerted efforts by 
successive governments to prevent asylum-seekers from arriving in Australia to 
claim asylum,3 it is apparent from Figure 6.1 that the number of protection visas 
granted to applicants who have made their way to Australia independently (the 
onshore category) has begun to approach the numbers granted refugee status 
via Australia’s long-standing resettlement programme (the offshore category). 
The grant rates for those who arrived by sea were 90.8 per cent in 2009–2010 
and 84.2 per cent in 2010–2011, as of 26 November 2012 (Barker, 2013).
3 These policies adopted across the developed world arguably violate the fundamental right to seek asylum. 
See L. Weber, “Asylum solution: Reinstating the right to seek asylum,” The Conversation, 5 August (2013). 
Available from http://theconversation.com/asylum-solutions-reinstating-the-right-to-seek-asylum-16522.
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Figure 6.1:  Number of offshore and onshore visas granted under Australia’s 
humanitarian visa programme, 2003–2013
Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship/Department of Immigration and Border Protection 
Annual Reports from 2003–2004 to 2012–2013.
Note:  Years correspond to Australia’s financial year from 1 July to 30 June.
Numbers published by the Australian Parliamentary Library and shown in Figure 
6.2 indicate that boat arrivals since 1990 have shown considerable volatility, 
with two discernible peaks around the early 2000s and again from 2009 to 2013 
(Phillips and Spinks, 2013). The degree to which this variability is explained by 
global trends in refugee-producing situations or by changes in Australian border 
protection policies is a matter of ongoing dispute.  
Figure 6.2:  Number of people arriving in Australia on unauthorized boats, 
1 January 1990–30 June 2013
Source: Phillips and Spinks, 2013. 
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Most people arriving in Australia by boat come from the Middle East and 
South Asia, and in recent years have overwhelmingly come from Afghanistan, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and Sri Lanka. Those fleeing Afghanistan, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq often engage in complicated travel routes that 
eventuate in air arrival to Malaysia and then onward travel to Indonesia (Barker, 
2013). Many Iranians travel directly to Indonesia where, along with those 
travelling from Iraq, they do not need visas. While Sri Lankan asylum-seekers 
may sail directly from Sri Lanka, the vast majority of asylum-seekers arriving in 
Australia have come via Indonesia. The most well-known routes for irregular 
travel to Australia as of May 2013 according to the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) are shown in Figure 6.3.  
Figure 6.3: Migrant smuggling routes to Australia  
Source: ABC News website (www.abc.net.au/news/2013-05-13/map-migrant-smuggling-to-australia-and-
canada-by-sea/4685670), attributed to UNODC, 13 May 2013.
Transit in Indonesia is often experienced as inhospitable4 and therefore asylum-
seekers often seek to minimize their time spent there. Indonesia is proximate to 
the Australian territories of Christmas Island, Cocos Islands and Ashmore Reef. 
Despite the “excising” of these and other islands off northern Australia,5 most 
asylum-seeker vessels still attempt to reach landfall on Christmas Island or other 
outposts of Australian sovereignty. In response to joint disruption operations 
4 See, for example, Taylor, 2009.
5 The effect of this legal manoeuvre is to remove the stated territories from Australia’s “migration zone,” 
thereby restricting access to Australian refugee protection procedures and facilitating offshore detention 
and processing.
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and offshore interdiction by Australian border authorities, departures have 
sometimes been reported to shift to longer and more dangerous routes 
(Weber and Grewcock, 2011); however, this effect has not been as marked as 
the dramatic geographical shifts in sea routes to Europe that resulted in many 
hundreds of deaths en route to the Canary Islands in the first decade of the 
millennium (Migreurop/New Internationalist 2012). The unprecedented arrival 
of an asylum-seeker vessel in the southern city of Geraldton, Western Australia, 
in April 2013, generated major consternation (Mullaney, 2013). The vessel had 
travelled directly from Sri Lanka and was reportedly bound for New Zealand, 
raising the possibility that new southern routes might be opening up. However, 
no other boats have arrived in similar fashion, and reported boat arrivals 
continue to be concentrated in the north.
In addition to the dangers posed by monsoon weather conditions, the 
seaworthiness of vessels and competence of the crews employed by facilitators 
have been key issues in the safety of those who travel by irregular means. 
Indonesian fishing boats designed for shorter journeys and lighter loads have 
typically been used to carry those hoping to seek asylum in Australia. The number 
of passengers carried may vary from fewer than 10 to several hundred (Phillips 
and Spinks, 2013), and some analysts claim that the type of vessel used may shift 
in response to operational changes in interdiction policies. For example, policies 
of seizing or scuttling boats deemed to be unseaworthy by border authorities 
may encourage the use of poorly maintained vessels that are considered to be 
expendable and therefore contain little or no safety equipment (Barker, 2013). 
Stepping up prosecutions of human smugglers has also been associated with 
the use of inexperienced crews, often Indonesian minors, since these low-level 
operatives are the most likely to be apprehended (Barker, 2013; Weber and 
Grewcock, 2011). The tragic loss of 50 lives in December 2010, many of them 
women and children, when a boat carrying asylum-seekers broke up on rocks on 
Christmas Island, was attributed in part to the lack of a competent crew (Hope, 
2012).
It must also be acknowledged that asylum-seekers at times endanger their own 
lives and those of others by sabotaging their own boats in desperate attempts 
to prevent their return to Indonesia. In 2009, an explosion on a vessel that was 
under the control of the Australian navy near Ashmore Reef caused the death 
of five asylum-seekers and injured other passengers and military personnel. 
The coronial inquest that followed (Cavanagh, 2010) attributed some of the 
responsibility for the explosion to passengers who had deliberately lit a fire, but 
the inquest also acknowledged that the actions of the military personnel had 
contributed to the passengers’ mistaken belief that they were to be returned 
to Indonesian waters. The tensions and practicalities of interdiction at sea 
therefore pose a number of risks to both passengers and official personnel, 
a theme that has been raised again in relation to the current policy of turn-
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back by naval personnel under Operation Sovereign Borders,6 which includes 
returning interdicted asylum-seekers to Indonesian waters using life boats (see, 
for example: Roberts and Solomons, 2014; Nicholson and Maley, 2011). 
The holding of interdicted asylum-seekers in offshore detention and processing 
facilities – whether on territory directly under the control of the Australian 
Government, such as Christmas Island, or in other Pacific nations such as Papua 
New Guinea and Nauru – creates a different set of risks, which can include 
psychological distress that may lead to self-harm, lack of timely access to medical 
care due to distance from medical infrastructure, and possibly heightened 
to violence. Less widely known is the fact that Australia’s border protection 
policies reach beyond these known locations of detention. Successive Australian 
Governments have, for many years, funded a range of detention and processing 
facilities in Indonesia, the conditions in which have also been subject to criticism 
(Taylor, 2009).7
6.3 Data sources and information gaps
We note that saving lives is not just about collecting information but also 
concerns how that information is used. We live in a “hyper-numeric” world in 
which something counts because it can be counted. However, death counts can 
be used like a sporting tally; they have been exploited by the Australian media 
to sensationalize poorly understood events and by federal politicians to argue 
for even harsher border control to prevent dangerous journeys, without calling 
into question the broader policies that create grave risks for asylum-seekers 
by blocking access to safe, legally regulated travel. Numbers can be subject to 
competing claims but at least provide a foundation for debate and accountability. 
As we have argued before, what counts in the end is how numbers are embedded 
in the mentalities of rule. The act of counting is therefore inherently political, 
whereas the necessity of accounting for border-related deaths should be 
approached from a humanitarian rather than a politicized perspective. 
The ethics and politics of counting is significantly reflected in the methodology 
and the application of the knowledge generated. Death counts can be constructed 
with different purposes in mind. These include providing a statistical basis for 
research on the risks and consequences of border crossing and enforcement, 
as a record and tribute to those who died, as a basis for accountability, to 
inform policy and prevent further deaths, and to assist relatives to identify 
their missing loved ones. The way knowledge is produced about border deaths 
reveals much about the political and legal drivers of that process. The decisions 
made in counting deaths can promote or prevent a greater understanding of 
6 See its website: www.customs.gov.au/site/operation-sovereign-borders.asp.
7 See also www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/annual/2009-10/html/outcome-4/administered4-3-2.htm. 
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border deaths and their relationship to irregular migration and border control 
processes. Counts can both draw attention to and seek to prevent border deaths, 
or can be mobilized for increased forms of control. The act of counting deaths 
can reveal how border enforcement varies in nature and intensity often through 
different sites along the same border. The counting can implicitly or explicitly 
attribute cause and effect, and can identify different forms of harm or death. In 
this section, we seek to relay how this ethical, practical and political terrain has 
been negotiated in the establishment and maintenance of the Australian Border 
Deaths Database, which is the source for the data presented in Section 6.4. 
The Australian Border Deaths Database was established as part of the research 
for Globalization and Borders: Death at the Global Frontier (Weber and Pickering, 
2011) when it became apparent that there was no publicly available official data 
on border-related deaths in Australia. The book analysed the implications of 
processes of counting and classifying border-related deaths and indeed of there 
being no count at all. Collection of data on border-related deaths in Australia 
was catalysed by a series of incidents in 2009 and 2010 where the lack of 
verifiable and systematic data hampered attempts to understand details of, let 
alone trends in, the loss of lives. The Database is hosted at the Border Crossing 
Observatory at Monash University. The Observatory receives no external funds 
for this purpose, and the data is maintained by University-employed academics 
as part of our ongoing research effort. The information is obtained primarily 
from media reports, which are cross-referenced where possible with official 
reports from governments, verified information from non-governmental 
organizations, coronial inquiries and similar. The data is updated as fatalities are 
reported, and other data sources are used from time to time to cross-check the 
list.8 Discrepancies identified through these checks can be difficult to reconcile. 
For example, media reports of missing boats, as obtained from interviews with 
concerned relatives in Australia, are sometimes corrected when the missing 
passengers are located in offshore detention centres following interdiction at 
sea, or the vessel is found to have arrived after all. The process of counting 
border-related deaths is therefore greatly complicated by the circumstances 
of unregulated travel and the climate of secrecy which surrounds both human 
smuggling activities that have been labelled illicit, and official actions that are 
held to be confidential due to their ‟operational” significance (in respect of 
interdictions at sea) or ‟commercial” nature (in relation to offshore detention). 
The Australian Border Deaths Database consists of two separate data files. A 
summary file of fatal incidents that have occurred across a range of border sites 
since 2000, which includes deaths after entry to Australia that are related to 
border control, is available on the Border Crossing Observatory website and is 
8 For example, see the SIEV X list of drownings (see note 9), and the Abolish Foreignness website (“Fortress 
Australia: Asylum-seeker and migrant death statistics for deaths up to 2012”, available from www.
abolishforeignness.org/blog/fortress-australia-asylum-seeker-and-migrant-death-and-detention-statistics).
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intended for public use.9 A more detailed file is maintained offline in SPSS format 
which is capable of producing basic statistics at the level of individual deaths, and 
can be accessed on request. This statistical file is the source for the descriptive 
statistics reported later in this chapter. There is no verifiable data available on 
the number of attempted sea crossings from Indonesia to Australia with which 
to compare the data on border fatalities in order to calculate statistics on risk of 
death, and estimates of the number of crossings differ widely.
No Australian government agency, law enforcement or migration-focused 
agency, at the state or federal level, publishes data on border-related deaths. 
A group of concerned individuals came together in response to the sinking of 
the SIEV X10 between Indonesia and Australia on 19 October 2001, to collect 
data on this specific incident.11 The information available on the SIEV X website 
on this and subsequent sinkings is often highly personalized and seeks to 
humanize the victims of these tragedies through storytelling, naming and visual 
representation. In the absence of official recognition or record of the deaths, the 
group undertook to support the survivors and relatives of those who died in that 
incident and created a repository of testimonies from survivors, a chronology of 
the events and a database of information on those believed to have perished. 
That project has since been extended to include subsequent tragedies but 
retains a focus on loss of life at sea.12  
The broader scope of the Australian Border Deaths Database was informed by 
death counts undertaken by governments and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) in other parts of the world.13 Unlike the SIEV X project, the Border 
Crossing Observatory database records border-related deaths that occur in 
contexts other than sea voyages, such as deaths in detention centres and during 
apprehension by immigration authorities. This count is therefore shaped by 
what is considered to constitute the border and a border-related death. Border-
related death is neither a clearly definable statistical category for the authorities 
nor a legally relevant one. The Australian Border Deaths Database uses the 
‟functional border” as the definitional construct. That concept is taken from 
Weber (2006) and Weber and Pickering (2013), and encompasses all functionally 
defined ‟border sites” at which border enforcement takes place or where 
immigration laws have a material impact on the conditions leading to death. 
This includes the physical border, en route, in offshore or onshore detention 
or processing facilities, during deportation, on forced return to a migrant’s 
9 See http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/thebordercrossingobservatory/publications/australian-border-deaths-
database/. 
10 The Australian Government uses the acronym SIEV (which stands for “suspected illegal entry vessel”) to 
describe boats coming from Indonesia to Australia. Overwhelmingly, these have asylum-seekers on board, 
and also include illegal fishing vessels and the like. Each SIEV is also given a number (e.g. SIEV 65, SIEV 66).
11 See http://sievx.com/dbs/SIEVX/. 
12 SIEV X: Drownings on the public record of people attempting to enter Australia irregularly by boat since 
1998. See http://sievx.com/articles/background/DrowningsTable.pdf.
13 For example, see www.unitedagainstracism.org/pdfs/listofdeaths.pdf. 
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homeland, and even within the community as a result of conditions of legal and 
social precariousness. 
Methodologically, these later sites are challengeable as radiating out ‟too far” 
from what is commonly understood as the border to remain meaningfully 
attributable to irregular migration and unauthorized border crossing. It also 
presents unresolved issues regarding comparability within and across data sets. 
However, to omit these sites is to overlook the fact that borders and border 
control occur in a variety of ways at physical locations often distant from the 
territorial border. It also recognizes that a person can go from being designated 
as lawful to unlawful in regard to migration law and be subject to migration 
and border control measures in a range of sites internal to the nation State 
(or in designated offshore places, for example, Nauru or Papua New Guinea 
where Australia contracts out the processing of asylum-seekers). In the case of 
Australia, deaths that may be regarded as non-maritime are significantly fewer 
in number than deaths occurring at sea. However, the mapping of these non-
maritime deaths reflects the approach to the spatial mapping of migration-
related deaths undertaken in the atlas of deaths in Europe published by the 
organization Migreurop (Migreurop/New Internationalist, 2012), which also 
includes deaths related to immigration enforcement that occur after entry to 
the European territory.
The use of the functional border methodologically challenges the idea that 
deaths are only counted if bodies are found in situ (cf. Michalowski, 2007). 
Those counts that include deaths where bodies are not found (as is often the 
case with individuals presumed to be lost at sea), or are found at some distance 
from the border, produce figures of a different nature and complexion than 
those generated by a count which relies solely on forensic examination. Most 
border-related deaths that have occurred on the Australian mainland or within 
Australian territorial waters have resulted in a coronial investigation, although the 
triggering of a coronial inquiry by state-based authorities is far from automatic 
(Powell, Weber and Pickering, 2013). Deaths occurring beyond Australian 
waters, yet within the surveillance zone patrolled by Australian naval, customs 
and coastguard vessels, are unlikely to result in any official documentation. In 
these cases, the only publicly available information tends to come from NGOs, 
survivors, and the media concerning details of the incidents and identities of 
those involved. While Australian and Indonesian authorities are likely to hold 
information on these events, this is not regularly made public. This data is 
produced within a law enforcement framework; but more recently this has 
become a military framework, and, as a result, this information has increased 
in its perceived sensitivity. Indeed, since 2013 the Australian Government has 
regarded unauthorized arrivals as an operational matter to be overseen by the 
Australian military through Operation Sovereign Borders, and information on 
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asylum-seeker voyages is suppressed.14 The lack of openly accessible data on 
border-related deaths occurring en route to Australia is a severe impediment 
to a full recording of deaths and understanding of the human costs of border 
controls and irregular migration. Since 2000, out of 43 incidents involving the 
deaths of 61 people, only 15 coronial inquests were conducted and just 8 
made publically available. For instance, out of 29 deaths occurring in onshore 
detention, 10 inquests were conducted and 4 made available to the public. 
Nine incidents during interdiction at sea resulted in only two publically available 
inquests (Powell, Weber and Pickering, 2013).
In the following sections, we present basic descriptive statistics derived from 
the Australian Border Deaths Database, not intended to serve only as ends in 
themselves, but also to illustrate in more detail the methodological challenges 
involved in counting border-related deaths, and the complexity that arises in 
interpreting and accounting for them.
6.4  What we know and do not know about deaths  
en route to Australia
6.4.1 How many people die? 
The Australian Border Deaths Database has recorded 1,494 border-related 
deaths between January 2000 and July 2014. This figure includes those who 
are believed to be missing, and those who have not been rescued or recovered 
and are therefore feared drowned. It includes those who have died en route 
to Australia, including during interdiction by Australian authorities, and during 
apprehension by authorities on the Australian mainland, while in onshore or 
offshore detention centres, and during or after deportation. Table 6.1 shows 
that the vast majority of these deaths (96%) occur at sea, often before asylum-
seeker vessels have entered Australian waters. The distinction between deaths 
that occur within and outside Australian waters should be treated with caution, 
since media reports do not always describe the location with precision, and also 
because of the variety of maritime borders that exist in law and practice.15
14 See, for example, ABC News, 2013.
15 See, for example, www.ga.gov.au/image_cache/GA3746.pdf. In the absence of more detailed information, 
fatal incidents have only been classified as occurring within Australian waters where there is some indication 
that Australian border control or rescue patrols have been involved. This approach is likely to undercount 
the number of sinkings that have occurred in Australian waters. 
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Table 6.1:  Known deaths related to Australian border controls, January 
2000–July 2014
Circumstances Deaths Percentage of total
En route to Australia 1,266 85
Inside Australian waters   171 11
Onshore detention     31   2
Upon return to home country     16   1
In-country suicide       5 <1
Offshore detention       3 <1
Arrest/deportation       2 <1
Total 1,494
Source: Australian Border Deaths Database (statistical file).
Since the focus of this chapter is deaths during journeys to Australia, the figures 
that follow include only the 1,437 known deaths that occurred at sea and the 
three deaths in offshore detention centres (shown in the shaded rows in Table 
6.1). The offshore detention figures do not include deaths that may have occurred 
in detention and processing centres funded by the Australian Government in 
transit countries such as Indonesia (Taylor, 2009). Not surprisingly, the peaks 
in deaths en route to Australia in the early 2000s and from 2008 to 2013 that 
are apparent in Figure 6.2 correspond to the periods during which the highest 
number of asylum-seeker vessels arrived in Australia.
Figure 6.4:  Year-by-year deaths during irregular journeys to Australia, 
January 2000–July 2014
Source: Australian Border Deaths Database (statistical file).
Note: Deaths for 2014 include those that occurred up until the end of May only. 
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One of the most important observations when considering this data is that the 
identities of many of those who die remain unknown, with many of the records 
lacking basic information on the deceased such as sex, age or nationality. This 
is primarily because such a large number of bodies are not recovered from 
the sea and identities remain unconfirmed. Unlike regulated modes of travel, 
irregular travel by its very nature does not require that passenger lists be lodged 
with transport authorities and leaves no trace in the border control records 
in countries of departure. Moreover, with some exceptions – such as the 
foundering of the SIEV 221 off Christmas Island in 2010, which was witnessed 
by horrified island residents and captured on film, and the explosion on board a 
vessel interdicted by the Australian navy, as reported earlier – most sinkings are 
unobserved by third parties and may only come to the attention of authorities 
when passengers, or relatives awaiting their arrival, raise the alarm. While 
retrospectively constructed passenger lists may be able to fill some of these 
gaps, these often remain partial and difficult to corroborate.
6.4.2  Origins of those who died
The vast majority of those who die en route to Australia are in the process of 
seeking asylum, and their countries of origin reflect which nationalities make or 
intend to make the journey by boat to claim refugee status. 
Figure 6.5:  Nationalities of asylum-seekers who died en route to Australia, 
January 2000–July 2014
Source: Australian Border Deaths Database (statistical file).
Although there are many gaps in the nationality data stored on the Australian 
Border Deaths Database, it is clear that since 2000 the majority of deaths have 
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the general region of origin is recorded more consistently on the Database. 
This data indicates that the groups facing the greatest risk of death en route 
come from countries most likely to be rejected for lawful entry as part of pre-
departure visa regimes governing lawful arrival (and, in many cases, most likely 
to gain refugee status post-arrival).
Figure 6.6:  Region of origin of asylum-seekers who died en route to Australia, 
January 2000–July 2014
Source: Australian Border Deaths Database (statistical file).
Note: Middle East includes Afghanistan.
6.4.3  Cause of death
In the case of Australia, the location of death unsurprisingly shapes the cause of 
death. Deaths that occur en route are overwhelmingly caused by environmentally 
hazardous conditions, leading to drowning between Indonesia and Australia. 
While it is possible that some deaths occur due to exposure to elements and 
lack of adequate food and medical care on board (for example, it was reported 
that a man was “found dead” on a vessel that was intercepted by Australian 
authorities), and there is one known incident where deaths were caused by an 
explosion (such as that in 2009 which was mentioned previously), information 
about precise causes of death is usually missing from media reports, and deaths 
associated with sinkings or missing vessels are generally presumed to be due to 
drowning. 
Of the three deaths that have occurred so far in offshore detention facilities, 
two were due to medical conditions where the distance from adequate medical 
care was likely to have been a factor, and one – the recent death of Kurdish 
asylum-seeker Reza Barati on Manus Island – was the result of deliberate 
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and investigation (Cornall, 2014).16 Where deaths have not been subject to an 
independent coronial inquiry, the factors that have contributed to the deaths 
will not have been fully determined. 
6.4.4  Age and sex
The Australian Border Deaths Database at its present state of development is 
unable to provide accurate data on the age and sex of each of those who died en 
route to Australia.17 The importance of monitoring age and sex was highlighted 
in the sinking of the SIEV X, where the large numbers of women and children 
who drowned was especially marked. Of the approximately 400 passengers 
believed to be on board, 65 men were among the fatalities, while 142 women 
and 146 children perished. Despite the large amount of missing data, Figure 6.7 
shows that 2001 and 2010 (the year of the SIEV X and Christmas Island SIEV 221 
sinkings, respectively) had particularly high levels of female fatalities. 
Figure 6.7:  Year-by-year deaths of asylum-seekers en route to Australia by 
sex, January 2000–May 2014 
Source: Australian Border Deaths Database (statistical file).
In addition to the many children known to have been lost in the catastrophic 
2001 sinking, at least 15 children died in sinkings in 2010. It has been observed 
that a larger proportion of women than men die at external border sites, 
including a high proportion of pregnant women (Pickering and Cochrane, 2013). 
16 See alternative Senate inquiry at www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_
and_Constitutional_Affairs/Manus_Island. 
17 At the time of writing, attempts were being made to rectify this by systematically revisiting the source 
reports, with a view to making inferences about sex and age group (i.e. whether the deceased was an adult 
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Although the data is limited, both women and children appear to be particularly 
vulnerable in circumstances of large-scale sinkings. The reasons why women die 
in greater proportions than men at the external border (rather than at internal 
border sites) are not clearly discernable from the data, yet based on the extant 
literature it is reasonable to conclude that in addition to the role of border 
control measures (such as restrictions on family reunion which may prompt 
dangerous journeys), gendered social practices within countries of origin and 
transit, smuggling practices and gendered social mores are contributing factors 
(for a full account of this, see Pickering and Cochrane, 2013). 
6.5  A chronology of counting
The discussion so far has established that where deaths occur, the unregulated 
mode of travel, and the lack of formal legal responses to deaths en route to 
Australia all contribute to the absence of systematic data about those who die. 
In this section, we use some case examples from the Australian Border Deaths 
Database to further illustrate the practical and conceptual issues that arise at 
various stages in the process of counting, and accounting for, border-related 
deaths.
6.5.1  Confirmation of sinkings
Asylum-seeker vessels are not part of the extensive networks of administration, 
communication and enforcement that closely monitor regulated shipping. Of 
necessity, those organizing voyages that are not sanctioned by law are motivated 
to avoid detection through any of these channels. Knowledge about sinkings 
often arises from distress messages sent from on-board, sightings of debris, or 
concern from friends and relatives at the non-arrival of their loved ones. In these 
circumstances, it is possible that vessels may be lost without it coming to the 
attention of national authorities or other concerned parties. On the other hand, 
instances have occurred where media reports of lost vessels have proven to be 
incorrect. For example, the records of 350 presumed deaths had to be removed 
from the Australian Border Deaths Database when it transpired that the vessel 
that had been reported missing in the media had later been accounted for. 18
A full discussion of Australia’s rescue capabilities and practices is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. However, processes of counting are inextricably linked with 
surveillance and rescue practices since early response clearly improves both the 
chance that lives will be saved, and that bodies will be recovered. Controversial 
questions have sometimes been posed regarding if and when Australian border 
surveillance authorities have detected vessels that are in distress, and the 
actions they have or have not taken in response (for a detailed coverage, see 
18 ABC News, “Dying for asylum” (21 April 2009). Available from www.abc.net.au/news/2009-04-21/dying-for-
asylum/1658168. 
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Kevin, 2011). It has long been alleged that rescue efforts in relation to the sinking 
of the SIEV X were hampered by disputes over whether the vessel sank inside or 
outside Australian territorial waters, and reluctance to reveal whether or not it 
was under surveillance at the time (Australian Senate Select Committee, 2002, 
Chapter 8). More recently, 55 people, including two babies, were killed in an 
incident in July 2013, and the slow response, despite a sighting of the boat by 
authorities, was attributed to confusion between different national agencies 
(O’Brien, 2013). At the Coronial Inquest into the sinking of the SIEV 358 in which 
104 men drowned, up to 16 distress calls from the vessel were reported to have 
been ignored due to previous false alarms (O’Brien, 2013) and disputes about 
whether Indonesian or Australian authorities should mount the rescue (AAP, 
2013). 
6.5.2  Recovering bodies and identifying the dead 
International lawyer Stefanie Grant (2011b) has argued that those who perish 
during irregular voyages at sea, and their relatives, have a “right to identity”. 
Although the importance of recovering bodies is a widely accepted imperative 
within the international community, efforts to retrieve the bodies of perished 
asylum-seekers have, at times, been accorded a low priority. This has significant 
humanitarian implications in terms of the suffering of relatives, and also 
hampers the collection of statistical information on deaths occurring in these 
circumstances. Some examples have already been given where delays or alleged 
delays in the response of rescue agencies resulted in failure to recover bodies. 
The sinking near Christmas Island in June 2013, in which 55 people drowned, 
prompted media reports that bodies were deliberately left in the water, even 
after rescue vessels had arrived. The commander of the Border Protection 
Command told reporters that the search for survivors had to be prioritized over 
the recovery of bodies, a decision that was driven by lack of resources since 
other vessels were deployed elsewhere (Ireland, 2013).
In other circumstances, government officials have been reluctant to release 
the names of the deceased, even where bodies have been recovered and 
identifications made. Thirteen years after the sinking of the SIEV X, the names of 
many of those who died have still not been publicly released, despite a Senate 
motion calling on the Australian Government to produce the lists of SIEV X victims 
that were reportedly compiled by the AFP, the Australian immigration authorities 
and the International Organization for Migration.19 According to reports, a list of 
passengers was compiled by the facilitator of the voyage but was thought to 
have been confiscated by Indonesian police. Although no credible explanation 
has been given for the failure to release the names of the SIEV X victims, it seems 
that the handling of the inquiries as a matter of criminal investigation aimed 
at identifying facilitators for prosecution may have contributed to a climate of 
19 Source: http://sievx.com/FAQ.shtml. 
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secrecy rather than open disclosure in the interests of the families and wider 
public. 
6.5.3  Conduct of coronial inquiries
Coronial inquiries create the possibility of accounting for specific border-related 
deaths by attributing chains of responsibility and making recommendations 
aimed at preventing further loss of life. While these important post-fatality 
procedures go beyond the objective of simply naming and counting, the 
information obtained from inquests leave an authoritative record of the death, 
and can also enrich the qualitative data recorded in statistical repositories 
such as the Australian Border Deaths Database. However, the circumstances of 
unauthorized travel, coupled with government policies intended to pre-empt 
arrival, create significant legal and practical barriers towards achieving this 
level of scrutiny in relation to migration-related deaths. Where deaths occur 
in locations beyond Australia’s territorial jurisdiction, they do not trigger legal 
requirements for full inquests, which exist within the legislation of individual 
states within Australia’s federated system.20 This applies to the majority of 
deaths occurring en route, and also to deaths in offshore detention centres, 
which are established by ad hoc agreements with independent Pacific nations 
and operated on behalf of the Australian Government by private security firms.
The killing of Reza Barati at Manus Island detention centre during violent 
disturbances in February 2014 has generated calls for a comprehensive and 
fully independent inquiry to establish the circumstances of his death. In the 
immediate aftermath, the Australian Government commissioned an ad hoc 
inquiry (Cornall, 2014), which has been supplemented by separate inquiries by 
the Opposition-controlled Senate (Laughland, 2014; Gordon et al., 2014) and 
the Government of Papua New Guinea (Whyte, 2014). The Australian Senate 
Inquiry is due to report in September 2014.21 While the identity of the victim 
and the recognition of this death as a border-related fatality are not in dispute in 
this case, the special conditions created by offshore detention policies highlight 
the differential response to deaths in custody in this context when compared 
with deaths in other custodial settings within Australia (discussed in the next 
section).22 This death has also reinforced wider concerns about the risks posed 
by offshore detention and processing, and the absence of credible investigative 
procedures.23 
20 A doctrine of state responsibility for official actions taken by governments beyond their sovereign territory is 
emerging within international law, but has not been tested in domestic courts. In any case, it may not cover 
circumstances where no direct involvement of Australian law and policy is apparent.
21 See www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Manus_
Island. 
22 For more detail on coronial processes in Australia, see Powell et al., 2013.
23 See, for example, Knott, 2014.
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Even where deaths occur in offshore detention centres under the direct control 
of the Australian Government, it is far from automatic that a coronial inquest will 
follow. In October 2011, the Supreme Court of Western Australia ruled against 
holding an inquest into the death of Fatima Irfani, who collapsed with a brain 
haemorrhage in Christmas Island detention centre in January 2003 and died after 
being flown thousands of kilometres for hospital treatment in Perth.24 Within a 
month, Fatima’s husband was returned to Kabul with his three small children, 
with no question of a full inquiry being conducted. By the time supporters had 
managed to put their case for a full inquiry, it was considered that too much time 
had elapsed to justify further investigation. This case highlights the importance 
of placing deaths in immigration detention on the same footing as other deaths 
in custody.
6.5.4  Inclusion of border-related deaths in national deaths  
in custody statistics
It has already been noted that no official collection of border-related deaths 
exists within Australia. However, one category of border-related deaths – 
namely deaths in immigration custody – could potentially be incorporated into 
an existing national collection held by the Australian Institute of Criminology.25 
In addition to the data collection function, the recording of a death as a “death 
in custody” triggers a requirement for a coronial inquiry into the particular 
circumstances of the death. Official deaths in custody reporting has only 
included deaths in the custodial settings of prison, juvenile detention and police 
custody on the Australian mainland, and during the apprehension of criminal 
suspects or escapees by police or prison authorities. Deaths that occur in 
immigration detention centres or while authorities attempt to take suspected 
“unlawful non-citizens” into Migration Act custody either on land or in Australia’s 
territorial waters are not considered to be deaths in custody for the purposes of 
investigation and national monitoring. However, in both contexts, a duty of care 
exists which distinguishes these deaths from drownings that occur without the 
direct knowledge or intervention of Australian authorities and should create a 
mandatory requirement to record and respond to the deaths. 
Judgements about whether or not a death at sea qualifies as “in custody” may 
be difficult to make on the basis of limited information. One clear-cut example 
is the explosion of the so-called SIEV 36 off Ashmore Reef while it was under 
the control of Australian border authorities (Northern Territory Coroner, 2010). 
Definitional disputes may also arise in grey areas where Australian authorities 
are alleged to have had knowledge of, or been in indirect contact with, stricken 
vessels due to aerial surveillance or other intelligence. Since 2000, none of the 
deaths during offshore interdiction or in offshore detention for which coronial 
24 Supreme Court of Western Australia Irfani v The State Coroner [2011] WASC 270.
25 See www.aic.gov.au/about_aic/research_programs/nmp/0004.html.
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inquiries were conducted was officially recorded as a death in custody (Powell, 
Weber and Pickering, 2013). Indeed, there is no mechanism to enable this 
to occur (ibid.). The transnational dimension of deaths that occur in offshore 
immigration detention locations is clearly an aspect that was not anticipated in 
the establishment of the deaths in custody collection. However, as with deaths 
in criminal justice settings, all of these deaths raise questions concerning duty of 
care, prevention of future deaths, and the determination of culpability.
The failure to classify these fatalities as deaths in custody effectively 
“bureaucratizes away” opportunities to consider the deaths of these non-
citizens either as homicides or as deaths arising from the specific risks associated 
with irregular migration or offshore detention. This exclusion is achieved by 
rendering deaths in the immigration enforcement system as somehow “other” 
to the ordinary business of detention and imprisonment and the various forms 
of oversight and accountability that apply in these custodial circumstances. This 
is a significant omission in human rights protection considering the burgeoning 
use of offshore interdiction, forced deportation, and administrative detention of 
unlawful non-citizens, not only in Australia but also worldwide.
6.6  Improving data and saving lives
6.6.1 Conclusions: Counting and accounting for deaths
The failure to comprehensively document and investigate deaths of asylum-
seekers at sea or in immigration custody while other fatal incidents invoke 
large-scale and international ad hoc responses, as in the case of missing flight 
MH380, suggests that certain lives effectively count for more than others, both 
at a domestic level and within the international community. The illustrative 
cases previously discussed also reveal an equity gap in the way that deaths in 
immigration custody are responded to when compared with deaths within the 
criminal justice system, with no legal requirement in place to require a coronial 
inquiry in the case of the former, or to record summary data about the deaths in 
the national deaths in custody collection. 
Inadequate responses to deaths during irregular journeys not only jeopardize 
efforts to identify chains of responsibility and prevent further deaths but also 
increase the suffering of relatives in places of origin or intended destination who 
have no way of knowing what has happened to their family members. Grant 
(2011a) has argued that the right to family life places a duty on governments 
to document all border-related deaths and establishes the right for families to 
know about the fate of their loved ones. 
The construction of asylum seeking as a problem of organized criminality rather 
than as a human rights concern, a trend that is occurring globally, has been 
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particularly devastating both in terms of multiplying risks to asylum-seekers who 
make unauthorized journeys (Pickering, 2004; Weber and Grewcock, 2011), and 
in diverting the official response once deaths occur towards the imperatives 
of criminal investigation and border protection, and away from humanitarian 
concern for survivors, victims and their relatives. Refusal to release information 
on security, operational, jurisdictional and commercial grounds adds further to 
the information vacuum.
The statistical patterns and individual examples discussed in this chapter of 
deaths of asylum-seekers en route to Australia have identified the following 
methodological problems in relation to the collection of such data:
Practical problems:
• Sinkings often occur in geographically remote or unknown locations.
• Since voyages take place outside normal regulatory frameworks, there is an 
absence of official records of embarkation or progress.
• Lack of access to legally sanctioned modes of travel promotes undocumented 
journeys, which further complicates identification of victims and 
determination of personal details.
Political issues:
• No Australian agencies have an explicit mandate to collate information on 
border-related deaths. 
• Bereaved relatives are relatively powerless or invisible, either because they 
reside abroad or because they have fragile immigration status or lack the 
political capital derived from citizenship.
• Disputes may occur over jurisdiction for responding to deaths or effecting 
rescue or recovery of bodies due to the contracting out of detention and 
processing arrangements to other countries and the extension of aerial and 
naval surveillance beyond Australia’s territorial waters.
• The construction of irregular travel as a form of criminality clouds the 
perception of those who die at sea as blameless victims and is used by 
authorities to justify withholding of information on security and operational 
grounds.
Definitional complexities:
• How do we record personal information such as age, sex and nationality in 
the absence of detailed reports?
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• Should deaths that occur in countries of transit (for example, while in 
Australian-funded detention centres in Indonesia) be included in counts of 
deaths en route to Australia?
• Which maritime boundaries are relevant in classifying offshore deaths that 
occur within or beyond Australian jurisdiction – territorial waters, extended 
economic zone, aerial surveillance zone?
• How do we determine which deaths are to count as “deaths in custody,” given 
that this is a relevant categorization in Australian law?
Ultimately, clarifying the purpose for which information on border-related deaths 
is collected is just as important as the task of overcoming these practical and 
political obstacles. As Grant (2011a) has argued, while an international database 
of migration-related deaths would be a great asset to relatives struggling to 
trace their missing loved ones, in the context of the widespread demonization 
of irregular migration, civil society groups will have cause for concern that such 
information could be used instead to further restrict the mobility of particular 
groups.
6.6.2  Recommendations
We urge that all possible efforts are made to reverse the criminal taint that has 
become attached to irregular migration, particularly when undergone for the 
purpose of seeking asylum, and to those who find themselves in immigration 
detention. Deaths at sea or in detention should be treated first as human 
tragedies, and not – or at least not primarily – as criminal events in which the 
“victims” are reduced to the role of witnesses or treated as though they were 
suspect themselves.
Since deaths during migration are in a very real sense “transnational deaths” 
(Grant, 2011b), our recommendations contain both international and domestic 
elements – based on principles of equity and the application of international 
standards for better counting, accounting for, and prevention of deaths arising 
from irregular migration. We believe that internationally agreed and resourced 
procedures are needed to deal with deaths in international waters or regions 
of disputed or diluted sovereignty; and that these protocols can also provide 
guidance for responses to deaths in Australian territory. 
A comprehensive and accountable post-fatality response must go beyond mere 
counts of border deaths. These protocols must be guided by established human 
rights principles and duties under criminal law, humanitarian law and maritime 
law which emphasize “prevention, restoration of family links, clarification of 
the fate of missing persons, the right of families to know, prosecution of human 
rights violations, the legal status of missing persons, and the ‘management’ of 
the dead and identification of their remains” (Grant, 2011a:143).
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As the main agencies operating in border zones and ultimately responsible for 
events in offshore detention, states will remain the primary source of information 
in relation to border-related deaths in many circumstances; however, due to 
the highly politicized context in which border-related deaths occur, counting 
should be done by organizations not involved in border control and migration 
management regimes – at both national and international levels.
At the national level, bodies such as the Commonwealth Ombudsman or the 
Australian Human Rights Commission have the credibility and independence to 
handle reports of border-related deaths – where applicable, referring cases to 
state coroners for investigation, or to the national deaths in custody monitoring 
programme for statistical recording, while also liaising with relevant international 
bodies.
At the transnational level, there are a range of agencies that already have the 
capacity to respond to large-scale disasters or individual deaths that occur away 
from the deceased person’s country of origin or develop relevant protocols 
(Grant, 2011a). This includes the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(particularly in relation to identification and proper handling of bodies), and 
the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (responsible for the Operational 
Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters). 
There should be legal requirements for governments to cooperate with 
designated national and international authorities in the event of migration-
related deaths within their jurisdictions, under agreed protocols for information 
exchange. This requirement to report is particularly important in a climate of 
increased secrecy around the release of information that is associated with the 
militarization of offshore border control in many contexts. Explicit agreements 
are needed to cover sinkings in international waters.
Discussions about national and international protocols should include in a 
meaningful way affected migrant communities and human rights NGOs, as 
well as border control authorities, in order to establish a human rights-driven 
framework that is not dominated by state concerns.
Grant (2011b) has made the interesting, if ambitious, suggestion that the 
resources needed to establish such an international framework to respond to 
border-related deaths could be raised by states diverting funds that are currently 
directed towards border control, in recognition of the role played by border 
control in the circumstances of the deaths. 
Those of us concerned with building empirical datasets for the purposes of 
understanding trends and preventing deaths must remain mindful of the 
politics and ethics, as well as the methodology, of the count. While the facticity 
of numbers at work in counting border-related deaths plays a vital role in 
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establishing the nature and scale of harms, there is an even greater importance 
in establishing an inclusionary account of border-related deaths. 
To overcome the use of death counts for purposes of greater exclusion, harm 
and death, we need to develop alternative ways of accounting for border deaths. 
This will require expanding the conversation beyond agreements for responding 
to deaths that occur during attempts to cross borders, in order to confront the 
full range of factors that contribute to these deaths, including the ways in which 
states currently control their borders.
The head of the Australian search team in the case of missing airliner MH370 is 
quoted as saying, in response to the evidence that the aircraft’s tracking system 
had been turned off: “I think that’s something that we, as a world community, 
have to correct as soon as possible”. If asylum-seekers and other migrants are to 
share in a future of safer travel, then concern over border-related deaths should 
become an equally high priority for the international community.
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Rokaya Satar and Najah Musin are among the few survivors of the SIEV X boat 
tragedy that occurred in October 2001 in international waters off the coast of 
Indonesia. Rokaya lost her husband and two young daughters in the tragedy. 
Najah lost her son, four brothers and a sister.26
When they came to us and showed us the boat, we were told that this 
boat was not the one to get us to Australia. It was only a transit boat that 
would get us to the boat that would bring us to Australia. (Rokaya)
Rokaya and Najah were among many others 
on the boat making the journey to Australia 
from Iraq. Most were families who fled Iraq 
via the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, 
once there, migrants were banned from 
renting housing and getting jobs, and their 
children were not allowed to attend school. 
Seeking opportunity, the migrants travelled 
to Indonesia from where they would cross to 
Australia by boat. The boat was overcrowded, 
packed with 400 others, including about 150 
children who were crammed into the cabin of 
the boat with their mothers, while the men 
stayed on deck. 
Already before the incident, some people 
were seasick and many were afraid and 
crying. The ship sailed along the coast of Indonesia for about nine hours before 
the engine stopped working and the vessel cracked and began to sink. Some 
passengers tried to fix the engine and to take water out of the boat, while others 
started moving left and right in a panicked attempt to keep the boat balanced in 
the water. Only about a hundred life jackets were available. 
The boat broke up within seconds; the waves washed the family members 
apart. I saw a woman giving birth in the ocean, I saw my brother being 
washed away by the waves, I called out to him but saw him weeping. 
(Najah)
In the panic that followed, many passengers were pushed under by others who 
were looking for family members or trying to get out of the sinking cabin. Rokaya 
lost both her daughters this way. She later found them dead.
26 This story is an adaptation of an original transcript of the videotaped interview with the survivors in the 
week following the shipwreck. It was published on sievx.com, which gained access to the document via Tony 
Kevin, who presented the document to the CMI Inquiry as an attachment to his first submission.
“The boat broke up 
within seconds; the 
waves washed the family 
members apart. I saw a 
woman giving birth in the 
ocean, I saw my brother 
being washed away 
by the waves, I called 
out to him but saw him 
weeping.” (Najah)
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I saw my small daughter Alya floating, eyes open, dead. A little later, 
we saw the body of my elder daughter. My husband looked quite strong 
until he saw his daughters and he started choking. He said, “I have lost 
my family, I have brought you to this, I do not deserve to live,” he said “I 
cannot stay, I do not want to see you die in front of me.” As he was talking, 
he was looking very tired, he was crying, his grip became loose because 
of his exhaustion. Then a wave came and washed him away from the 
timber. I felt alone until the middle of the night. I heard cries from others 
from time to time, but I could not see the other survivors. Later, I saw two 
people. I yelled out to them: take me with you, I am alone, they pulled 
my plank towards theirs where there was another woman holding on. 
The other woman became tired and sank under the water twice and died. 
[. . . ] We remained until the boats came and rescued us. (Rokaya)
About a hundred passengers managed to survive the initial sinking by holding 
on to the floating debris. When night came, many more died in the water of 
exhaustion, hunger, thirst and the consumption of fuel-polluted seawater. Some 
without life jackets died of the cold. The next morning, 45 survivors were rescued 
by an Indonesian boat.
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